The national security issues surrounding U.S. arms sales policies and practices have been the subjects or our research tor the past ten years. In this study the authors’ were determined to conduct a more focussed analysis of emerging policy issues tor security assistance; namely, the relationship between technology transfer and security assistance policies of the U.S. Government. This book assesses the development or indigenous arms production capabilities or recipients or U.S. security assistance. In particular we examine a seldom analyzed level of technology transfer: the transfer or less than state-of-the-art technologies and production capabilities to allies through routine security assistance decisions.

Contents: (1) U.S.-Israeli Relations and the Role of Foreign Aid; (2) U.S. Bilateral Military Aid to Israel: A 10-Year Military Aid Agreement; Foreign Military Financing; Ongoing U.S.-Israeli Defense Procurement Negotiations; (3) Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Programs: Multi-Layered Missile Defense; High Altitude Missile Defense System; (4) Aid Restrictions and Possible Violations: Israeli Arms Sales to China; Israeli Settlements; (5) Other Ongoing Assistance and Cooperative Programs: Migration and Refugee Assistance; Loan Guarantees for Economic Recovery; American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program; U.S.-Israeli Scientific and Business Cooperation; (6) Historical Background. Illustrations.

The national security issues surrounding U.S. arms sales policies and practices have been the subjects or our research tor the past ten years. In this study the authors’ were determined to conduct a more focussed analysis of emerging policy issues tor security assistance; namely, the relationship between technology transfer and security assistance policies of the U.S. Government. This book assesses the development or indigenous arms production capabilities or recipients or U.S. security assistance. In particular we examine a seldom analyzed level of technology transfer: the transfer or less than state-of-the-art technologies and production capabilities to allies through routine security assistance decisions.

In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology—and ignore the security risk—in a desperate search for hard currency. Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves. In Exporting the Bomb, Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980s; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of "rogue" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

The global implications of China's rise as a global actor In 2005, a senior official in the George W. Bush administration expressed the hope that China would emerge as a “responsible stakeholder” on the world stage. A dozen years later, the Trump administration dramatically shifted course, instead calling China a “strategic competitor” whose actions routinely threaten U.S. interests. Both assessments reflected an underlying truth: China is no longer just a “rising” power. It has emerged as a truly global actor, both economically and militarily. Every day its actions affect nearly every region and every major issue, from climate change to trade, from conflict in troubled lands to competition over rules that will govern the uses of emerging technologies. To better address the implications of China's new status, both for American policy and for the broader international order, Brookings scholars conducted research over the past two years, culminating in a project: Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World. The project is intended to furnish policy makers and the public with hard facts and deep insights for understanding China's regional and global ambitions. The initiative draws not only on Brookings's deep bench of China and East Asia experts, but also on the tremendous breadth of the institution's security, strategy, regional studies, technological, and economic development experts. Areas of focus include the evolution of China's domestic institutions; great power relations; the emergence of critical technologies; Asian security; China's influence in key regions beyond Asia; and China's impact on global governance and norms. Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World provides the most current, broad-scope, and fact-based assessment of the implications of China's rise for the United States and the rest of the world.

The activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) and its contractors in manufacturing, testing, maintaining, and disposing of military equipment make up a significant portion of the industrial processes conducted in the United States. As is the case with the commercial industries, some of these activities, such as metal plating, have resulted in industrial pollution and environmental contamination. With increasing environmental regulation of such processes in recent decades, defense facilities have been faced with growing compliance issues. Department of Defense efforts to manage, correct, and prevent these problems have included the establishment of the National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence (NDCEE) under the management of the U.S. Army Industrial Ecology Center (IEC). The National Research Council's Committee to Evaluate Transfer of Pollution Prevention Technology for the U.S. Army was formed to identify major barriers to the transfer of pollution prevention technologies and to recommend pathways to success. To address the study objectives, the committee (1) reviewed the NDCEE's technology transfer activities, (2) examined efforts to transfer technology in four areas, two of which were identified at the outset by the NDCEE as successful and two of which were identified as unsuccessful, and (3) identified opportunities for improving the transfer of pollution prevention technologies to maintenance and rework facilities in the Department of Defense and to industrial manufacturing facilities performing defense-related operations.