In War, Wine, and Taxes, John Nye debunks the myth that Britain was a free-trade nation during and after the industrial revolution, by revealing how the British used tariffs—notably on French wine—as a mercantilist tool to politically weaken France and to respond to pressure from local brewers and others. The book reveals that Britain did not transform smoothly from a mercantilist state in the eighteenth century to a bastion of free trade in the late nineteenth. This boldly revisionist account gives the first satisfactory explanation of Britain's transformation from a minor power to the dominant nation in Europe. It also shows how Britain and France negotiated the critical trade treaty of 1860 that opened wide the European markets in the decades before World War I. Going back to the seventeenth century and examining the peculiar history of Anglo-French military and commercial rivalry, Nye helps us understand why the British drink beer not wine, why the Portuguese sold liquor almost exclusively to Britain, and how liberal, eighteenth-century Britain managed to raise taxes at an unprecedented rate—with government revenues growing five times faster than the gross national product. War, Wine, and Taxes stands in stark contrast to standard interpretations of the role tariffs played in the economic development of Britain and France, and sheds valuable new light on the joint role of commercial and fiscal policy in the rise of the modern state.

How did the rich countries really become rich? In this provocative study, Ha-Joon Chang examines the great pressure on developing countries from the developed world to adopt certain 'good policies' and 'good institutions', seen today as necessary for economic development. His conclusions are compelling and disturbing: that developed countries are attempting to 'kick away the ladder' with which they have climbed to the top, thereby preventing developing countries from adopting policies and institutions that they themselves have used.

In this ambitious exploration of how foreign trade policy is made in democratic regimes, Daniel Verdier casts doubt on theories that neglect voters. Bringing the voters back in, Verdier shows that special interests, party ideologues, and state officials and diplomats act as agents of the voters. Constructing a general theory in which existing theories (rent seeking, median voting, state autonomy) function as partial explanations, he shows that trade institutions are not fixed entities but products of political competition. Verdier then offers a thorough analysis of how foreign trade policy was made in France, Britain, and the United States during the period from 1860 through 1990. He discloses a reality startlingly different from previous understandings of American and French trade policies. Challenging the conventional view that special interests have dominated American trade policy, he argues that sectoral economic weight has not been a good predictor of political power in the United States since 1888. Conversely, against the prevailing belief that French industry is controlled by an autonomous state, he reveals the existence of a privileged, collusive relationship between French industry and state officials from the 1892 Meline Tariff through the Socialist victory of 1981. The standard opinion is confirmed only in the case of Britain, where an arm's-length relationship has historically been maintained between industry and government. The book's findings make it essential reading for political scientists, political economists, and historians alike.

Studies In History, Economics And Public Law, No. 506.

The first full examination of the 'protectionist turn' of French liberalism in the early stages of nineteenth-century globalisation.

A transnational survey of the economic development of Europe, exploring why some regions advanced and some stayed behind.

Covers British trade with the republics of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.