The philosophy of perception has been an important topic throughout history, appealing to thinkers in antiquity and the middle ages as well as to figures such as Kant, Bergson and others. In this wide-ranging study, Mark Eli Kalderon presents multiple perspectives on the general nature of perception, discussing touch and hearing as well as vision. He draws on the rich history of the subject and shows how analytic and continental approaches to it are connected, providing readers with insights from both traditions and arguing for new orientations when thinking about the presentation of perception. His discussion addresses issues including tactile metaphors, sympathy in relation to the concept of fellow-feeling, and the Wave Theory of sound. His comprehensive and thoughtful study presents bold and systematic investigations into current theory, informed by centuries of philosophical enquiry, and will be important for those working on ontological and metaphysical aspects of perception and feeling.

A wide-ranging study of the nature of perception, discussing touch, hearing and vision, and bringing together analytic and continental approaches.

In Perception, Empathy, and Judgment Arne Johan Vetlesen focuses on the indispensable role of emotion, especially the faculty of empathy, in morality. He contends that moral conduct is severely threatened once empathy is prevented from taking part in an interplay with cognitive faculties (such as abstraction or imagination) in acts of moral perception and judgment. Drawing on developmental psychology, especially British "object relations" theory, to illuminate the nature and functioning of empathy, Vetlesen shows how moral performance is constituted by a sequence involving perception, judgment, and action, with an interplay between the agent's emotional (empathic) and cognitive faculties occurring at each stage. In the powerful tradition from Kant to present-day theorists such as Kohlberg, Rawls, and Habermas, reason is privileged over feeling and judgment over perception, in such a way that basic philosophical questions remain unasked. Vetlesen focuses our attention on these questions and challenges the long-standing assertion that emotions are damaging to moral response. In the final chapter he relates his argument to recent feminist critiques that have also castigated moral theorists in the Kantian tradition for their refusal to recognize a role for emotion in morality. While the book's argument is philosophical, its method and scope are interdisciplinary. In addition to critiques of such philosophers as Arendt, MacIntyre, and Habermas, it contains discussions of specific historical, ideological, and sociological factors that may cause "numbing"—selective or broad-ranging, pathological insensitivity—in humans. The Nazis' mass killing of Jews is studied to illuminate these and other relevant empirical aspects of large-scale immoral action.

The lack of ability to emphathize is central to many psychiatric conditions. Empathy is affected by neurodevelopment, brain pathology and psychiatric illness. Empathy is both a state and a trait characteristic. Empathy is measurable by neuropsychological assessment and neuroimaging techniques. This book, first published in 2007, specifically focuses on the role of empathy in mental illness. It starts with the clinical psychiatric perspective and covers empathy in the context of mental illness, adult health, developmental course, and explanatory models. Psychiatrists, psychotherapists and mental heath professionals will find this a very useful reference for their work.

The origins of this book probably go back to Gordon Allport's seminar in social psychology at Harvard during the late 1940s and to the invitation from Gardner Lindzey, some years later, to contribute a section on "Sympathy and Empathy" to the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968). Since those early beginnings, the book has been "in the process of becoming. " During that time I have benefited greatly from the knowledge and assistance of many colleagues, especially the following, who read and commented upon portions of the manuscript: Raymond Gastil, the late Joseph Katz, David McClelland, Jitendra Mohanty, Paul Mussen, Richard Solomon, and Bernard Weiner. To Kenneth Merrill for a close reading of the Hume material and to M. Brewster Smith for a careful reading of and suggestions on Chapters 7 and 8, I am especially indebted. Beverly Joyce withstood constant interruptions to provide much-needed library assistance, and Vivian Wheeler gave generously of her excellent editorial experience and knowledge. A fellowship at the Battelle Research Center in Seattle and an appointment as a visiting scholar at Harvard were of incalculable help, providing opportunity, stimulation, and freedom from teaching responsibilities. To all of the above I am deeply indebted. Just a few words about the organization of this book.

This collection of Laurence Blum's essays examines the moral import of emotion, motivation, judgement, perception, and group identifications.

What is the basis of our capacity to act morally? This is a question that has been discussed for millennia, with philosophical debate typically distinguishing two sources of morality: reason and sentiment. This collection aims to shed light on whether the human capacity to feel for others really is central for morality and, if so, in what way. To tackle these questions, the authors discuss how fellow feeling is to be understood: its structure, content and empirical conditions. Also discussed are the exact roles that relevant psychological features - specifically: empathy, sympathy and concern - may play within morality. The collection is unique in bringing together the key participants in the various discussions of the relation of fellow feeling to moral norms, moral concepts and moral agency. By integrating conceptually sophisticated and empirically informed perspectives, Forms of Fellow Feeling will appeal to readers from philosophy, psychology, sociology and cultural studies.