The New York Times Bestseller and Winner of the 2015 Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award for Unit History. Since the attacks of September 11, one organization has been at the forefront of America's military response. Its efforts turned the tide against al-Qaida in Iraq, killed Bin Laden and Zarqawi, rescued Captain Phillips and captured Saddam Hussein. Its commander can direct cruise missile strikes from nuclear submarines and conduct special operations raids anywhere in the world. Relentless Strike tells the inside story of Joint Special Operations Command, the secret military organization that during the past decade has revolutionized counterterrorism, seamlessly fusing intelligence and operational skills to conduct missions that hit the headlines, and those that have remained in the shadows-until now. Because JSOC includes the military's most storied special operations units-Delta Force, SEAL Team 6, the 75th Ranger Regiment-as well as America's most secret aviation and intelligence units, this is their story, too. Relentless Strike reveals tension-drenched meetings in war rooms from the Pentagon to Iraq and special operations battles from the cabin of an MH-60 Black Hawk to the driver's seat of Delta Force's Pinzgauer vehicles as they approach their targets. Through exclusive interviews, reporter Sean Naylor uses his unique access to reveal how an organization designed in the 1980s for a very limited mission set transformed itself after 9/11 to become the military's premier weapon in the war against terrorism and how it continues to evolve today.

This book looks at the origins of the World War Two Commands and their outline histories until 1968. It also looks at the operations that took place during Strike Commands existence, the aircraft they flew and the men who flew them.

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.

After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions.

-> Historically rich in detail with previously unpublished photographs from private archives -> Researched and written by an aviation and military historian renowned author -> Essential for military/historians, modellers, flight-sim enthusiasts (War Thunder, IL-2 Sturmovik: Great Battles and DCS) and those interested in the complexities of aircraft design and production during the Second World War ‘They sowed the wind and now they are going to reap the whirlwind.’ Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris The concept of an aerial campaign on a nation’s industrial and military might was advocated by Britain before the start of the First World War; however, a stringent post-war economy ensured that the creation of Bomber Command in 1936 witnessed a daunting disparity between the aim of striking at an adversary’s ability to sustain itself and the means to do so. From 1939 to 1942, Bomber Command was very weak in terms of human and material losses. The navigational means with which to accurately guide bombers to targets was almost completely lacking while the enemy defensive network inflicted serious casualties. Consequently, the punishment handed out was minimal. The resurgence of Bomber Command’s fortunes coincided with the appointment of Sir Arthur Harris. The advent of four-engine designs such as the Avro Lancaster and Handley Page Halifax ensured that a greatly increased bomb tonnage could be delivered. Also, electronic aids such as Gee, Oboe and H2S simplified the task in finding targets. Therefore, by 1944-1945, the RAF’s bombers pulverised Hitler’s Third Reich. Although flak and night-fighters took a heavy toll on the bombers, the RAF’s nocturnal offensive in conjunction with the USAAF’s daylight assaults crippled Germany’s ability to fight back.

The Navy has put forth a new construct for its strike forces that enables more effective forward deterrence and rapid response. A key aspect of this construct is the need for flexible, adaptive command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. To assist development of this capability, the Navy asked the NRC to examine C4ISR for carrier, expeditionary, and strike and missile defense strike groups, and for expeditionary strike forces. This report provides an assessment of C4ISR capabilities for each type of strike group; recommendations for C4ISR architecture for use in major combat operations; promising technology trends; and an examination of organizational improvements that can enable the recommended architecture.