Mumbai 26/11 saw a mix of commando-style attacks typical of the special forces of an army and indiscriminate killing of civilians typical of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Pakistani jihadi organization. The meticulous planning, the thorough training of the 10 LeT terrorists, who carried it out, and the close co-ordination of the attacks from the command and control of the LeT had the stamp of Al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, both of which the LeT has a close relationship with. The LeT terrorists attacked a mix of targets—innocent Indian civilians in public places, Jewish people in a religious-cum-cultural centre and members of the Indian and foreign social and business elite in two five-star hotels. The attacks on the Jewish centre and the hotels lasted over 60 hours and were continuously telecast live by the TV channels. The success of the terrorist attacks, mounted from the sea, highlighted once again the serious deficiencies in India’s national security apparatus and the role of Pakistan in the spread of terrorism across the world. Have we drawn the right lessons in respect of both? Can the Indian people now expect at least a more robust counter-terrorism policy to prevent another 26/11?

In 1985, President Ronald Reagan received a group of bearded turban-wearing men who looked like they came from another century. After receiving them in the White House, Reagan spoke to the press, referring to his foreign guests as "freedom fighters." These were the Afghan mujahideen. In August 1998, another American president ordered missile strikes from the American navy based in the Indian Ocean to kill Osama bin Laden and his men in the camps in Afghanistan. The terrorist of yesterday is the hero of today, and the hero of yesterday becomes the terrorist of today. In Terrorism: Theirs and Ours, Eqbal Ahmad holds up the concepts of "terrorist" and "freedom fighter" to U.S. foreign policy. What do these terms mean? Where do they apply? How can the roots of political violence be stemmed? An invaluable primer.

Terrorism is a threat, a modus operandi and a phenomenon. A resolution of the UN General Assembly after 9/11 designated it as a threat to international peace and security. As an MO, from a largely uni-dimensional threat of the years before the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, it has evolved into a multi-dimensional threat. As a phenomenon, it has many dimensions-political, economic, ideological and operational. Even the profile of a terrorist keeps changing. The terrorists of yesterday were seen as \"misled youth\" from the exploited or wronged sections of society. An increasing number of the terrorists of today are educated and come from well-to-do families. They are self-motivated and technology savvy. Their ability to add sophistication to their methods of operation surpasses the skill of the security agencies. This book seeks to contribute to the task of understanding terrorism as it is evolving. Its author, B.Raman, headed the counter-terrorism division of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), India's external intelligence agency, for six years and has continued studying the subject even after his retirement in 1994. He is well known as an analyst of terrorism in India and abroad. He is much in demand in international conferences on terrorism. His prolific writings on this subject are widely read and his views are heard with attention and respect.

The first introductory book to focus on terrorists themselves, looking at the mindset, motivation and tactics of a variety of terrorist groupd.

The wars against terror have begun, but it will take some time before the nature and composition of these wars is widely understood. The objective of these wars is not the conquest of territory, or the silencing of any particular ideology, but rather to secure the necessary environment for states to operate according to principles of consent and make it impossible for our enemies to impose or induce states of terror. Terror and Consent argues that, like so many states and civilizations in the past that suffered defeat, we are fighting the last war, with weapons and concepts that were useful to us then but have now been superseded. Philip Bobbitt argues that we need to reforge links that previous societies have made between law and strategy; to realize how the evolution of modern states has now produced a globally networked terrorism that will change as fast as we can identify it; to combine humanitarian interests with strategies of intervention; and, above all, to rethink what 'victory' in such a war, if it is a war, might look like - no occupied capitals, no treaties, no victory parades, but the preservation, protection and defence of states of consent. This is one of the most challenging and wide-ranging books of any kind about our modern world.