The surface warfare community prides itself on having the most capable, best trained, and most proficient leaders at the Department Head (DH) level. This assumption stems from an age when the "Head of Department" was a seasoned, matriculated, and more senior officer, both chronologically and by years of service. Today's DH normally has five to seven years of naval officer experience, is still in his twenties, likely has only three years of experience at sea, and possesses few of the core competencies required of the position. Surface warfare officer department head leadership development is the thesis topic under examination. This study asks, "Does Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) offer the instruction and leadership training required to meet 21st century Department Head requirements?" Examination of both Army and Navy mid-grade leadership courses will gage the competing services level of leader development and the effectiveness of the Department Head Leadership Curriculum. The survey revealed low marks for Resource Management and Leading Change in both services. Recommendations are made for improving SWOS leadership and offers options for future study.

Current Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) retention is well below the level needed to staff Department Head billets in the Fleet. The Navy is developing a career incentive pay to stem the flow of SWOs leaving the Navy and increase retention. The purpose of this thesis is to capture the training costs of junior Surface Warfare Officers that occur between commissioning and qualifying as a SWO. This thesis also explains the economic theory of specific training and its relevance to the wage streams offered to SWOs. This thesis estimates the training cost of qualifying a SWO to be $80,194.

This thesis will examine how Surface Warfare Officers (SWO) received their initial post-commission training beginning with the end of World War II and ending with the training program as of September 2008. Specifically, this thesis examines the reasons why there was no initial SWO training after commissioning and what changed to require initial training. The discussion also addresses the effects of changing the commissioning source to a mix of Naval Academy, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps and Officer Candidate School. Additionally, the influence of technology and the bipolar world of the Cold War will provide insight as to the appropriateness of the initial training. Finally, the decision to conduct most of the initial training onboard ship beginning in 2003 will be analyzed, especially in light of the decision in 2008 to establish a four-week course in San Diego and Norfolk, which is mandatory for all ensigns to attend immediately after reporting to their ships. Although the world changed from the relatively simple Cold War paradigm in the past twenty years, history provides us with a means to understand why the Navy came to do business the way it did. Understanding why things occurred as they did, leads to lessons that will aid in making future decisions.

As the United States Naval Academy undertakes an institution-wide curriculum review, questions have been raised regarding the composition of course material, and the allocation of credit hours for its First Class Leadership Capstone courses. This study analyzes the needs of the Surface Warfare Officer Leadership Capstone Course at USNA. The purpose of this research is to use qualitative data to determine how the USNA SWO Leadership Capstone Course should be structured, and to determine the appropriate balance between leadership education and practical training. The research also determines whether or not there is a gap between current course content and the expectations of Commanding Officers, Executive Officers, Department Heads, and Division Officers in the Fleet, with respect to the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes Ensigns should possess on the day they arrive onboard their first ship. In addition to holding focus groups with course instructors and faculty coordinators, interviews were conducted with prospective Commanding Officers, prospective Executive Officers, prospective Department Heads, and Ensigns enrolled in the Division Officer's Course at Surface Warfare Officer School Command, Newport, RI.

The number of Surface Warfare Officers (111Xs) in a wardroom directly affects the combat readiness and effectiveness of a warship today. Preliminary research indicates that the "Sea to SWOS" training initiative is seen to have a positive effect on the amount of time it takes an 116X to attain the 111X designation. The initial qualitative analysis highlights a perceived increase in retention and readiness (combat effectiveness) while the quantitative analysis shows additional costs to the Navy Personnel Command and savings in training costs for the Naval Education and Training Command and OPNAV N76, the Surface Warfare Resource Sponsor. This thesis examines the cost-effectiveness of the newly established "Sea to SWOS" training transformation on the Surface Warfare Officer qualification process. This initiative leverages shipboard on-the-job training experiences and interactive computer-based training replacing previously formalized classroom training. As a result, this initiative significantly alters the Division Officer Sequencing Plan (DOSP). Based on the qualitative data, the transformation to the DOSP in the Surface Warfare Officer qualification process will most likely have a positive effect on retention and the utilization of fully qualified 111X Division Officer resources through earlier numbers of 111X attainment and increased officer personnel readiness.