Please note that the content of this book primarily consists of articles available from Wikipedia or other free sources online. Pages: 25. Chapters: S-300, HQ-61, QW-1 Vanguard, PL-12, TY-90, FN-6, HQ-9, LY-60 / FD-60 / PL10, HN-5, HQ-7, PL-8, PL-9, QW-2 Vanguard 2, KS-1, TA580/TAS5380, HQ-2J. Excerpt: The S-300 is a series of Russian long range surface-to-air missile systems produced by NPO Almaz, all based on the initial S-300P version. The S-300 system was developed to defend against aircraft and cruise missiles for the Soviet Air Defence Forces. Subsequent variations were developed to intercept ballistic missiles. The S-300 was jointly produced by Almaz with Samsung Group of South Korea since 1993. The S-300 system was first deployed by the Soviet Union in 1979, designed for the air defense of large industrial and administrative facilities, military bases, and control of airspace against enemy strike aircraft. The project-managing developer of the S-300 is Russian Almaz corporation (government owned, aka "KB-1") which is currently a part of "Almaz-Antei" Air Defense Concern. S-300 uses missiles developed by MKB "Fakel" design bureau (a separate government corporation, aka "OKB-2"). The S-300 is regarded as one of the most potent anti-aircraft missile systems currently fielded. Its radars have the ability to simultaneously track up to 100 targets while engaging up to 12. S-300 deployment time is five minutes. The S-300 missiles are sealed rounds and require no maintenance over their lifetime. An evolved version of the S-300 system is the S-400 (NATO reporting name SA-21), entering limited service in 2004. Numerous versions have since emerged with different missiles, improved radars, better resistance to countermeasures, longer range and better capability against short-range ballistic missiles or targets flying at very low altitude. There are currently three main variations. Two S-300-PM missile TEL and a 'Flap Lid' radarThe S-300P (transliterated from...

This book analyses the capabilities of the People's Republic of China's surface-to-air missile (SAM) units. It lists and describes all the SAM weapon systems in detail; historical, current and even those not yet in active use. All three branches -- the Air Force, the Navy and the Army -- have their units and organization listed and described.

This report analyzes key trends and themes in China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) surface-to-air missile (SAM) unit training. After providing background information on China's air defense forces, the report introduces the basics of PLAAF SAM training, including training requirements, trends in recent training activities, and analysis of training themes.

Contents: (1) Understanding China¿s Strategy; (2) China¿s Mil. Strategy and Doctrine; (3) Force Modernization (FM) Goals and Trends; (4) Resources for FM; (5) FM and Security in the Taiwan Strait; (6) Develop. in: China¿s Strategy, in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, in the Size, Location, and Capabilities of PRC Mil. Forces, in PLA Doctrine, in PRC Efforts to Develop, Acquire, or Gain Access to Advanced Technologies That Could Enhance Its Military Capabilities, and in China¿s Asymmetric Capabilities; Challenges to Taiwan¿s Deterrent Forces; (7) China¿s Mil. Diplomacy; Joint Exercises; Peacekeeping Oper.; Humanitarian Assist. and Disaster Relief; Arms Sales; (8) China and Taiwan Forces Data. Maps, charts and tables.

China’s anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), the DF-21D, has reached the equivalent of Initial Operational Capability. Although it probably has been deployed in small numbers, additional challenges and tests remain. This study examines the ASBM’s capability and history, showing how the DF-21D meets multiple priorities in Chinese defense modernization and in the national security bureaucracy, as well its implications for the United States. The ASBM’s physical threat to U.S. Navy ships will be determined by the development of associated systems and organizations, which currently limit data fusion and coordination in the complex task of identifying a U.S. aircraft carrier in the open ocean. Still, the ASBM poses a direct threat to the foundations of U.S. power project in Asia and will undermine the U.S. position, unless efforts to counter its political-military effects are taken.

This vital report from a distinguished international group of experts on airpower, military affairs, and the People's Republic of China PRC - Taiwan relationship examines the present state and future prospects of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). The report was produced by the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (CSCMA) of the National Defense University. In the ongoing military buildup by the People's Republic of China, one of the crucial areas of concern is the force disparity between the PRC and Taiwan. The traditional technological edge that Taiwan's military air-power forces enjoyed over the mainland is a thing of the past. Where a decade ago, Taiwan's airmen flew aircraft that were at least one, and in some cases two, technological generations superior to those of the PRC, today they are already in a position of inferiority, with their aging F-16A/B, AIDC F-CK-1 Ching-Kuo, and Mirage 2000 fighters increasingly outclassed and outnumbered by newer PRC aircraft such as the Su-27, J-10, J-11, and Su-30 aircraft. Where a decade ago, Taiwan's airmen could operate with relative impunity over the Taiwan Strait, facing a limited-range surface-to-air missile threat built around derivatives of the then 40-year-old Khrushchev-era SA-2, today they face far more dangerous S-300 (SA-10/20) systems that deny access over the strait, and the prospect of the S-400 which, installed along the coast of the PRC, will reach across the strait and beyond Taiwan itself. Coupled with the PRC's introduction of precision air-to-surface munitions, air refueling, airborne early warning, large numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, land attack cruise missiles, and an increased emphasis on electronic and cyber warfare, the challenges facing Taiwan's air defenders have never been graver than at the present time. Significantly, because of the longstanding ties between the United States and Taiwan, any prospect of cross-strait conflict carries with it the implicit risk of igniting a broader and even more devastating conflict. Clearly, it is in the interest of all parties to ensure that the PRC-Taiwan relationship evolves in a peaceful, mutually beneficial fashion. Beijing's missile-centric strategy presents a number of challenges for regional stability. Barring the fielding of effective countermeasures, Chinese conventional aerospace power, specifically short- and medium-range ballistic and extended-range land attack cruise missiles, may over time give the PLA a decisive advantage in future conflicts around China's periphery. Contents: Foreword * I: CONCEPTS * Chapter 1 - The Concept of Airpower: Its Emergence, Evolution, and Future * Chapter 2 - China's Quest for Joint Aerospace Power: Concepts and Future Aspirations * Chapter 3 - The PLAAF's Evolving Influence within the PLA and upon National Policy * II: ORGANIZATION, LEADERSHIP, AND DOCTRINE * Chapter 4 - The Organizational Structure of the PLAAF * Chapter 5 - The Missions of the People's Liberation Army Air Force * Chapter 6 - The Development of the PLAAF's Doctrine * Chapter 7 - The PLAAF and the Integration of Air and Space Power * III: EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL, AND EDUCATION / TRAINING * Chapter 8 - Equipping the PLAAF: The Long March to Modernity * Chapter 9 - Meeting the Challenge of the Upcoming PLAAF Leadership Reshuffle * Chapter 10 - Education and Training in the PLAAF * IV: INDUSTRIES AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS * Chapter 11 - China's Aviation Industry: Past, Present, and Future * Chapter 12 - China's Quest for Advanced Aviation Technologies * Chapter 13 - The Employment of Airpower in the Taiwan Strait * Chapter 14 - The U.S.-China Military Balance Seen in a Three-Game Framework