In this book historian R.J.Q. Adams examines the policy of appeasement as practiced by British Governments in the inter-war years - a programme widely praised in its day and frequently condemned as wrong-headed and even wicked ever since. In this thoroughly accessible work, he reveals the motivations and goals of the men who practiced appeasement as well as of those who opposed it, and makes clear the road to Munich - and to war.

"A new history of the British appeasement of the Third Reich on the eve of World War II"--

Drawing on a wide range of material, including primary sources, Frank McDonough re-examines the controversial policy of appeasement, and argues that appeasement was part of a broad consensus in British society at the time.

In this book historian R.J.Q. Adams examines the policy of appeasement--so frequently praised as realistic and statesman-like in its day and commonly condemned as wrong-headed and even wicked in ours. Exciting and thoroughly accessible, this work explains the motivations and goals of the principal policy-makers, including Chamberlain, Lord Hailfax, and Sir John Simon, as well as those of the chief critics: Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and others.

An engaging range of period texts and theme books for AS and A Level history. This book examines the key roles played by Adolf Hitler and Neville Chamberlain in the events that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. It looks at Hitler's foreign-policy aims, why appeasement became British foreign policy and, most extensively, the role of Chamberlain and appeasement in the unfolding international crisis of the late 1930s. Using a wide range of primary sources, Frank McDonough offers a generally critical interpretation of Chamberlain and appeasement, and suggests that standing up to Hitler earlier may have prevented war. The book also features a detailed analysis of the historical debates surrounding the issue of appeasement.

Since the 1930s, appeasement has been labeled as a futile and possibly dangerous policy. In this landmark study, Stephen Rock seeks to restore appeasement to its proper place as a legitimate—and potentially successful—diplomatic strategy. Appeasement was discredited by Neville Chamberlain's disastrous attempt to satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial ambitions and avoid war in 1938. Rock argues, however, that there is very little evidence to support the belief that dissatisfied states and their leaders cannot be appeased or that appeasement undermines a state's credibility in later attempts at deterrence. Rock looks at five case studies from the past 100 years, revealing under what conditions appeasement can achieve its goals. From British appeasement of the United States near the beginning of the twentieth century to American conciliation of North Korea in the early 1990s, Rock concludes that appeasement succeeds or fails depending on the nature of the adversary, the nature of the inducements used on the antagonist, and the existence of other incentives for the adversary to acquiesce. Appeasement in International Politics suggests the type of appeasement strategy most appropriate for various situations. The options range from pure inducements, reciprocity, to a mixture of inducements and threats. In addition to this theoretical framework, Rock's explicit comparison of appeasement and deterrence offers important guidelines for policymakers on when and how to implement a strategy of appeasement. At a time when the strategy of engagement plays an increasingly central—and controversial—role in U.S. foreign policy, Appeasement in International Politics reestablishes the long-discredited use of inducements as an effective means of preventing conflict.

Drawing on a wealth of previously unexamined material, this staggering account sheds new light on the Allies’ responsibility for a landmark agreement that had dire consequences. On returning from Germany on September 30, 1938, after signing an agreement with Hitler on the carve-up of Czechoslovakia, Neville Chamberlain addressed the British crowds: “My good friends…I believe it is peace for our time. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts. Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.” Winston Churchill rejoined: “You have chosen dishonor and you will have war.” P. E. Caquet’s history of the events leading to the Munich Agreement and its aftermath is told for the first time from the point of view of the peoples of Czechoslovakia. Basing his work on previously unexamined sources, including press, memoirs, private journals, army plans, cabinet records, and radio, Caquet presents one of the most shameful episodes in modern European history. Among his most explosive revelations is the strength of the French and Czechoslovak forces before Munich; Germany’s dominance turns out to have been an illusion. The case for appeasement never existed. The result is a nail-biting story of diplomatic intrigue, perhaps the nearest thing to a morality play that history ever furnishes. The Czechoslovak authorities were Cassandras in their own country, the only ones who could see Hitler’s threat for what it was, and appeasement as the disaster it proved to be. In Caquet’s devastating account, their doomed struggle against extinction and the complacency of their notional allies finally gets the memorial it deserves.