The early history of British aerial defence development is one of misdirection and delusion. The misdirection, judging by the criteria of successful aerial defence in World War II, was primarily in the downgrading of home defence measures including the fighter plane. The delusion, again judging by Britain’s efforts in that second world war, was primarily in the assumption of the effects to be obtained by strategic bombing. In both cases, the First World War was a major catalyst. Although events and writings before that war indicate the coming patterns, it was during that war that a great amount of the patterns are well established. Originally published in 1976, this work explores these origins and stresses the interaction between various diverse segments of English society in the formation of the major patterns. The working out of these patterns in the first half of the interwar years is also analysed, again with respect to diverse groupings in Britain.

In the hopes of "preserving these delightful devices for future generations," this collector of slide rules covers everything one could possibly want to know about this crude form of analog computer: from its invention in the 17th century to manufacturers- retailers, 1850-1998, and the Oughtred Society for collectors. Includes a glossary with biographies, patent data, component specs, dating and valuing, care, historical milestones, and illustrations

A major revision of our understanding of long-range bombing, this book examines how Anglo-American ideas about "strategic" bombing were formed and implemented. It argues that ideas about bombing civilian targets rested on--and gained validity from--widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment. These assumptions were derived from the social and political context of the day and were maintained largely through cognitive error and bias. Tami Davis Biddle explains how air theorists, and those influenced by them, came to believe that strategic bombing would be an especially effective coercive tool and how they responded when their assumptions were challenged. Biddle analyzes how a particular interpretation of the World War I experience, together with airmen's organizational interests, shaped interwar debates about strategic bombing and preserved conceptions of its potentially revolutionary character. This flawed interpretation as well as a failure to anticipate implementation problems were revealed as World War II commenced. By then, the British and Americans had invested heavily in strategic bombing. They saw little choice but to try to solve the problems in real time and make long-range bombing as effective as possible. Combining narrative with analysis, this book presents the first-ever comparative history of British and American strategic bombing from its origins through 1945. In examining the ideas and rhetoric on which strategic bombing depended, it offers critical insights into the validity and robustness of those ideas--not only as they applied to World War II but as they apply to contemporary warfare.

This book is the only full-scale account of the strategic air offensive against Germany published in the last twenty years, and is the only one that treats the British and the Americans with parity. Much of what Levine writes about British operations will be unfamiliar to American readers. He has stressed the importance of winning air superiority and the role of escort fighters in strategic bombing, and has given more attention to the German side than most writers on air warfare have. Levine gets past a simple account of what we did to them and describes the target systems and German countermeasures in detail, providing exact yet dramatic accounts of the great bomber operations--the Ruhr dams, Ploesti, and Regensburg and Schweinfurt. The book is broad-guaged, touching many matters, from the development of bombing doctrine before the war to the technical development of the Luftwaffe and the RAF, jets and V-weapons, to the role of the heavy bombers in supporting land and sea operations. Levine stresses the impact of bombing on the war, and generally endorses the strategic air campaign as worthwhile and effective. But he concludes that many mistakes were made by the Allies--both the British and the Americans--in tactics, the development of equipment, and in the selection of targets. Levine sees strategic bombing as a powerful tool that was often misused, particularly when the doctrine of area bombing flourished. Scholars, students, and buffs interested in World War II and/or the history of aviation will find this study of great interest.

In the early twentieth century, the new technology of flight changed warfare irrevocably, not only on the battlefield, but also on the home front. As prophesied before 1914, Britain in the First World War was effectively no longer an island, with its cities attacked by Zeppelin airships and Gotha bombers in one of the first strategic bombing campaigns. Drawing on prewar ideas about the fragility of modern industrial civilization, some writers now began to argue that the main strategic risk to Britain was not invasion or blockade, but the possibility of a sudden and intense aerial bombardment of London and other cities, which would cause tremendous destruction and massive casualties. The nation would be shattered in a matter of days or weeks, before it could fully mobilize for war. Defeat, decline, and perhaps even extinction, would follow. This theory of the knock-out blow from the air solidified into a consensus during the 1920s and by the 1930s had largely become an orthodoxy, accepted by pacifists and militarists alike. But the devastation feared in 1938 during the Munich Crisis, when gas masks were distributed and hundreds of thousands fled London, was far in excess of the damage wrought by the Luftwaffe during the Blitz in 1940 and 1941, as terrible as that was. The knock-out blow, then, was a myth. But it was a myth with consequences. For the first time, The Next War in the Air reconstructs the concept of the knock-out blow as it was articulated in the public sphere, the reasons why it came to be so widely accepted by both experts and non-experts, and the way it shaped the responses of the British public to some of the great issues facing them in the 1930s, from pacifism to fascism. Drawing on both archival documents and fictional and non-fictional publications from the period between 1908, when aviation was first perceived as a threat to British security, and 1941, when the Blitz ended, and it became clear that no knock-out blow was coming, The Next War in the Air provides a fascinating insight into the origins and evolution of this important cultural and intellectual phenomenon, Britain's fear of the bomber.

In 1918, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) played a critical role in defeating the German army and thus winning the First World War. This 'Hundred Days' campaign (August to November 1918) was the greatest series of land victories in British military history. 1918 also saw the creation of the Royal Air Force, the world's first independent air service, from the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service. Until recently, British histories of the First World War have tended to concentrate on the earlier battles of 1916 and 1917 and often underplayed this vitally important period. Changing War fills this significant gap in our knowledge by providing in-depth examinations of key aspects of the operations of the British Army, the Royal Air Force and its antecedents in the climactic year of the First World War. Written by a group of established historians and emerging scholars it sheds light not only on 1918, but on the revolutionary changes in warfare that took place at that time.

This book, first published in 1985, is an in-depth analysis of the Luftwaffe in the Second World War, using previously untapped German archives and newly-released ‘Ultra’ intelligence records. It looks at the Luftwaffe within the context of the overall political decision-making process within the Third Reich. It is especially valuable for its careful study of industrial production and pilot losses in the conduct of operations.