This paper presents findings from independent research conducted by Dr. Josef Berger, who mapped the flight routes of the Syrian aircraft and helicopters that penetrated the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War. His research revealed that on the morning of October 9, 1973, the fourth day of the war, Syrian commando forces conducted three separate landings behind the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) that fought in the Golan Heights. This casts the Syrian landings in a new light, as the IDF had, until now, been aware of only one such landing, which took place near Nafakh Junction. In that landing, the nearby IDF forces quickly engaged and eliminated the Syrian forces. The research also correlated the newly discovered Syrian landing sites with nearby sites, where Syrian forces ambushed the reconnaissance company of the 7th armored brigade (Palsar7) and the tanks of the 679th armored brigade. IDF forces across the battlefield saw the Syrian helicopters flying overhead, unaware that the helicopters were carrying commando forces to the Golan Heights landing sites. Nevertheless, the various echelons of the IDF, including the 7th and 679th brigades, the 36th division, the Northern Command, the Israel Air Force (IAF), and the IDF General Staff, did not understand this Syrian activity or misinterpreted it. Various publications surveying the Golan Heights battles during the Yom Kippur War, whether official IDF reports or other books about this specific front, make no mention of Syrian commando forces landing near Wasit or A-Dalawe. IDF Colonel (Ret.) Pesach Malovany, who has conducted extensive research into Arab military history and Soviet involvement in the Middle East during the USSR era, obtained Syrian materials that confirmed one of the newly discovered commando landings: the October 9 landing near Wasit. This landing occurred at the same time as the well-known landing of the commando force near Nafakh village. Given the dearth of information about the forces that landed and their fighting techniques, Malovany located additional Syrian sources, including Syrian newspapers, going back to 1974. These featured interviews and memoirs by Syrian soldiers and commanders, along with helicopter pilots and Syrian commando fighters who participated in those landings. This article weaves together Dr. Berger’s research findings and the information gleaned and translated from Arabic sources by Malovany. Combined, these findings shed light on one incident of the Yom Kippur War that had remained unknown for more than 40 years, both to the IDF and to researchers of the Syrian front. Perhaps this publication, and the new information it reveals, might help glean lessons from the past.

Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.

This is a story of the discovery of unknown Syrian commando landings behind the lines of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the Golan Heights, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. On the fourth day of the war, as part of the last Syrian attempt to conquer the Golan, Syrian helicopter groups were seen passing over IDF soldiers on their way in and out of the Golan. Around ten helicopters participated in the operation: two were downed on their exit route, one helicopter was downed by a tank gun shell, and one by a Mirage aircraft. For four decades, the IDF was aware of only one landing site. The author interviewed many IDF veterans who were stationed all over the Golan. He mapped the many Syrian airplane routes observed and discovered that those helicopters also flew to three previously unknown landing sites. Using photos and tracing the routes on maps, the research links the landing sites of the Syrian forces and the ambushes that the Syrians executed behind the IDF lines. To confirm the research findings, a search of Arabic open sources was done. The search results were added as updates to this article. The article demonstrates how military systems tend to confuse themselves when reports flow from many units in the battle field describing enemy operations happening simultaneously. The article suggests ways to overcome this confusion.

On October 6, 1973, Israel's Northern Command was surprised by the thunder of cannon fire and the sight of dense, black smoke. A Syrian force of 1,400 tanks supported by artillery and air power had attacked from the north while the Egyptian military invaded the Sinai Peninsula in the south. Syria sought to avenge its devastating loss of the Golan Heights in the 1967 Six-Day War -- a conflict that not only resulted in territorial gain for Israel but also cemented the nation's reputation as the region's preeminent military power. Although Israel ultimately prevailed, the Yom Kippur War (or Ramadan War, as it is known in Arab countries) shattered the illusion of Israel's invincibility. In Syrians at the Border , Israel's foremost scholar of the war, Dani Asher, and an eminent group of experts provide the definitive history of this key conflict. The contributors -- Major General Yitzhak Hofi, the Northern commander in chief; Major General Uri Simchoni, head of Command Operations; Brigadier General Avraham Bar David, head of Artillery; and Colonel Hagai Mann, the command's intelligence officer -- all held key positions during the fighting. Together, they offer fresh insight into the prewar debate that raged between the Israeli Northern Command and intelligence officers who believed that Syria would not instigate conflict. This seminal study also examines the pivotal battles that changed the course of the war, as well as the disastrous effects of a flawed postwar evaluation that adversely affected the careers of several high-ranking intelligence officials and the course of defense strategic planning thereafter. The contributors' incisive analyses contribute significantly to our understanding of this troubled region.

Looking at the political, military and intelligence components of the Yom Kippur War, this work offers interpretations of Israel's conflict with the Arabs. The contributors, Israeli academics, some involved in the war, make a contribution to the understanding of this part of Israel's history.

An updated edition that sheds new light on one of the most dramatic reversals of military fortune in modern history. The easing of Israeli military censorship after four decades has enabled Abraham Rabinovich to offer fresh insights into this fiercest of Israel-Arab conflicts. A surprise Arab attack on two fronts on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, with Israel’s reserves un-mobilized, triggered apocalyptic visions in Israel, euphoria in the Arab world, and fraught debates on both sides. Rabinovich, who covered the war for The Jerusalem Post, draws on extensive interviews and primary source material to shape his enthralling narrative. We learn of two Egyptian nationals, working separately for the Mossad, who supplied Israel with key information that helped change the course of the war; of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s proposal for a nuclear “demonstration” to warn off the Arabs; and of Chief of Staff David Elazar’s conclusion on the fifth day of battle that Israel could not win. Newly available transcripts enable us to follow the decision-making process in real time from the prime minister’s office to commanders studying maps in the field. After almost overrunning the Golan Heights, the Syrian attack is broken in desperate battles. And as Israel regains its psychological balance, General Ariel Sharon leads a nighttime counterattack across the Suez Canal through a narrow hole in the Egyptian line -- the turning point of the war.

This study is an analysis of the decisiveness of Israeli small-unit leadership on the Golan Heights during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. What allowed the Israeli brigades on the Golan Heights to defeat an Arab coalition that launched a surprise attack with a force that vastly outnumbered the Israelis in men, tanks and artillery? The one advantage the Israelis had was the quality of leadership at the small-unit level. This study begins with a brief review of the strategic and operational situation in the Middle East in 1973. This includes background information on the Israeli and Arab forces facing each other on the Golan Heights and their plans for the defense and attack respectfully prior to the start of hostilities. The majority of the thesis discussion is concerned with the actual battle on the Golan Heights. It highlights the contributions that small-unit leadership made during the battle that allowed the vastly outnumbered IDF to destroy a massive Soviet-style Arab army. This portion of the study also looks at the experiences of those Israeli leaders involved in the fighting. The study then looks at leadership from the Israeli perspective. I define what leadership is and why it is important at the small-unit level. I take a close look at how the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) picks and trains its leaders and what role the Israeli Military Culture plays in that process. The conclusion of the thesis is that the IDF was able to fight and win even though surprised and vastly outnumbered due to the quality of leadership at the small-unit level. This lesson may prove to be important still today as the armies of the Western societies continue to get smaller even though they still face the threat of fighting the massive Soviet-style armies of the “Axis of Evil” for decades to come.