Chile's experience shows that it is possible to design direct subsidies (such as Chile's subsidy for potable drinking water) at relatively low cost to the state and without distorting poor people's behavior. Prices have fallen substantially in services that new operators have entered, showing that regulation is a poor substitute for competition.

Chile's experience shows that it is possible to design direct subsidies (such as Chile's subsidy for potable drinking water) at relatively low cost to the state and without distorting poor people's behavior. Prices have fallen substantially in services that new operators have entered, showing that regulation is a poor substitute for competition.Serra analyzes subsidies in Chile's public utilities. Over the last decade, especially, significant efforts have been made to extend public services to rural populations. An explicit consumption subsidy for potable water (targeted to the poorest 20 percent of the population) currently benefits 17 percent of the population.Cross-subsidies have been virtually eliminated in Chile, and existing subsidies are funded from the national budget. The elimination of cross-subsidies has facilitated competition in some services. Prices have fallen substantially in services that new operators have entered, showing that regulation is a poor substitute for competition.The Chilean experience shows that it is possible to design direct subsidies (such as the one for drinking water) at relatively low cost to the state. Moreover, putting rural infrastructure projects out to public tender whenever possible has allowed substantial reductions in government spending.Chile's experience also shows that it is possible to use subsidies that do not distort people's behavior - by making sure that they perceive the marginal cost of providing the service. In rural areas it is advisable to introduce consumption subsidies with an upper limit on the amount subsidized, so that when a family consumes more than the subsidized amount, it perceives at the margin the total cost of providing the service.In rural zones where there is no infrastructure, investment needs to be subsidized. Users do not pay the long-run marginal cost, but it is important that the rate charged at least cover the short-term marginal cost. In other words, rural utility charges are required to cover the system's operating costs.For those who argue that the poor would be better off with cash transfers (choosing their own consumption baskets), Serra outlines the arguments for subsidizing utilities, beyond the moral value of giving the poor access to public services considered basic for existence.This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation.

Water pricing to achieve conservation in scarce water resources is a major policy challenge. This book provides credible evidence from water pricing experiences in various countries around the world. The book chapters, written by experts in water pricing from various countries, documents the past 10 to 15 years of water pricing experiences in Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, France, India, Israel, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa and Spain. The book includes also several chapters that review innovations in water pricing in various countries, such as new reform mechanisms, achieving social objectives via water pricing, achieving revenue recovery, water use efficiency and customer equity, and charging the poor.

This book offers a detailed examination of the main sources of Chile’s water, its principle consumers, the gap between supply and demand, hydrological droughts, and future projected impacts of climate change. It describes, analyzes and evaluates the performance of water policies, laws and institutions, identifies the main challenges that Chile needs to face and derives lessons learnt from Chile’s reform experience. Expert contributors discuss such topics as Chile’s water policy, and the reasoning which explains its policy reform. The book presents and evaluates the performance of the legal and institutional framework of water resources. It also describes efforts to meet actual demands for water by augmenting supplies with groundwater management, waste water re-use and desalination and improve the state of water ecosystems. The last chapter presents the editor’s assessment and conclusions. The case of Chile is illustrative of a transition from command and control to market based management policies, where economic incentives play a significant role in water management.

