n this extremely comprehensive overview of airlift and air mobility, Colonel Miller shows how the worldwide orientation of American foreign policy, the numerous threats to free-world interests, and the speed and complexity of modern warfare have combined with political and resource constraints to produce today's airlift doctrine and force structure. Airlift is the movement of goods and people to where they are needed, when they are needed there. Since the 1920s there has been an evolving awareness and articulation of how to best organize, train, and equip airlift forces for that mission. The worldwide orientation of American foreign policy, the numerous threats to free world interests, and the speed and complexity of modern warfare have combined with political and resource constraints to produce today's airlift doctrine and force structure. Colonel Miller's study traces these many interrelationships to discover what critical airlift decisions were made, why they were made, and what they may mean in the future. Airlift is the backbone of deterrence. A properly structured and equipped airlift force is critical to the successful execution of the national military strategy. How we think about airlift and how we translate those thoughts into a meaningful expression of how to develop, deploy, and employ airlift forces is vital to the national defense. Colonel Miller's study is a definitive step in that important process.

The memoirs of Lieutenant General William H. Tunner, a key leader in the development of military airlift from World War II through 1960. He recounts major challenges of his career: organizing the aircraft ferrying effort of World War II, flying the "Hump" route of supply from India to China, managing the Berlin Airlift in 1948 and 1949, and commanding the Combat Cargo Command of Far East Air Forces in the crucial early months of the Korean War. Photos.

This book was donated as a part of the David H. Hugel Collection, a collection of the Special Collections & Archives, University of Baltimore.

This is the story of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) from its inception to 1991. In suggesting such a reserve airlift fleet in 1947, Admiral E. S. Land, President of the Air Transport Association, drew on the organization's experience with mobilization planning in the mid- to late-1930s and on the airlines' experience in the early months of World War II. "As I see it," he said, "we would have to face it along the same general lines as we did then, omitting as many of the mistakes as possible, of course. At the beginning of the last war, the air transport system had a detailed war plan. Given the necessary information from the military services as to their needs, we can develop this one." The Civil Reserve Air Fleet concept was formally approved on December 15, 1951-by a memorandum of understanding between the Departments of Commerce and Defense. It began to take shape in 1952, when it was allocated some 300 four-engine, airline aircraft for use in case of war or a national emergency. Planning for the use of these assets began almost immediately and interim arrangements were in place by mid-1953. Still, it was not until 1958 that a formal wartime organization was agreed to, and not until 1959 that the first major carrier signed the standby contract that obligated it to provide crews and aircraft in case of a major war or national emergency. Two factors clearly shape the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. The first, the nation's military strategies, dictated the airlift resources CRAF was asked to supply. As it happened, evolving strategies entailed an ever growing requirement for CRAF airlift. By the late 1950s, U.S. military strategy promised the ability to respond across the spectrum of aggression, and then, two decades later, it committed the nation to an increasingly rapid deployment of forces to NATO. The second factor was economic, the economics of the air transportation marketplace. Despite the efforts of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and, its successor, the Military Airlift Command (MAC) to influence the make-up of airline fleets-in particular attempts to encourage the airlines to increase their cargo capability-it was the circumstances of the commercial marketplace that drove the decisions. When the air freight business failed to grow as expected, and when the lower-lobe capacity of the airlines' widebody jets proved capable of handling what air freight there was, the scheduled airlines began to divest themselves of their freighter aircraft. MAC's efforts to halt or even to slow this process proved ineffectual. It was not until the development of the air express parcel business, that the industry began once again to add cargo aircraft. Again, it was the economic forces that intervened, not MAC. This is the story of the evolution of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet-from its roots in the pre-World War II planning of the ATA and the Army Air Corps Staff, through its creation in 1951 and its evolution over the years, to a seemingly troubled existence in 1987.