This paper asserts there exists a dangerous GAP in US strategic intertheater transportation capabilities, propounds a model describing the GAP, and proposes a solution to the problem. Logistics requirements fall into three broad, overlapping categories: Immediate, Mid-Term, and Sustainment requirements. These categories commence and terminate at different times depending on the theater of operations, with Immediate being the most time sensitive and Sustainment the least. Using the Gulf War logistics flow as a model, the three phase points are shown and their airlift/sealift tradeoffs discussed. Other logistics support options, which figured in the war, such as prepositioning and host nation support, are discussed and the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations shown to be, in many ways, a fortuitous theater of operations. This serendipitous combination of circumstances contributed greatly to our successful logistics buildup and is unlikely to recur. The airship is recommended as a suitable solution to the Mid-Term strategic transportation di lemma (GAP). The fundamentals of airship operation. 11 are described, its history in both war and peace discussed, and some current private and military airship activities mentioned. Recent technological breakthroughs in materials technology are discussed and the potential for government-sponsored research and development yielding equally great propulsion and cargo capacity dividends explored. A discussion of the potential threat environment of the early twenty-first century shows the airship, properly constructed and used, would likely be no more vulnerable than jet air lifters while offering transportation capabilities currently unavailable. The airship's advantages as an inter/intratheater transporter are so great as to deserve further investigation for addition to the US strategic airlift fleet.

History and Evolution of Aircraft reviews the history of aviation from early history to the present day, including the evolution milestones of military aircraft, civil aircraft, helicopters, drones, balloons, airships, and their engines. It also provides the background and development of different types of aircraft, including manned and unmanned vehicles, aircraft carriers, fixed or rotary wings, air, sea, and amphibian flight vehicles. Covering current and developing applications of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the book highlights the prospects of future flying vehicles including automotives and jetpacks. It follows the transition from piston to jet engines that include shaft-based engines (turboprop, turboshaft, and propfan), turbine-based engines (turbojet and turbofan), and athodyd engines (ramjet, turbo-ramjet, and scramjet). The book explores flight vehicles’ technological advancements and evolution, including their geometrical features and performance parameters. It will also include nine appendices resembling databases for all types of aircraft. The book will be a useful reference for academic researchers and aviation, aerospace, and mechanical engineering students taking aerodynamics, aircraft structures, aircraft engines, and propulsion courses. Aviation history enthusiasts will be interested in the scope of the content as well. Instructors can utilize a Solutions Manual for their course.

"The purpose of this paper is to determine to what extent and how the Joint Force Commander (JFC) should control support from space forces. Current Air Force doctrine, as delineated in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, identifies the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) as being responsible for both air and space for the theater. This statement follows the Air Force notion that air and space are an indivisible medium of warfare. On the other hand, Joint Pub 3-14 states the Operations Directorate, J-3, on the supported commander's (the JFC's) staff functions in this role. To examine this issue of in-theater control of space forces more closely, this study is divided into five chapters. Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 looks into how space forces were planned for and employed during Desert Storm. This chapter discusses who was in-charge and what planning processes were used. In Chapter 3, lessons and initiatives to improve planning and employment of support from space forces are discussed. Chapter 4 explores the possible need to have one individual in-theater clearly identified as being responsible for directing space forces. Centralized control, similar to air, may have beneficial effects that allow joint commanders to take better advantage of space forces' full potential. The study concludes by offering recommendations."--Abstract.

This study examines the question: What strategic approach should the USAF take toward Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and Anti-Missile Offensive Actions in the near-term? The thesis begins with an introductory chapter asking the stated question in context, presenting the methodology used, and summarizing the proposals given at the end of the treatment. The methodological approach to this thesis involves historical and literature reviews, interviews, and a qualitative comparison of current and proposed weapons systems, capabilities, and doctrine. Broad strategic options, not specific tactical systems, are the focus of this study. The second chapter reviews milestones of missile and anti-missile, diplomatic, and political history to establish a basis for how we arrived at the present situation. Next, the third chapter reviews the current theater ballistic missile (TBM) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat situation. Also, an overview of contemporary political and military reasoning is presented to provide a baseline of support for the critical need of an integrated joint and multi-layered TMD. The fourth chapter compares current and near-term Anti-Missile systems and programs, identifies a near-term Anti-Missile Capabilities Gap, and distills the plethora of situational information to four succinct implications. Finally, the last chapter provides and analyzes four proposals for possible actions that the USAF can take to answer the thesis question while taking into account the implications of the current and near-term TBM situation. Overall, this thesis recommends a philosophical shift to one in which USAF near-term Attack Operations (AO) and BMC4I integration are considered as part of an air and space power Anti-Missile Offensive Counterair effort, not simply an adjunct to a ground-force driven TMD paradigm.