In seeking to evaluate the efficacy of post-9/11 homeland security expenses--which have risen by more than a trillion dollars, not including war costs--the common query has been, "Are we safer?" This, however, is the wrong question. Of course we are "safer"--the posting of a single security guard at one building's entrance enhances safety. The correct question is, "Are any gains in security worth the funds expended?"In this engaging, readable book, John Mueller and Mark Stewart apply risk and cost-benefit evaluation techniques to answer this very question. This analytical approach has been used throughout the world for decades by regulators, academics, and businesses--but, as a recent National Academy of Science study suggests, it has never been capably applied by the people administering homeland security funds. Given the limited risk terrorism presents, expenses meant to lower it have for the most part simply not been worth it. For example, to be considered cost-effective, increased American homeland security expenditures would have had each year to have foiled up to 1,667 attacks roughly like the one intended on Times Square in 2010--more than four a day. Cataloging the mistakes that the US has made--and continues to make--in managing homeland security programs, Terror, Security, and Money has the potential to redirect our efforts toward a more productive and far more cost-effective course.

In seeking to evaluate the efficacy of post-9/11 homeland security expenses--which have risen by more than a trillion dollars, not including war costs--the common query has been, "Are we safer?" This, however, is the wrong question. Of course we are "safer"--the posting of a single security guard at one building's entrance enhances safety. The correct question is, "Are any gains in security worth the funds expended?" In this engaging, readable book, John Mueller and Mark Stewart apply risk and cost-benefit evaluation techniques to answer this very question. This analytical approach has been used throughout the world for decades by regulators, academics, and businesses--but, as a recent National Academy of Science study suggests, it has never been capably applied by the people administering homeland security funds. Given the limited risk terrorism presents, expenses meant to lower it have for the most part simply not been worth it. For example, to be considered cost-effective, increased American homeland security expenditures would have had each year to have foiled up to 1,667 attacks roughly like the one intended on Times Square in 2010--more than four a day. Cataloging the mistakes that the US has made--and continues to make--in managing homeland security programs, Terror, Security, and Money has the potential to redirect our efforts toward a more productive and far more cost-effective course.

The global financial sector is increasingly vulnerable to penetration by criminal money-launderers, financiers of terrorism, and proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, it offers instruments that can be usefully employed to pursue foreign and security policy objectives. It is thus hardly surprising that finance has emerged as an arena of intense competition, if not conflict, between those seeking to exploit or attack this vital element of state power and those tasked with defending its integrity or harnessing it for legal purposes. Navias assesses the key threats to financial systems and shows how the public and private sectors are co-operating to contain them. He analyses the main characteristics of criminal money-laundering and terrorist financing, and reviews major multilateral and national regimes locked in the perpetual battle to shore up the financial sector against these constantly evolving security challenges. He also considers the uses of finance in support of key sanctions, counter-proliferation, and arms embargo policies. Uniquely, Finance and Security views these financial threats and weapons through a security and war studies prism. It will be equally invaluable to scholars of security and international relations and to professionals working in the legal, banking and compliance professions.

It is an axiom within the U.S. law enforcement and intelligence communities that "following the money" is the key to disrupting and dismantling criminal organizations. The same is true when it comes to terrorist networks. Officials in the United States and abroad now realize that fighting terrorism financing (and its corollary, money laundering) is one of the best ways to prevent future catastrophic attacks. As a new generation of public servants learns the ropes and begins to contribute to the war on terror, the proven tactic of following money trails will become more central than ever. At the same time, this task is becoming increasingly complex due to our adversaries' skill in avoiding traditional financial countermeasures. Law enforcement and intelligence officials must learn to understand the sometimes obscure methodologies that terrorist organizations use to raise, move, and store money-whether these activities stem from the Usama bin Ladens of the world, rogue regimes like Iran and North Korea, or members of Hizbollah, Hamas, or a host of other like-minded organizations.

Why have there been no terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11? It is ridiculously easy for a single person with a bomb-filled backpack, or a single explosives-laden automobile, to launch an attack. So why hasn't it happened? The answer is surely not the Department of Homeland Security, which cannot stop terrorists from entering the country, legally or otherwise. It is surely not the Iraq war, which has stoked the hatred of Muslim extremists around the world and wasted many thousands of lives. Terrorist attacks have been regular events for many years -- usually killing handfuls of people, occasionally more than that. Is it possible that there is a simple explanation for the peaceful American homefront? Is it possible that there are no al-Qaeda terrorists here? Is it possible that the war on terror has been a radical overreaction to a rare event? Consider: 80,000 Arab and Muslim immigrants have been subjected to fingerprinting and registration, and more than 5,000 foreign nationals have been imprisoned -- yet there has not been a single conviction for a terrorist crime in America. A handful of plots -- some deadly, some intercepted -- have plagued Europe and elsewhere, and even so, the death toll has been modest. We have gone to war in two countries and killed tens of thousands of people. We have launched a massive domestic wiretapping program and created vast databases of information once considered private. Politicians and pundits have berated us about national security and patriotic duty, while encroaching our freedoms and sending thousands of young men off to die. It is time to consider the hypothesis that dare not speak its name: we have wildly overreacted. Terrorism has been used by murderous groups for many decades, yet even including 9/11, the odds of an American being killed by international terrorism are microscopic. In general, international terrorism doesn't do much damage when considered in almost any reasonable context. The capacity of al-Qaeda or of any similar group to do damage in the United States pales in comparison to the capacity other dedicated enemies, particularly international Communism, have possessed in the past. Lashing out at the terrorist threat is frequently an exercise in self-flagellation because it is usually more expensive than the terrorist attack itself and because it gives the terrorists exactly what they are looking for. Much, probably most, of the money and effort expended on counterterrorism since 2001 (and before, for that matter) has been wasted. The terrorism industry and its allies in the White House and Congress have preyed on our fears and caused enormous damage. It is time to rethink the entire enterprise and spend much smaller amounts on only those things that do matter: intelligence, law enforcement, and disruption of radical groups overseas. Above all, it is time to stop playing into the terrorists' hands, by fear-mongering and helping spread terror itself.

