This volume contains 30 provocative essays, previously published in political science and law journals, on the abiding problems of American constitutional law. Mendelson organizes them under the headings: "The Judge's Art," "Freedom of Expression," and "The Path of the Law." The book includes thoughts on the American Constitution, the behavior of judges, and other judicial matters, such as James B. Thayer's influence on Holmes, Brandeis and Frankfurter; Justice Hugo Black's distrust of judicial discretion; Justice Douglas' views on the government by the judiciary and on adjudication of constitutional issues; the Bill of Rights; the Fourteenth Amendment; due process of law; and the Equal Rights Amendment. ISBN 0-8138-1047-7 : $21.95.

Constitutional Statecraft in Asian Courts explores how courts engage in constitutional state-building in aspiring, yet deeply fragile, democracies in Asia. Yvonne Tew offers an in-depth look at contemporary Malaysia and Singapore, explaining how courts protect and construct constitutionalism even as they confront dominant political parties and negotiate democratic transitions. This richly illustrative account offers at once an engaging analysis of Southeast Asia's constitutional context, as well as a broader narrative that should resonate in many countries across Asia that are also grappling with similar challenges of colonial legacies, histories of authoritarian rule, and societies polarized by race, religion, and identity. The book explores the judicial strategies used for statecraft in Asian courts, including an analysis of the specific mechanisms that courts can use to entrench constitutional basic structures and to protect rights in a manner that is purposive and proportionate. Tew's account shows how courts in Asia's emerging democracies can chart a path forward to help safeguard a nation's constitutional core and to build an enduring constitutional framework.

While common-sense attitudes towards the United States Supreme Court have been focused on what decisions they are likely to make, this book aims to focus on the impacts of other politicized elements of the Court. Through statistical modeling and other quantitative analyses, Justin DePlato examines the ability of the presidency and the Senate to influence and shape policy through the Court’s nomination process, docket selection, and judicial retirements. The Court operating as a political institution threatens to affect, where it hasn’t already outright intervened, civil liberties and social issues in the modern era and represents a controversial mechanic in the workings of American statecraft.

"This book provides a comprehensive study of Israeli statecraft, using an interdisciplinary framework to enable an in-depth understanding of its characteristics, challenges, and responses"--

How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? Building the Judiciary uncovers the causes and consequences of judicial institution-building in the United States from the commencement of the new government in 1789 through the close of the twentieth century. Explaining why and how the federal judiciary became an independent, autonomous, and powerful political institution, Justin Crowe moves away from the notion that the judiciary is exceptional in the scheme of American politics, illustrating instead how it is subject to the same architectonic politics as other political institutions. Arguing that judicial institution-building is fundamentally based on a series of contested questions regarding institutional design and delegation, Crowe develops a theory to explain why political actors seek to build the judiciary and the conditions under which they are successful. He both demonstrates how the motivations of institution-builders ranged from substantive policy to partisan and electoral politics to judicial performance, and details how reform was often provoked by substantial changes in the political universe or transformational entrepreneurship by political leaders. Embedding case studies of landmark institution-building episodes within a contextual understanding of each era under consideration, Crowe presents a historically rich narrative that offers analytically grounded explanations for why judicial institution-building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what--in the broader scheme of American constitutional democracy--it achieved.

With quiet eloquence, Lane Sunderland argues that we must reclaim the fundamental principles of the Constitution if we are to restore democratic government to its proper role in American life. For far too long, he contends, the popular will has been held in check by an overly powerful Supreme Court using non-constitutional principles to make policy and promote its own political agendas. His work shows why this has diminished American democracy and what we can do to revive it. Sunderland presents a strong, thoughtful challenge to the constitutional theories promoted by Ronald Dworkin, Archibald Cox, Richard Epstein, Michael Perry, John Hart Ely, Robert Bork, Philip Kurland, Laurence Tribe, Mark Tushnet, and Catharine MacKinnon—an enormously diverse group united by an apparent belief in judicial supremacy. Their theories, he demonstrates, undermine the democratic foundations of the Constitution and the power of the majority to resolve for itself important questions of justice. Central to this enterprise is Sunderland's reconsideration of The Federalist as the first, most reliable, and most profound commentary on the Constitution. "The Federalist," he states, "is crucial because it explains the underlying theory of the Constitution as a whole, a theory that gives meaning to its particular provisions." In addition, Sunderland reexamines the Declaration of Independence and the work of Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu, in order to better define the nature and limits of their influence on the Framers. His reading of these works in conjunction with The Federalist shows just how far afield contemporary commentators have strayed. Sunderland deliberately echoes and amplifies Madison's wisdom in Federalist No. 10 that the object of the Constitution is "to secure the public good and private rights . . . and at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of popular government." To attain that object, he persuasively argues, requires that the judiciary acknowledge and enforce the constitutional limitations upon its own powers. In an era loudly proclaiming the return of popular government, majority rule, and the "will of the people," that argument is especially relevant and appealing.