This book focuses on several specific features characterizing China’s economy in the Mao era (1952–1976), and discusses whether and how they are related to the new economic strategy called “reforms and opening-up” under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership with the result of the aftermath of well-known rapid growth. It provides the reader with basic knowledge of the continuity and discontinuity between the Mao and Deng eras. Readers are provided with some important clues for thinking about how Maoist China could have contributed to or alternatively prevented today’s economic development. The topics addressed here include a brief overview of economic development under Mao, significant differences between Mao and Deng economics, and socialist transformations during the early Mao era. These include collectivization as well as communization and the effects on agricultural productivity; water supply construction drives utilizing a vast amount of rural surplus labor; rural finance; the effects on national savings, and the development of heavy and light industry. Also considered are the effects on the socialist industrialization, rural small-scale industries during the Cultural Revolution and their aftermath, and the realities of social life in a Third-front construction site promoted by Mao’s military strategy in the 1960s. This book is highly recommended to readers who are interested in contemporary China’s economy, particularly to scholars and students. The volume gives new insight into the background or preconditions that made possible historically rare miracles of the Chinese economy after Mao.

In the first systematic study of its kind, Hua-yu Li explains why, in 1953, Mao suddenly changed direction in economic policy and launched China on a Stalinist road to socialism. In so doing, he profoundly changed the country's economic and political landscape. Including rich archival materials recently released from China and Russia, this book carefully examines Mao's ideological orientation and his relationship with Stalin. Li argues that Mao made this policy shift for two reasons: his commitment to Stalin's ideas as expressed in an influential historical text compiled under Stalin's guidance on the Soviet experience of building socialism and his competitive zeal to surpass Stalin by building socialism in China faster than Stalin had achieved it in the Soviet Union. The timing of the change arose from Mao's belief that China was ready to begin building socialism and from his interpreting an ambiguous statement Stalin made in October 1952 as an endorsement of the policy shift. Situating its analysis within the larger context of the world communist movement, this carefully researched book will have a profound impact on the fields of communist studies and Sino-Soviet relations and in studies of Mao, Stalin, and their relationship.

Economic development in mainland China during the first two decades of Communist control provides a typical example for the difficult task to transform a vast underdeveloped agrarian economy into a modern industrial one. In the first half of this period, a series of massive transformations of social and economic institutions was accompanied by a drafted industrialization program; the result was an impressive speed-up in economic growth. The second decade witnessed an economic crisis (1960-62) and a political upheaval (1966-68). These disruptions marred the economic performance over the period as a whole. Consequently, the long-term growth rate appears to have been only moderate.The Economy of Communist China reviews selected aspects of the economy. After examining the development strategy, it analyzes the quantitative trends and the structural changes. The book goes on to analyze the key factors contributing to the earlier growth and the elements responsible for the later disruption and finally assesses the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese economy and the prospects of the current Third Five-Year Plan.The text includes a bibliography of selected materials on Chinese economic development.

This thoroughly researched and clearly written compendium of available statistical information on China provides reliable information, careful explanations, useful guides to further research, and a full bibliography. An exhaustive compilation of national and provincial statistics on mainland China from 1949 to 1959, this book covers every facet of the Communist Chinese economy and presents the most comprehensive coverage available of statistical data on China from this period. Based on data obtained directly from Chinese sources, this book is the first attempt to provide Western readers with a reliable reference on the economy of mainland China. Nai-Ruenn Chen thoroughly and systematically examines each area of the economy and provides an authoritative guide to the terminology, classification, and method of collecting and listing data presented in the ample tables included in the book. Except in cases where missing information could be filled by simple arithmetic means or from descriptions by the Chinese themselves, no data was synthesized by inferential methods and no non-Chinese estimates were used. Rather Chen lists formulae for achieving indices for statistical measurement, defines geographical, economic, and administrative units of measurement, and explains the development of statistical procedures that have evolved in China. This volume is divided into eleven sections: area and population; national income; capital formation and related estimates; industry; agriculture; transportation and communication; trade; prices; living standards; public finance, credit, and foreign exchange rates; and employment, labor productivity, and wages. Each section consists of two parts: one containing the explanatory text, and the other, statistical tables grouped largely according to Chinese classifications. Chinese Economic Statistics in the Maoist Era: 1949-1965 is indispensable to anyone studying China, a valuable source for students of economic develo

Along with the political and economic reforms that have characterized the post-Mao era in China there has been a potentially revolutionary change in Chinese science and technology. Here sixteen scholars examine various facets of the current science and technology scene, comparing it with the past and speculating about future trends. Two chapters dealing with science under the Nationalists and under Mao are followed by a section of extensive analysis of reforms under Deng Xiaoping, focusing on the organizational system, the use of human resources, and the emerging response to market forces. Chapters dealing with changes in medical care, agriculture, and military research and development demonstrate how these reforms have affected specific areas during the Chinese shift away from Party orthodoxy and Maoist populism toward professional expertise as the guiding principle in science and technology. Three further chapters deal with China's interface with the world at large in the process of technology transfer. Both the introductory and concluding chapters describe the tension between the Chinese Communist Party structure, with its inclinations toward strict vertical control, and the scientific and technological community's need for a free flow of information across organizational, disciplinary, and national boundaries.

How China Became Capitalist details the extraordinary, and often unanticipated, journey that China has taken over the past thirty five years in transforming itself from a closed agrarian socialist economy to an indomitable economic force in the international arena. The authors revitalise the debate around the rise of the Chinese economy through the use of primary sources, persuasively arguing that the reforms implemented by the Chinese leaders did not represent a concerted attempt to create a capitalist economy, and that it was 'marginal revolutions' that introduced the market and entrepreneurship back to China. Lessons from the West were guided by the traditional Chinese principle of 'seeking truth from facts'. By turning to capitalism, China re-embraced her own cultural roots. How China Became Capitalist challenges received wisdom about the future of the Chinese economy, warning that while China has enormous potential for further growth, the future is clouded by the government's monopoly of ideas and power. Coase and Wang argue that the development of a market for ideas which has a long and revered tradition in China would be integral in bringing about the Chinese dream of social harmony.