Jimmy Gurulé knows how to bankrupt terrorists like few others do. As Undersecretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, he spearheaded the fight against al-Qaeda s global bank accounts, helping to earn the highest grade awarded on the 9/11 Commissioners report card. As an author, he performs once again. Unfunding Terror provides policymakers and laymen alike a clear roadmap on how to keep terrorists out of the global financial system. Timothy J. Roemer, Center for National Policy, former US Congressman and member of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) Jimmy Gurulé has given us a superbly comprehensive and well-written assessment of why, regarding terrorism, Deep Throat s principle is bang on: follow the money. R. James Woolsey, venture partner, VantagePoint, and former Director of Central Intelligence, US A detailed study by a true scholar-practitioner, Unfunding Terror explains the legal response to terror finance in language accessible to both the expert and layman. Required reading. Matthew Levitt, Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, US Professor Gurulé is comprehensive: he describes the problem (terrorist funding by those in the free world), analyzes the legal responses (make it a crime, freeze terrorist assets, impose regulations on financial institutions), critiques the administration s and international community s efforts to unfund terrorists (political rhetoric, not in fact backed up with effective strategies or implementation), and outlines concrete legal and administrative remedies. Would that they to whom the recommendations are addressed act on them quickly. Too much is at stake to let terrorists, who condemn the West as corrupt, get their funding to attack the US and its allies from the West itself. That would be a form of social suicide. G. Robert Blakey, Notre Dame Law School, US The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of 2,973 innocent civilians required as much as $500,000 to stage. At the time, al Qaeda was operating on an annual budget of between $30 and $50 million. However, despite the obvious fact that terrorists need money to terrorize, preventing the financing of terrorism was not a priority for the United States or the international community prior to 9/11. Jimmy Gurulé, former Under Secretary for Enforcement in the US Department of the Treasury, provides the first book-length, comprehensive analysis of the legal regime that evolved following the terrorist attacks. The book begins with a discussion of how shutting down the pipelines of funding is as important as dismantling the terrorist cells themselves. Next, the book covers the various means and methods used by terrorist groups to raise money, and examines how money is transferred globally to finance their lethal activities. The principal components of the legal strategy to disrupt the financing of terrorism are then discussed and evaluated. Unfortunately, the author concludes that the legal regime has met with mixed results, and finds that the sense of urgency to deprive terrorists of funding that existed following 9/11 has since dissipated. As a result, international efforts to freeze terrorist assets have dramatically declined. Moreover, the US Department of Justice has suffered several embarrassing and disappointing legal defeats in prosecuting major terrorist financiers. The author provides numerous recommendations to Congress, the Executive Branch, and the UN Security Council for strengthening the legal regime to deny terrorists the money needed to wage global jihad, acquire weapons of mass destruction, and launch another terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11. Unfunding Terror fills an important gap in the literature and will be essential reading for counter-terrorism experts, law enforcement and national se

The product of painstaking research and countless interviews, A High Price offers a nuanced, definitive historical account of Israel's bold but often failed efforts to fight terrorist groups. Beginning with the violent border disputes that emerged after Israel's founding in 1948, Daniel Byman charts the rise of Yasir Arafat's Fatah and leftist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--organizations that ushered in the era of international terrorism epitomized by the 1972 hostage-taking at the Munich Olympics. Byman reveals how Israel fought these groups and others, such as Hamas, in the decades that follow, with particular attention to the grinding and painful struggle during the second intifada. Israel's debacles in Lebanon against groups like the Lebanese Hizballah are examined in-depth, as is the country's problematic response to Jewish terrorist groups that have struck at Arabs and Israelis seeking peace. In surveying Israel's response to terror, the author points to the coups of shadowy Israeli intelligence services, the much-emulated use of defensive measures such as sky marshals on airplanes, and the role of controversial techniques such as targeted killings and the security barrier that separates Israel from Palestinian areas. Equally instructive are the shortcomings that have undermined Israel's counterterrorism goals, including a disregard for long-term planning and a failure to recognize the long-term political repercussions of counterterrorism tactics.