This paper provides direct empirical evidence on the relationship between technology and firms' global sourcing strategies. Using new data on U.S. firms' decisions to contract for manufacturing services from domestic or foreign suppliers, I show that changes in firm use of communication technology between 2002 to 2007 can explain almost one quarter of the increase in fragmentation over the period. The effect of firm technology also differs significantly across industries; in 2007, it is 20 percent higher, relative to the mean, in industries with production specifications that are easier to codify in an electronic format. These patterns suggest that technology lowers coordination costs, though its effect is disproportionately higher for domestic rather than foreign sourcing. The larger impact on domestic fragmentation highlights its importance as an alternative to offshoring, and can be explained by complementarities between technology and worker skill. High technology firms and industries are more likely to source from high human capital countries, and the differential impact of technology across industries is strongly increasing in country human capital.

"Fragmentation" is a term used in this volume to describe cross-border component specialization and production-sharing. Examination of recent trade data suggests that offshore sourcing of parts and components, as well as offshore assembly, are assuming an increasing role in the world economy. The theoretical implications of this type of specialization are examined in several chapters with the aid of both Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin trade models. Production is first decomposed ("fragmented") into its constituent parts and activities, and then it is at this level that factor-intensities and technologies are calibrated. The implications of intra-product specialization and component trade are investigated under conditions of free, restricted, and preferential trade. The role of multinationals is explored and the importance of cross-border service-links among component activities is examined. Overall, extension of the principle of comparative advantage beyond products to the realm of parts and components is welfare-enhancing. Industries take advantage of offshore sourcing in order to reduce costs and increase competitiveness. Component specialization offers new and additional opportunities for the exploitation of scale economies. Across a broad range of conditions, it raises output and employment. Its effects on wages are spelled out. Trade between advanced, high-wage and developing low-wage countries is an obvious candidate for the two-way application of component specialization. The empirical part of the volume presents an evaluation of new data which allow the separation of trade in components and in final products. It also provides assessments of the role of component specialization in the trade of several countries and regions. In addition to their relevance for trade theorists and country specialists, the studies collected in this volume have interesting implications for the conduct of trade policy. They contradict claims that trade with low-wage countries must be welfare-reducing and they suggest new approaches to industrialization and economic development.

This paper focuses on the sluggish growth of world trade relative to income growth in recent years. The analysis uses an empirical strategy based on an error correction model to assess whether the global trade slowdown is structural or cyclical. An estimate of the relationship between trade and income in the past four decades reveals that the long-term trade elasticity rose sharply in the 1990s, but declined significantly in the 2000s even before the global financial crisis. These results suggest that trade is growing slowly not only because of slow growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but also because of a structural change in the trade-GDP relationship in recent years. The available evidence suggests that the explanation may lie in the slowing pace of international vertical specialization rather than increasing protection or the changing composition of trade and GDP.

Doing business in the digital age The Great Fragmentation: And Why the Future of All Business is Small is a business survival manifesto for the technology revolution. As the world moves from the industrial era to the digital age, power is shifting and fragmenting. Power is no longer about might and ownership; power in a digital world is about access. Existing businesses need to understand this shift and position themselves to survive and thrive in an environment where entrepreneurs and start-ups enabled by access to technology are genuine threats. Author Steve Sammartino is widely regarded as a thought leader on the subject of technology and business, and helps companies transition from industrial-era thinking to the mindset and processes required to compete in today's digital marketplace. The Great Fragmentation shows how technological changes such as Big Data, gamification, crowdfunding, Bitcoin, 3D printing, social media, mashup culture and artisanal production will forever change business and the way we live our lives. Examine how the digital era has altered where we work, how we work, where we live and what we do Discover how the digital era has impacted social and economic structures, including educational systems, financial systems and government policy Understand that the social media and collecting 'friends' is just the tip of the iceberg in a digital business environment Weaving together insights from business, technology and anthropology, The Great Fragmentation provides both corporations and entrepreneurs with a playbook for the future of work, life and business in the digital era.

An Economist Best Book of the Year A Financial Times Best Economics Book of the Year A Fast Company “7 Books Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella Says You Need to Lead Smarter” Between 1820 and 1990, the share of world income going to today’s wealthy nations soared from twenty percent to almost seventy. Since then, that share has plummeted to where it was in 1900. As the renowned economist Richard Baldwin reveals, this reversal of fortune reflects a new age of globalization that is drastically different from the old. The nature of globalization has changed, but our thinking about it has not. Baldwin argues that the New Globalization is driven by knowledge crossing borders, not just goods. That is why its impact is more sudden, more individual, more unpredictable, and more uncontrollable than before—which presents developed nations with unprecedented challenges as they struggle to maintain reliable growth and social cohesion. It is the driving force behind what Baldwin calls “The Great Convergence,” as Asian economies catch up with the West. “In this brilliant book, Baldwin has succeeded in saying something both new and true about globalization.” —Martin Wolf, Financial Times “A very powerful description of the newest phase of globalization.” —Larry Summers, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury “An essential book for understanding how modern trade works via global supply chains. An antidote to the protectionist nonsense being peddled by some politicians today.” —The Economist “[An] indispensable guide to understanding how globalization has got us here and where it is likely to take us next.” —Alan Beattie, Financial Times

This paper studies the growth and determinants of information technology (IT) trade in the Asia-Pacific region. We argue that the rise of IT trade must be understood within the context of increasing vertical fragmentation of production processes that has occurred over the past two decades. To evaluate this empirically, we estimate a set of pooled bilateral IT export equations for eight Asian countries, the U.S. and the E.U., where FDI inflows are introduced as a proxy for fragmentation. We apply a panel cointegration approach that allows for heterogeneity in short-run dynamics and in fixed effects. Consistent with production fragmentation, we find that the evolution of IT trade can be explained in part by traditional income and relative price effects but also by FDI inflow.

The unprecedented globalization of the production process, dividing up the value chain, has brought the integration of trade and the disintegration of production, with deep implications for the international division of labor. Have Central European economies been able to readjust their production structures to international markets? Three of them: Estonia, Hungary, and Slovakia have done especially well.