Studies in U.S. Supreme Court Behavior
Title | Studies in U.S. Supreme Court Behavior PDF eBook |
Author | Harold J. Spaeth |
Publisher | Scholarly Title |
Pages | 368 |
Release | 1990 |
Genre | Law |
ISBN |
Presents studies of the Supreme Court arranged in chronological stages. Each of these stages constitutes a chapter in which the authors systematically analyze the Court's control of its docket, the justices' initial vote on the merits of the cases it has agreed to decide, how majority opinions are assigned, the explanation for the final vote on the merits, the writing and joining of special (non- majority) opinions, and the Court's output. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).
The Behavior of Federal Judges
Title | The Behavior of Federal Judges PDF eBook |
Author | Lee Epstein |
Publisher | Harvard University Press |
Pages | 491 |
Release | 2013-01-07 |
Genre | Law |
ISBN | 0674070682 |
Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision-makers is not well understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made. The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor-market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors: as self-interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of their work. In the authors' view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional “legalist” theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior. Ideology does figure into decision-making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform. It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision-making. Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes.
Judicial Conflict and Consensus
Title | Judicial Conflict and Consensus PDF eBook |
Author | Sheldon Goldman |
Publisher | University Press of Kentucky |
Pages | 390 |
Release | 2021-10-21 |
Genre | Political Science |
ISBN | 0813186226 |
These original essays by major scholars of judicial behavior explore the frequency, intensity, and especially the causes of conflict and consensus among judges on American appellate courts. Together, these studies provide new insights into judges' attitudes and values, role perceptions, and small group interactions.
The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior
Title | The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior PDF eBook |
Author | Lee Epstein |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 625 |
Release | 2017 |
Genre | Law |
ISBN | 019957989X |
The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior offers readers a comprehensive introduction and analysis of research regarding decision making by judges serving on federal and state courts in the U.S. Featuring contributions from leading scholars in the field, the Handbook describes and explains how the courts' political and social context, formal institutional structures, and informal norms affect judicial decision making. The Handbook also explores the impact of judges' personal attributes and preferences, as well as prevailing legal doctrine, influence, and shape case outcomes in state and federal courts. The volume also proposes avenues for future research in the various topics addressed throughout the book. Consultant Editor for The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics George C. Edwards III.
Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making
Title | Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making PDF eBook |
Author | Paul M. Collins, Jr. |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 249 |
Release | 2008-08-15 |
Genre | Law |
ISBN | 0199707227 |
The U.S. Supreme Court is a public policy battleground in which organized interests attempt to etch their economic, legal, and political preferences into law through the filing of amicus curiae ("friend of the court") briefs. In Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making, Paul M. Collins, Jr. explores how organized interests influence the justices' decision making, including how the justices vote and whether they choose to author concurrences and dissents. Collins presents theories of judicial choice derived from disciplines as diverse as law, marketing, political science, and social psychology. This theoretically rich and empirically rigorous treatment of decision-making on the nation's highest court, which represents the most comprehensive examination ever undertaken of the influence of U.S. Supreme Court amicus briefs, provides clear evidence that interest groups play a significant role in shaping the justices' choices.
The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions
Title | The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions PDF eBook |
Author | Theodore Lewis Becker |
Publisher | New York : Oxford University Press |
Pages | 262 |
Release | 1973 |
Genre | Language Arts & Disciplines |
ISBN |
Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court
Title | Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court PDF eBook |
Author | James R. Rogers |
Publisher | University of Virginia Press |
Pages | 606 |
Release | 2012-10-05 |
Genre | Political Science |
ISBN | 0813934192 |
Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices’ votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to "sophisticated" behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with constraints on their ability to do so. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court, James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential interactions among various branches of the U.S. government. Contributors: Kenneth A. Shepsle, Andrew De Martin, James R. Rogers, Christopher Zorn, Georg Vanberg, Cliff Carrubba, Thomas Hammond, Christopher Bonneau, Reginald Sheehan, Charles Cameron, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Matthew Stephenson, Stefanie A. Lindquist, Susan D. Haire, Lawrence Baum