Strategic Foundations of Oligopolies in General Equilibrium
Title | Strategic Foundations of Oligopolies in General Equilibrium PDF eBook |
Author | Simone Tonin |
Publisher | |
Pages | 96 |
Release | 2015 |
Genre | Competition |
ISBN |
Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium
Title | Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium PDF eBook |
Author | Douglas Gale |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Pages | 236 |
Release | 2000-08-15 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 9780521644105 |
The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-taking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses game theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-taking behavior. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.
Strategic Complementarities and Endogenous Heterogeneity in Oligopolistic Markets
Title | Strategic Complementarities and Endogenous Heterogeneity in Oligopolistic Markets PDF eBook |
Author | Malgorzata Knauff |
Publisher | Presses univ. de Louvain |
Pages | 168 |
Release | 2006 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 9782874630118 |
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first of them contains introduction. Chapter 2 considers a broad class of two player symmetric games, which display a fundamental non-concavity when actions of both players are about to be the same. This implies that no symmetric equilibrium is possible. We distinguish different properties of the payoff functions, like strategic substitutes, complements and quasi-concavity, which are not necessarily imposed globally on the joint action space. A number of applications from industrial organization and applied microeconomics literature are provided. In Chapter 3 we generalize to the extent possible the known results for the case of games with one-dimensional action sets to the general case of games with action spaces that are complete lattices. We find that in the general case the scope for asymmetric equilibrium behavior is definitely broader than in the one-dimensional case, though still quite limited. Moreover, we investigate under which sufficient conditions asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria are always Pareto dominated by symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria. In Chapter 4 we deal with the effects of market transparency on prices in the Bertrand duopoly model. We consider two types of strategic interaction between firms in an industry - strategic complementarities and substitutabilities. In the first case, the results are close to conventional wisdom, especially, when in the same time products are substitutes. Namely, equilibrium prices and profits are always decreasing in transparency level, while the consumer’s surplus is increasing. Considering price competition with strategic substitutes, an ambiguity in the direction of change of prices appears. This leads to ambiguity concerning equilibrium profits and surplus changes caused by increasing transparency. In Chapter 5 we provide general conditions for Cournot oligopoly with product differentiation to have monotonic reaction correspondences. We give a proof for the conditions stated by Vives (1999). Moreover we elaborate more general requirements. They allow for identifying increasing best responses even in case inverse demand is submodular, and similarly, decreasing best responses in case of supermodular inverse demand. Examples illustrating the scope of applicability of these results are provided.
Oligopoly Pricing
Title | Oligopoly Pricing PDF eBook |
Author | Xavier Vives |
Publisher | MIT Press (MA) |
Pages | 446 |
Release | 1999 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 9780262220606 |
Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.
Intermediate Microeconomics
Title | Intermediate Microeconomics PDF eBook |
Author | Patrick M. Emerson |
Publisher | |
Pages | |
Release | 2019 |
Genre | Economics |
ISBN |
The Flawed Foundations of General Equilibrium Theory
Title | The Flawed Foundations of General Equilibrium Theory PDF eBook |
Author | Frank Ackerman |
Publisher | Routledge |
Pages | 418 |
Release | 2004-06-24 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 1135997373 |
This book, as the title suggests, explains how General equilibrium, the dominant conceptual framework in mainstream economics, describes a perfectly impossible world. Even with its counterfactual assumptions taken for granted, it fails on many levels. Under the impressive editorship of Ackerman and Nadal, this book will appeal to students and resea
New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure
Title | New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure PDF eBook |
Author | International Economic Association |
Publisher | MIT Press |
Pages | 588 |
Release | 1986 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 9780262690935 |
These contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of market structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors which determine the effective degree of competition in the market; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordination under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies.ContributorsJoseph E. Stiglitz, G. C. Archibald, B. C. Eaton, R. G. Lipsey, David Enaoua, Paul Geroski, Alexis Jacquemin, Richard J. Gilbert, Reinhard Selten, Oliver E. Williamson, Jerry R. Green, G. Frank Mathewson, R. A. Winter, C. d'Aspremont, J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Steven Salop, Branko Horvat, Z. Roman, W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, R. D. Willig, Richard Schmalensee, Richard Nelson, Michael Scence, and Partha Dasgupta