Written before the outbreak of World War II, this is a compelling book on military strategy, in particular the doctrines of surprise and the flank attack. Almost breaking completely with traditional military thinking, despite citing ideas which tally with the doctrines of Clausewitz, Moltke and Schlieffen, Erfurth’s work is indicative of the vast amount of thinking and writing about warfare that took place in the inter war years in Germany—a crucial element to any nation dedicated to having an effective army and navy.

A historian of military intelligence presents a revelatory account of ancient Greek battle tactics, including the use of espionage and irregular warfare. There are two images of warfare that dominate Greek history. The better known is that of Achilles, the Homeric hero skilled in face-to-face combat and outraged by deception on the battlefield. The alternative model, also taken from Homeric epic, is Odysseus, ‘the man of twists and turns’ who saw no shame in winning by stealth, surprise or deceit. It is common for popular writers to assume that the hoplite phalanx was the only mode of warfare used by the Greeks. The fact is, however, that the use of spies, intelligence gathering, ambush, and surprise attacks at dawn or at night were also a part of Greek warfare. While such tactics were not the supreme method of defeating an enemy, they were routinely employed when the opportunity presented itself.

How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings.

Charming story in rhyme of a surprise family outing for a little girl who takes a trip with her mother and father on the Washington D. C. Metro train and discovers the surprising wonders of a trip to the National Zoo. Beautifully illustrated throughout in full color crayon drawings by Washington, D. C. native Emmanuel B. Cooper. Cleaton D. Battle is a native of Chesterfield County, Virginia, where he grew into his passion for helping other people. He presents his work as an opportunity for all people to view the experience of a special girl who navigates the Washington, DC metro area using the mass transportation system.

War by Numbers assesses the nature of conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A. Lawrence establishes what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. By demonstrating the impact a variety of factors have on combat he moves such analysis beyond the work of Carl von Clausewitz and into modern data and interpretation. Using vast data sets, Lawrence examines force ratios, the human factor in case studies from World War II and beyond, the combat value of superior situational awareness, and the effects of dispersion, among other elements. Lawrence challenges existing interpretations of conventional warfare and shows how such combat should be conducted in the future, simultaneously broadening our understanding of what it means to fight wars by the numbers.

Warfare is hugely important. The fates of nations, and even continents, often rests on the outcome of war and thus on how its practitioners consider war. The Human Face of War is a new exploration of military thought. It starts with the observation that much military thought is poorly developed - often incoherent and riddled with paradox. The author contends that what is missing from British and American writing on warfare is any underpinning mental approach or philosophy. Why are some tank commanders, snipers, fighter pilots or submarine commanders far more effective than others? Why are many generals sacked at the outbreak of war? The Human Face of War examines such phenomena and seeks to explain them. The author argues that military thought should be based on an approach which reflects the nature of combat. Combat - fighting - is primarily a human phenomenon dominated by human behaviour. The book explores some of those human issues and their practical consequences. The Human Face of War calls for, and suggests, a new way of considering war and warfare.