called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas-as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modem sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modem times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a na!ivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate a priori possibilities and necessities.

Originally published in French under the title La Logique de Husserl: Étude sur Logique Formelle et logique transcendentale.

Coming from what is arguably the most productive period of Husserl's life, this volume offers the reader a first translation into English of Husserl's renowned lectures on `passive synthesis', given between 1920 and 1926. These lectures are the first extensive application of Husserl's newly developed genetic phenomenology to perceptual experience and to the way in which it is connected to judgments and cognition. They include an historical reflection on the crisis of contemporary thought and human spirit, provide an archaeology of experience by questioning back into sedimented layers of meaning, and sketch the genealogy of judgment in `active synthesis'. Drawing upon everyday events and personal experiences, the Analyses are marked by a patient attention to the subtle emergence of sense in our lives. By advancing a phenomenology of association that treats such phenomena as bodily kinaesthesis, temporal genesis, habit, affection, attention, motivation, and the unconscious, Husserl explores the cognitive dimensions of the body in its affectively significant surroundings. An elaboration of these diverse modes of evidence and their modalizations (transcendental aesthetic), allows Husserl to trace the origin of truth up to judicative achievements (transcendental logic). Joined by several of Husserl's essays on static and genetic method, the Analyses afford a richness of description unequalled by the majority of Husserl's works available to English readers. Students of phenomenology and of Husserl's thought will find this an indispensable work.

Coinciding with the renewed interest in Husserl and the origins of phenomenology, Logical Investigations, his most famous and influential work, is presented here in paperback for the first time.

Husserl and Mathematics explains the development of Husserl's phenomenological method in the context of his engagement in modern mathematics and its foundations. Drawing on his correspondence and other written sources, Mirja Hartimo details Husserl's knowledge of a wide range of perspectives on the foundations of mathematics, including those of Hilbert, Brouwer and Weyl, as well as his awareness of the new developments in the subject during the 1930s. Hartimo examines how Husserl's philosophical views responded to these changes, and offers a pluralistic and open-ended picture of Husserl's phenomenology of mathematics. Her study shows Husserl's phenomenology to be a method capable of both shedding light on and internally criticizing scientific practices and concepts.