This book discusses civil litigation at the supreme courts of nine jurisdictions – Argentina, Austria, Croatia, England and Wales, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United States – and focuses on the available instruments used to keep the caseload of these courts within acceptable limits. Such instruments are necessary in order to allow supreme courts to fulfil their main duties, that is, the administration of justice in individual cases (private function) and providing for the uniformity and development of the law within their respective jurisdictions (public function). If the number of cases at the supreme court level is too high, the result is undue delays, which are mainly problematic with regard to the private function. It may also put the quality of the court’s judgments under pressure, which can affect its public and private function alike. Thus, measures aimed at avoiding excessive caseloads need to take both functions into account. Increasing the capacity of the court to handle larger numbers of cases may result in the court being unable to adequately fulfil its public function, since large numbers of court decisions make it difficult to guarantee the uniformity of the law and its development. Therefore, a balanced approach is needed to safeguard capacity and quality. As shown by the contributions gathered here, the nature of reform in this area is not the same everywhere. There are a variety of reasons for this heterogeneity, ranging from different understandings of the caseload problem itself, local conceptions regarding the purpose of the Supreme Court, and strong entitlements concerning the right to appeal to budgetary restrictions and extremely rigid legislation. The book also shows that the implementation of similar solutions to case overload, such as access filters, may have different effects in different jurisdictions. The conclusion might well be that the problem of overburdened courts is multifactorial and context-dependent, and that easy, one-size-fits-all solutions are hard to find and perhaps even harder to implement.

Here is a comprehensive account of the U.S. Constitution--including its evolution and its impact on shaping American government and political representation. In eight fact-filled chapters, the authors carefully explore the Constitution's role. Those involved in the study of American More ... government, constitutional law, judicial behavior, legislative behavior, or politics will find this critical examination systematic, thorough, and thought-provoking.

On the Supreme Court places the Supreme Court in a rich historical and political context, demonstrating how its interpretations of statutes and the Constitution are necessarily shared with the elected branches, the 50 states, and the general public. It explains why the Court exercises judicial review, not judicial supremacy. It demonstrates that, contrary to popular opinion, the Court does not supply the final or exclusive word on the Constitution. As with other branches, it is capable of making errorssometimes quite major ones. A number of clear and interesting examples are marshaled to show how the Court at times recognizes its errors and reverses itself, or reverses itself under pressure from the elected branches, as with child labor legislation. Moreover, the book reveals that the Court has rarely been a reliable guardian of individual freedoms and minority rights. Often, Congress has been the better protector, with specific examples analyzed. In an era of tectonic changes, On the Supreme Court offers a fresh perspective on this mainstay institution from a scholar with unique insights as a Constitutional specialist as well as a Congressional researcher.

Reveals how the U.S. Supreme Court's presidentialism threatens our democracy and what to do about it. Donald Trump's presidency made many Americans wonder whether our system of checks and balances would prove robust enough to withstand an onslaught from a despotic chief executive. In The Specter of Dictatorship, David Driesen analyzes the chief executive's role in the democratic decline of Hungary, Poland, and Turkey and argues that an insufficiently constrained presidency is one of the most important systemic threats to democracy. Driesen urges the U.S. to learn from the mistakes of these failing democracies. Their experiences suggest, Driesen shows, that the Court must eschew its reliance on and expansion of the "unitary executive theory" recently endorsed by the Court and apply a less deferential approach to presidential authority, invoked to protect national security and combat emergencies, than it has in recent years. Ultimately, Driesen argues that concern about loss of democracy should play a major role in the Court's jurisprudence, because loss of democracy can prove irreversible. As autocracy spreads throughout the world, maintaining our democracy has become an urgent matter.