The process by which presidents decide whom to nominate to fill Supreme Court vacancies is obviously of far-ranging importance, particularly because the vast majority of nominees are eventually confirmed. But why is one individual selected from among a pool of presumably qualified candidates? In Strategic Selection: Presidential Nomination of Supreme Court Justices from Herbert Hoover through George W. Bush, Christine Nemacheck makes heavy use of presidential papers to reconstruct the politics of nominee selection from Herbert Hoover's appointment of Charles Evan Hughes in 1930 through President George W. Bush's nomination of Samuel Alito in 2005. Bringing to light firsthand evidence of selection politics and of the influence of political actors, such as members of Congress and presidential advisors, from the initial stages of formulating a short list through the president's final selection of a nominee, Nemacheck constructs a theoretical framework that allows her to assess the factors impacting a president's selection process. Much work on Supreme Court nominations focuses on struggles over confirmation, or is heavily based on anecdotal material and posits the "idiosyncratic" nature of the selection process; in contrast, Strategic Selection points to systematic patterns in judicial selection. Nemacheck argues that although presidents try to maximize their ideological preferences and minimize uncertainty about nominees' conduct once they are confirmed, institutional factors that change over time, such as divided government and the institutionalism of the presidency, shape and constrain their choices. By revealing the pattern of strategic action, which she argues is visible from the earliest stages of the selection process, Nemacheck takes us a long way toward understanding this critically important part of our political system.

Explains how United States presidents select justices for the Supreme Court, evaluates the performance of each justice, and examines the influence of politics on their selection.

He describes a new and better manner of deliberating about who should serve on the Court - an approach that puts the burden on nominees to show that their judicial philosophies and politics are acceptable to senators and citizens alike. And he makes a new case for the virtue of judicial moderates."

Norman Vieira and Leonard Gross provide an in-depth analysis of the political and legal framework surrounding the confirmation process for Supreme Court nominees. President Ronald Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court met with a fierce opposition that was apparent in his confirmation hearings, which were different in many ways from those of any previous nominee. This behind-the-scenes view of the politics and personalities involved in the Bork confirmation controversy provides a framework for future debates regarding the confirmation process. To help establish that framework, Vieira and Gross examine the similarities as well as the differences between the Bork confirmation battle and other confirmation proceedings for Supreme Court nominees.

Contents: (1) Pres. Selection of a Nominee: Senate Advice; Advice from Other Sources; Criteria for Selecting a Nominee; Background Invest.; Recess Appoint. to the Court; (2) Consid. by the Senate Judiciary Comm.: Background: Senators Nominated to the Court; Open Hear.; Nominee Appear. at Confirm. Hear.; Comm. Involvement in Appoint. Process; Pre-Hearing Stage; Hearings; Reporting the Nomin.; (3) Senate Debate and Confirm. Vote; Bringing Nomin. to the Floor; Evaluate Nominees; Filibusters and Motions to End Debate; Voice Votes, Roll Calls, and Vote Margins; Reconsid. of the Confirm. Vote; Nomin. That Failed to be Confirmed; Judiciary Comm. to Further Examine the Nomin.; After Senate Confirm.

In The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees, Maltese traces the evolution of the contentious and controversial confirmation process awaiting today's nominees to the nation's highest court. His story begins in the second half of the nineteenth century, when social and technological changes led to the rise of organized interest groups. Despite occasional victories, Maltese explains, structural factors limited the influence of such groups well into this century. Until 1913, senators were not popularly elected but chosen by state legislatures, undermining the potent threat of electoral retaliation that interest groups now enjoy. And until Senate rules changed in 1929, consideration of Supreme Court nominees took place in almost absolute secrecy. Floor debates and the final Senate vote usually took place in executive session. Even if interest groups could retaliate against senators, they often did not know whom to retaliate against.