How to prevent runs on open-end mutual funds? In recent years, markets have observed an innovation that changed the way open-end funds are priced. Alternative pricing rules (known as swing pricing) adjust funds’ net asset values to pass on funds’ trading costs to transacting shareholders. Using unique data on investor transactions in U.K. corporate bond funds, we show that swing pricing eliminates the first-mover advantage arising from the traditional pricing rule and significantly reduces redemptions during stress periods. The positive impact of alternative pricing rules on fund flows reverses in calm periods when costs associated with higher tracking error dominate the pricing effect.

We develop a model of the feedback between mutual fund outflows and asset illiquidity. Following a market shock, alert investors anticipate the impact on a fund's net asset value (NAV) of other investors' redemptions and exit first at favorable prices. This first-mover advantage may lead to fund failure through a cycle of falling prices and increasing redemptions. Our analysis shows that (i) the first-mover advantage introduces a nonlinear dependence between a market shock and the aggregate impact of redemptions on the fund's NAV; (ii) as a consequence, there is a critical magnitude of the shock beyond which redemptions bring down the fund; (iii) properly designed swing pricing transfers liquidation costs from the fund to redeeming investors and, by removing the nonlinearity stemming from the first-mover advantage, it reduces these costs and prevents fund failure. Achieving these objectives requires a larger swing factor at larger levels of outflows. The swing factor for one fund may also depend on policies followed by other funds.

Swing pricing allows a fund manager to transfer to redeeming or subscribing investors the costs associated with their trading activity, thus potentially discouraging large flows. This liquidity management tool, which is already used in major jurisdictions, may also help mitigate systemic risk. Here we develop and apply a methodology to investigate whether swing pricing does in fact help dampen flows out of funds, especially during periods of market stress. Drawing on evidence of first-mover advantage within a group of ‘swinging’ corporate bond funds, we provide policy considerations for enhancing the tool’s effectiveness as a systemic risk mitigant.

This Article explains and explores new Securities Exchange Commission rules authorizing optional swing pricing for mutual funds. Swing pricing is an anti-dilution tool intended to protect sedentary investors who enter, and stay, in a fund. Workers setting aside money for retirement are often sedentary investors. Mutual funds are the mainstay vehicle for retirement investors, yet as sedentary shareholders they can experience significant asset dilution over their savings lifetime. Swing pricing - a mutual fund pricing mechanism that allocates transaction costs to the triggering shareholders - could save sedentary shareholders, collectively, billions of dollars.The mutual fund industry's operational complexities and competing regulatory obligations may prevent funds from immediately utilizing swing pricing once it becomes effective in November 2018. The biggest obstacle is a time conflict reminiscent of the chicken and egg problem. Under current industry operations, mutual funds will not receive the trading information necessary to adjust the daily price of the fund (swing the price) until after funds have to finalize the price adjustment. Blockchain technology - offering secure, automated, and verified ledgers - may present an operational path forward for the industry.The SEC's swing pricing approach leaves unanswered how funds will overcome these, and other, hurdles. This Article explores the components of swing pricing, as well as the objections to and perceived benefits of swing pricing, and concludes with two unique perspectives on the SEC rules: one academic and one professional. This Article maintains that mutual funds should taken on the challenge of implementing swing pricing, and that market incentives will pave the way.

How effective are available policy tools in managing liquidity risks in the mutual fund industry? We assess one such tool - swing pricing - which allows funds to adjust their settlement price in response to large net flows. Our empirical analysis exploits the fact that swing pricing is available to Luxembourg funds, but not yet to U.S. funds. We show that swing pricing dampens outflows in reaction to weak fund performance, but has a limited effect during stress episodes. Furthermore, swing pricing supports fund returns, while raising accounting volatility, and may lead to lower cash buffers.

Author Russel Kinnel walks readers through the handful of key factors they need to pick winning funds. Armed with the quantitative data and qualitative research, they will gain the confidence to pick great funds for the long-term. This book will be accompanied by a web-based tool created by Morningstar, which will enable readers to evaluate their own funds using Kinnel's criteria. Written in a fun and accessible manner, The Fund Spy offers Kinnel's unique insight as a 14-year Morningstar fund analyst. He speaks plainly about the conflicts that can go against investors' interests, explaining how to avoid traps and push out the slick sales pitches facing today's investors. He also offers several "10 lists," which provide quick answers to investors' most common questions (e.g., the Top 10 Funds to Recommend to Relatives, the 10 Best Contrarian Managers, the 10 Most Overrated Managers).