Syndromic entry and exit screening for fever and/or respiratory, gastrointestinal or haemorrhagic fever symptoms, using one or more methods such as temperature check, observation and health declaration forms, with subsequent follow-up interventions including testing and other additional health measures, has been conducted at ground crossings over decades for some epidemic-prone diseases such as Ebola virus disease (EVD) and other viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHFs), severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and other respiratory infections, as well as plague. This document summarizes and evaluates available scientific evidence on the efficacy of syndromic entry and exit screening to prevent or limit the spread of epidemic-prone diseases at ground crossings and is intended as a call for research in this field. It is targeted at public health and ground crossing policy-makers, researchers and relevant stakeholders.

In response to the call of the 48th World Health Assembly for a substantial revision of the International Health Regulations, this new edition of the Regulations will enter into force on June 15, 2007. The purpose and scope of the Regulations are "to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade." The Regulations also cover certificates applicable to international travel and transport, and requirements for international ports, airports and ground crossings.

The emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in late 2002 and 2003 challenged the global public health community to confront a novel epidemic that spread rapidly from its origins in southern China until it had reached more than 25 other countries within a matter of months. In addition to the number of patients infected with the SARS virus, the disease had profound economic and political repercussions in many of the affected regions. Recent reports of isolated new SARS cases and a fear that the disease could reemerge and spread have put public health officials on high alert for any indications of possible new outbreaks. This report examines the response to SARS by public health systems in individual countries, the biology of the SARS coronavirus and related coronaviruses in animals, the economic and political fallout of the SARS epidemic, quarantine law and other public health measures that apply to combating infectious diseases, and the role of international organizations and scientific cooperation in halting the spread of SARS. The report provides an illuminating survey of findings from the epidemic, along with an assessment of what might be needed in order to contain any future outbreaks of SARS or other emerging infections.

This field manual is intended to help health professionals and public health coordinators working in emergency situations prevent, detect and control the major communicable diseases encountered by affected populations. The manual is the result of collaboration among a number of WHO departments and several external partner agencies in reviewing existing guidelines on communicable disease control and adapting them to emergency situations. The manual deals with the fundamental principles of communicable disease control in emergencies, which are: Rapid assessment to identify the communicable disease threats faced by the emergency-affected population, including those with epidemic potential, and define the health status of the population by conducting a rapid assessment; Prevention to prevent communicable disease by maintaining a healthy physical environment and good general living conditions; Surveillance to set up or strengthen disease surveillance system with an early warning mechanism to ensure the early reporting of cases to monitor disease trends, and to facilitate prompt detection and response to outbreaks; outbreak control to ensure outbreaks are rapidly detected and controlled through adequate preparedness (i.e. stockpiles, standard treatment protocols and staff training) and rapid response (i.e.confirmation, investigation and implementation of control measures); and disease management to diagnose and treat cases promptly with trained staff using effective treatment and standard protocols at all health facilities.

First edition published in 2002. Second edition published in 2008.

"This guide was designed to assist WHO Member States, both large and small, to bridge the gap between the legal requirements of the International Health Regulations (2005), or IHR (2005), and the pragmatic readiness and response capacity for public health emergencies at designated points of entry (POE). Under IHR (2005), Member States must comply with the legal requirements set out for designated POE. Furthermore, each country should ensure that the core capacities for designated POE are in place by June 2012, in principle. Many countries have prioritized their designation of several international airports, ports or ground crossings, while some small countries have chosen to designate only one airport and/or port to handle incoming and departing travellers during public health emergency situations. IHR (2005) compliance requires that a public health emergency contingency plan (PLECP) be developed and maintained in a designated POE for responding to events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC)"--P. 5.