On June 29, 1950, the U.S. launched its first ever air strikes on the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, marking the start of what would become the longest conflict in history between two industrial powers. Four decades later, the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the beginning of a new phase of the conflict, with a new unipolar world order centered on the power of the U.S. and Western world leaving North Korea in unprecedented isolation. Now unsupported in its fight against a Western superpower intent on its destruction, the small but technologically adept and heavily militarized East Asian state would need to adopt more radical measures to ensure its security. Over the next 35 years, the conflict would transform from a period of North Korean decline in the face of tremendous economic and military pressure, to one of an ascent in its power and decline in the West as international order evolved past the unipolar era Surviving the Unipolar Era elucidates the conflict’s transformation, beginning with unprecedented U.S.-led efforts to achieve North Korea’s total collapse and elimination through maximum pressure, and ending three decades later with a subsiding of Pyongyang’s international isolation and the modernization of its economy, armed forces and nuclear deterrent. A. B. Abrams highlights how the small state has been able to hold its own in multiple standoffs with the world’s superpower, successfully weather economic sanctions, and prevent penetration of its information space, and the implications that this has had for the country, the region and the wider world. He details the strong consistency in American objectives, and the evolution of consensus across five separate administrations on how these should be pursued as the circumstances of the conflict transformed. In the context of prevailing geopolitical, economic and security trends, Abrams projects the future course of the conflict including aspects such as Western difficulties coming to terms with North Korea’s ascent, U.S. policy priorities going forward, and the growing opportunities that an emerging new global cold war is likely to provide Pyongyang.

This is the first book-length treatment of international politics in a unipolar world that adopts a structural realist perspective. It applies Waltz's microeconomic analogy to a market with a price leader. It concludes that unipolarity is sustainable as long as the unipole distributes rewards to other states.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has enjoyed unparalleled military power. The international system is therefore unipolar. A quarter of a century later, however, we still possess no theory of unipolarity. Theory of Unipolar Politics provides one. Dr Nuno P. Monteiro answers three of the most important questions about the workings of a unipolar world. Is it durable? Is it peaceful? What is the best grand strategy a unipolar power such as the contemporary United States can implement? In our nuclear world, the power preponderance of the United States is potentially durable but likely to produce frequent conflict. Furthermore, in order to maintain its power preponderance, the United States must remain militarily engaged in the world and accommodate the economic growth of its major competitors, namely, China. This strategy, however, will lead Washington to wage war frequently. In sum, military power preponderance brings significant benefits but is not an unalloyed good.

At the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the world's most powerful state, and then used that power to initiate wars against smaller countries in the Middle East and South Asia. According to balance-of-power theory--the bedrock of realism in international relations--other states should have joined together militarily to counterbalance the United States' rising power. Yet they did not. Nor have they united to oppose Chinese aggression in the South China Sea or Russian offensives along its western border. This does not mean balance-of-power politics is dead, argues renowned international relations scholar T. V. Paul; instead it has taken a different form. Rather than employ familiar strategies such as active military alliances and arms buildups, leading powers have engaged in "soft balancing," which seeks to restrain threatening powers through the use of international institutions, informal alignments, and economic sanctions. Paul places the evolution of balancing behavior in historical perspective, from the post-Napoleonic era to today's globalized world. This book offers an illuminating examination of how subtler forms of balance-of-power politics can help states achieve their goals against aggressive powers without wars or arms races.

This volume analyzes the decisions that major powers have made since the Cold War to adapt to a rapidly changing economic and security environment. The authors acknowledge that, while great power wars are now unlikely, positional conflicts over resources and markets still remain.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the United States engaged in the most ambitious and far-reaching liberal order building the world had yet seen. This liberal international order has been one of the most successful in providing security and prosperity to more people, but in the last decade the American-led order has been troubled. Some argue that the Bush administration undermined it. Others argue that we are witnessing he end of the American era. In Liberal Leviathan G. John Ikenberry argues that the crisis that besets the American-led order is a crisis of authority. The forces that have triggered this crisis have resulted from the successful functioning and expansion of the postwar liberal order, not its breakdown.

This book presents a systematic comparison of the military strategies pursued by five great powers, eight major middle powers and eight middle powers during the early twenty-first century. In addition to mapping the strategic priorities of these states, the study develops and applies a theoretical framework to explain differences and similarities in their strategic priorities. Moreover, the work evaluates how the stability of the present international system, and the US-led liberal international order (LIO), is affected by the strategies pursued by the US and other leading states. The book aims to contribute to previous research in three ways. First, it intervenes in the debate on the stability of the unipolar system and the US-led international order by offering a theoretical framework and an empirical approach for exploring and explaining the strategic priorities and defence strategies of different categories of states. Second, it aims to fill a void in research on strategy – the lack of a comparative and systematic approach to contemporary strategy that facilitates and guides systematic comparisons and analyses of the alignment and military strategies pursued by both major powers and less powerful states. Third, it provides an empirical contribution to the debate on the stability of the unipolar system and the US-led international order by presenting a documentation of the strategic priorities of 21 states based on primary sources, consisting of official documents such as national security and defence strategies and defence bills. In the conclusion, the authors summarise the empirical findings on the system level, the regional level and the unit level and present their overarching conclusions for the whole project. This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, defence studies, foreign policy and international relations in general.