The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is arguably the most contentious and emotionally charged protracted identity-based conflict still raging in the world today. This thesis argues that third-party mediation by small states such as Sweden has proved an indispensable tool of conflict management in such a conflict context. The conclusion and implementation of any permanent status agreement, however, will in all likelihood require multi-party mediation. Though bereft of coercive political power, Sweden has played an important role in the peace process by encouraging dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians determined to take concerted steps toward a negotiated, peaceful resolution to their conflict. Involvement has been possible thanks to excellent relations with the moderate peace camps of both sides. Beginning with the initiation of relations between the US and the PLO in 1988, this thesis analyses the significance of contributions by Swedish mediators throughout the peace process. Additionally, it analyses the way each instance of small-state mediation, including the Norwegian mediation of the Oslo Accords, was informed and influenced by the efforts that preceded it. Historical analysis suggests the American mediating role in the negotiations themselves should be minimal. A coercive bargaining strategy for which America is best equipped and is most likely to wield is unlikely to yield concessions on the existential issues that drive the conflict. As the world's pre-eminent superpower and Israel's closest ally, the US will undoubtedly be indispensable to the finalising, sponsorship and implementation of any eventual permanent status agreement. Accountability, perhaps the main American failing during the Oslo process, should be their main focus. For lasting peace to prevail, Israelis and Palestinians must widely acknowledge the legitimacy of the other, and recognise that their own existence and security is intertwined with that of their counterpart. Third parties can help bring them together and try to appeal to their mutual interests, but cannot make the necessary concessions for them.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most prolonged, contentious and divisive in the modern era. But, despite the volatile nature of the conflict, which frequently flares up in armed confrontations between the two, there have been advancements towards a settlement through an admittedly protracted peace process. In this book, Jacob Eriksson argues that the impact of small states, such as Sweden or Norway, should not be ignored when it comes to the ongoing efforts to negotiate between Israel and Palestine. Although small states lack coercive power, the talks they have sponsored in this particular instance (such as the Norwegian-mediated Oslo Accords) have transformed both the conflict and the conceptions of a solution to it. Of course, the diplomatic and financial power of larger states such as the USA is undoubtedly central to a negotiated solution. But by looking at conflict resolution from the perspective of the small state, Eriksson offers a unique analysis of power and diplomacy in the context of negotiations and efforts towards peace settlements.

This book scrutinises how three small Scandinavian countries – Norway, Sweden and Denmark – developed a unique foreign policy that brought Israel and the Palestinians to the negotiating table. Bringing together the field of soft power diplomacy with the field of conflict mediation, the text analyses the specific type of peace diplomacy offered by Scandinavia. It identifies the different methods and policies of the three Scandinavian countries, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of their mediation strategies. Close examination of the historical record through primary and secondary sources in five languages reveals how Scandinavian involvement worked over almost three decades and to what extent it shaped the content of the Oslo peace talks. The author documents how the Scandinavian countries employed soft power diplomacy to enlist the aid of more powerful countries and international institutions to compensate for their limited authority and legitimacy, and how they used the Middle East peace process to strengthen their own national interests, financial standing and international status. The book will appeal to scholars, diplomats, politicians, educators and students interested in Scandinavian foreign policy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have become important actors in the globalised world. They run aid and relief programmes in the poorest countries, support international institutions (like the United Nations), or are watchdogs of them (for example watchdogs of the Bretton Woods institutions). In doing so, NGOs naturally work permanently with state-agencies and it is probably hard to find an NGO which is totally free of any governmental support (in financial, logistical or informative matters). Thus, there are strong NGO-government connections on a daily-work basis. NGOs run multiple attempts to contribute to the resolution of conflicts on all political levels. They bring together people on the grass-root level, they try to influence high officials through public pressure and they organise conferences and discussions with members and consultants of the concerned parties. The latter approach is analysed in this study. But how do NGOs influence the level of official international relations? To which degree can NGOs improve the relations of two conflicted parties, especially when the conflict is protracted and severe? The aim of this book is to define the preconditions of successful NGO mediation, to measure the NGO influence as an ?antecedent condition? for successful mediation, and to exhibit its limits. The underlying assumption is that conflict resolution is more likely if NGO mediation supports this attempt. This approach can be labelled as an ?assumption of constant effect? since the focus is on understanding the NGOs influence on international conflict resolution.