The recent global financial crisis has forced a re-examination of risk transmission in the financial sector and how it affects financial stability. Current macroprudential policy and surveillance (MPS) efforts are aimed establishing a regulatory framework that helps mitigate the risk from systemic linkages with a view towards enhancing the resilience of the financial sector. This paper presents a forward-looking framework ("Systemic CCA") to measure systemic solvency risk based on market-implied expected losses of financial institutions with practical applications for the financial sector risk management and the system-wide capital assessment in top-down stress testing. The suggested approach uses advanced contingent claims analysis (CCA) to generate aggregate estimates of the joint default risk of multiple institutions as a conditional tail expectation using multivariate extreme value theory (EVT). In addition, the framework also helps quantify the individual contributions to systemic risk and contingent liabilities of the financial sector during times of stress.

The recent global financial crisis has forced a re-examination of risk transmission in the financial sector and how it affects financial stability. Current macroprudential policy and surveillance (MPS) efforts are aimed establishing a regulatory framework that helps mitigate the risk from systemic linkages with a view towards enhancing the resilience of the financial sector. This paper presents a forward-looking framework ("Systemic CCA") to measure systemic solvency risk based on market-implied expected losses of financial institutions with practical applications for the financial sector risk management and the system-wide capital assessment in top-down stress testing. The suggested approach uses advanced contingent claims analysis (CCA) to generate aggregate estimates of the joint default risk of multiple institutions as a conditional tail expectation using multivariate extreme value theory (EVT). In addition, the framework also helps quantify the individual contributions to systemic risk and contingent liabilities of the financial sector during times of stress.

Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) (hereafter referred to as BSM) introduced the contingent claim approach (CCA) to the valuation of corporate debt and equity. The BSM modeling framework is also named the 'structural' approach to risky debt valuation. The CCA approach considers all stakeholders of the corporation as holding contingent claims on the assets of the corporation. Each claim holder has different priorities, maturities and conditions for payouts. It is based on the principle that all the assets belong to all the liability holders.In the structural approach the arrival of the default event relies on economic arguments for why firms default as it is explicitly related to the dynamics of the economic value of the firm. A standard structural model of default timing assumes that a corporation defaults when its assets drop to a sufficiently low level relative to its liabilities.The BSM modeling framework gives the basic fundamental version of the structural model where default is assumed to occur when the net asset value of the firm at the maturity of the pure-discount debt becomes negative, i.e., market value of the assets of the firm falls below the market value of the firm's liabilities. In a regime of limited liability, the shareholders of the firm have the option to default on the firm's debt. Equity can be viewed as a European call option on the firm's assets with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm's debt. Actually, CCA can be used to value all the components of the firm's liabilities. Option pricing models are used to value stocks, bonds, and many other types of corporate claims.Different versions of the model correspond to different assumptions about the conditions when a firm defaults. Merton (1974) assumes that the firm only defaults at the maturity date of the firm's outstanding debt when the net asset value of the firm, in market value terms, is negative. Others introduce other conditions for default. Also, different authors introduce more complicated capital structure with different kinds of bonds (e.g. senior and junior), warrants, corporate taxes, ESOP, and more. Volume 1: Foundations of CCA and Equity ValuationVolume 1 presents the seminal papers of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973, 1974). This volume also includes papers that specifically price equity as a call option on the corporation. It introduces warrants, convertible bonds and taxation as contingent claims on the corporation. It highlights the strong relationship between the CCA and the Modigliani-Miller (M&M) Theorems, and the relation to the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM). Volume 2: CCA Approach to Corporate Debt ValuationVolume 2 concentrates on corporate bond valuation by introducing various types of bonds with different covenants as well as introducing various conditions that trigger default. While empirical evidence indicates that the simple Merton's model underestimates the credit spreads, additional risk factors like jumps can be used to resolve it. Volume 3: Issues in Corporate Finance with CCA ApproachVolume 3 includes papers that look at issues in corporate finance that can be explained with the CCA approach. These issues include the effect of dividend policy on the valuation of debt and equity, the pricing of employee stock options and many other issues of corporate governance. Volume 4: CCA Approach to Banking and Financial IntermediationVolume 4 focuses on the application of the contingent claim approach to banks and other financial intermediaries. Regulation of the banking industry led to the creation of new financial securities (e.g., CoCos) and new types of stakeholders (e.g., deposit insurers).

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the federal government has pursued significant regulatory reforms, including proposals to measure and monitor systemic risk. However, there is much debate about how this might be accomplished quantitatively and objectively—or whether this is even possible. A key issue is determining the appropriate trade-offs between risk and reward from a policy and social welfare perspective given the potential negative impact of crises. One of the first books to address the challenges of measuring statistical risk from a system-wide persepective, Quantifying Systemic Risk looks at the means of measuring systemic risk and explores alternative approaches. Among the topics discussed are the challenges of tying regulations to specific quantitative measures, the effects of learning and adaptation on the evolution of the market, and the distinction between the shocks that start a crisis and the mechanisms that enable it to grow.

The analysis of interconnectedness and contagion is an important part of the financial stability and risk assessment of a country’s financial system. This paper offers detailed and practical guidance on how to conduct a comprehensive analysis of interconnectedness and contagion for a country’s financial system under various circumstances. We survey current approaches at the IMF for analyzing interconnectedness within the interbank, cross-sector and cross-border dimensions through an overview and examples of the data and methodologies used in the Financial Sector Assessment Program. Finally, this paper offers practical advice on how to interpret results and discusses potential financial stability policy recommendations that can be drawn from this type of in-depth analysis.

Giving stress tests a macroprudential perspective requires (i) incorporating general equilibrium dimensions, so that the outcome of the test depends not only on the size of the shock and the buffers of individual institutions but also on their behavioral responses and their interactions with each other and with other economic agents; and (ii) focusing on the resilience of the system as a whole. Progress has been made toward the first goal: several models are now available that attempt to integrate solvency, liquidity, and other sources of risk and to capture some behavioral responses and feedback effects. But building models that measure correctly systemic risk and the contribution of individual institutions to it while, at the same time, relating the results to the established regulatory framework has proved more difficult. Looking forward, making macroprudential stress tests more effective would entail using a variety of analytical approaches and scenarios, integrating non-bank financial entities, and exploring the use of agent-based models. As well, macroprudential stress tests should not be used in isolation but be treated as complements to other tools and—crucially—be combined with microprudential perspectives.

The recent financial crisis and the difficulty of using mainstream macroeconomic models to accurately monitor and assess systemic risk have stimulated new analyses of how we measure economic activity and the development of more sophisticated models in which the financial sector plays a greater role. Markus Brunnermeier and Arvind Krishnamurthy have assembled contributions from leading academic researchers, central bankers, and other financial-market experts to explore the possibilities for advancing macroeconomic modeling in order to achieve more accurate economic measurement. Essays in this volume focus on the development of models capable of highlighting the vulnerabilities that leave the economy susceptible to adverse feedback loops and liquidity spirals. While these types of vulnerabilities have often been identified, they have not been consistently measured. In a financial world of increasing complexity and uncertainty, this volume is an invaluable resource for policymakers working to improve current measurement systems and for academics concerned with conceptualizing effective measurement.