The need to reform energy subsidies was one of the pressing issues highlighted at the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Many types of subsidy, especially those that encourage the production and use of fossil fuel, and other non-renewable forms of energy, are harmful to the environment. They can also have high financial and economic costs, and often only bring few benefits to the people for whom they are intended.Removing, reducing or restructuring such energy subsidies is helpful for the environment and the economy at the same time. Potential social costs in terms of employment in the conventional energy industry or reduced access to energy could be addressed by redirecting the money formerly spent on subsidies to income support, health, environment, education or regional development programmes.Of course, subsidies can have certain positive consequences, particularly where they are aimed at encouraging more sustainable energy production and use. Temporary support for renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies to overcome market barriers, and measures to improve poor or rural households' access to modern, commercial forms of energy, for instance, could be positive measures in support of sustainable development.Based on ground-breaking work undertaken by UNEP and the International Energy Agency, this book aims to raise awareness of the actual and potential impacts of energy subsidies and provide guidance to policy-makers on how to design and implement energy-subsidy reforms. It provides methodologies for analysing the impact of subsidies and their reform, and reviews experiences with energy subsidies in a number of countries and regions. Drawing on these case studies, it analyses the lessons learned as well as the policy implications, and provides guidance on how to overcome resistance to reform.The book provides an analytical framework which aims to set the scene for the detailed discussion of energy-subsidy issues at the country level. It considers how subsidies are defined, how they can be measured, how big they are and how their effects can be assessed. A more detailed discussion of methodological approaches to the assessment of the economic, environmental and social effects of subsidies and their reform is contained in the Annex.Chapters 3–11 of the book contain country case studies from contributing authors, which review various experiences and issues related to energy subsidies in selected countries, but do not strive for a common approach. They are organised along geographical lines, beginning with a review of energy subsidies generally in OECD countries. Case studies of energy subsidies in transition economies – the Czech and Slovak Republics (Chapter 4) and Russia (Chapter 5) – follow. Three studies of Asian countries focus on the costs of different types of energy subsidy: electricity subsidies in India (Chapter 6), oil subsidies in Indonesia (Chapter 7) and energy subsidies generally in Korea (Chapter 8). Chapter 9 reviews the effect of energy subsidies in Iran and suggests a pragmatic approach to reforming them. This is followed by an assessment of the LPG subsidy programme in Senegal (Chapter 10) and an analysis of the effects of removing coal and oil subsides in Chile (Chapter 11).Chapter 12 analyses the lessons learned from these case studies, focusing on the economic, environmental and social effects and their implications for policy. Finally, Chapter 13 discusses the implications of these findings and makes practical recommendations for designing and implementing policy reforms.This book will be essential for both practitioners and academics involved in the energy sector and for governments and policy-makers wishing to examine the reform of energy subsidies.

May 2000 - An alternative to traditional subsidies for water and sanitation services is direct subsidies - funds governments provide to cover part of the water bill for households that meet certain criteria. Issues associated with such a subsidy are analyzed through a case study of Panama. As an alternative to traditional subsidy schemes in utility sectors, direct subsidy programs have several advantages: they are transparent, they are explicit, and they minimize distortions of the behavior of both the utility and the customers. At the same time, defining practical eligibility criteria for direct subsidy schemes is difficult and identifying eligible households may entail substantial administrative costs. Foster, Gomez-Lobo, and Halpern, using a case study from Panama, discuss some of the issues associated with the design of direct subsidy systems for water services. They conclude that: · There is a need to assess - rather than assume - the need for a subsidy. A key test of affordability, and thus of the need for a subsidy, is to compare the cost of the service with some measure of household willingness to pay. · The initial assessment must consider the affordability of connection costs as well as the affordability of the service itself. Connection costs may be prohibitive for poor households with no credit, suggesting a need to focus subsidies on providing access rather than ongoing water consumption. · A key issue in designing a direct subsidy scheme is its targeting properties. Poverty is a complex phenomenon and difficult to measure. Eligibility must therefore be based on easily measurable proxy variables, and good proxies are hard to find. In choosing eligibility criteria for a subsidy, it is essential to verify what proportion of the target group fails to meet the criteria (errors of exclusion) and what proportion of nontarget groups is inadvertently eligible for the benefits (errors of inclusion). · Administrative costs are roughly the same no matter what the level of individual subsidies, so a scheme that pays beneficiaries very little will tend not to be cost-effective. It is important to determine what proportion of total program costs will be absorbed by administrative expenses. · Subsidies should not cover the full cost of the service and should be contingent on beneficiaries paying their share of the bill. Subsidies for consumption above a minimum subsistence level should be avoided. Subsidies should be provided long enough before eligibility is reassessed to avoid poverty trap problems. · The utility or concessionaire can be helpful in identifying eligible candidates because of its superior information on the payment histories of customers. It will also have an incentive to do so, since it has an interest in improving poor payment records. Thought should therefore be given at the design stage to the role of the service provider in the implementation of the subsidy scheme. · The administrative agency's responsibilities, the sources of funding, and the general principles guiding the subsidy system should have a clear legal basis, backed by regulations governing administrative procedures. · To reduce administrative costs and avoid duplication of effort, it would be desirable for a single set of institutional arrangements to be used to determine eligibility for all welfare and subsidy programs in a given jurisdiction, whether subnational or national. This paper - a product of the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to evaluate and disseminate lessons of experience in designing policies to improve the quality and sustainability of infrastructure services and to enhance access of the poor to these basic services. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].

Do Latin America's poor households lose from the privatization of infrastructure? How can policymakers minimize the risk of losses while promoting competition and private financing of infrastructure?