Good strategic assessment does not guarantee success in international relations, but bad strategic assessment dramatically increases the risk of disastrous failure. The most glaring example of this reality is playing out in Iraq today. But what explains why states and their leaders are sometimes so good at strategic assessment--and why they are sometimes so bad at it? Part of the explanation has to do with a state's civil-military relations. In Shaping Strategy, Risa Brooks develops a novel theory of how states' civil-military relations affect strategic assessment during international conflicts. And her conclusions have broad practical importance: to anticipate when states are prone to strategic failure abroad, we must look at how civil-military relations affect the analysis of those strategies at home. Drawing insights from both international relations and comparative politics, Shaping Strategy shows that good strategic assessment depends on civil-military relations that encourage an easy exchange of information and a rigorous analysis of a state's own relative capabilities and strategic environment. Among the diverse case studies the book illuminates, Brooks explains why strategic assessment in Egypt was so poor under Gamal Abdel Nasser prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and why it improved under Anwar Sadat. The book also offers a new perspective on the devastating failure of U.S. planning for the second Iraq war. Brooks argues that this failure, far from being unique, is an example of an assessment pathology to which states commonly succumb.

How do military organizations assess strategic policy in war? In this book Scott Gartner develops a theory to explain how military and government leaders evaluate wartime performance, how much they change strategies in response to this evaluation, and why they are frequently at odds when discussing the success or failure of strategic performance. Blending history, decision theory, and mathematical modeling, Gartner argues that military personnel do reevaluate their strategies and that they measure the performance of a strategy through quantitative, "dominant" indicators. But different actors within a government use different indicators of success: some will see the strategy as succeeding when others see it as failing because of their different dominant indicators. Gartner tests his argument with three case studies: the British shift to convoys in World War I following the German imposition of unrestricted submarine warfare; the lack of change in British naval policy in the Battle of the Atlantic following the German introduction of Wolf Packs in World War II; and the American decision to deescalate in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. He also tests his approach in a nonwar situation, analyzing the Carter Administration's decision to launch the hostage rescue attempt. In each case, his dominant indicator model better predicts the observed behavior than either a standard-organization or an action-reaction approach.

Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is a new approach to environmental assessment, global in scope, which considers the environmental impacts of policies, plans and programmes. It is already in use in a number of countries and is rapidly being adopted by those involved with environmental management and regulation, including governments, official and voluntary sector agencies, academic courses and consultancies. This text defines and analyzes SEA within the overall context of environmental assessment. It introduces and reviews the current state of SEA, evaluates its application in a number of countries with a range of detailed case studies, provides a critique of its techniques and an analysis of its importance for the future.

This volume gathers a selection of research contributions on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), including theoretical and methodological studies and real-world case studies. It sheds new light on the respective steps in the procedure defined in the SEA Directive from theoretical and operational standpoints, intended to enhance the sustainability of plans and programmes adopted by local, regional and national authorities. Improving the legitimacy and transparency of decision-making in the field of environmental management was one of the goals that led the European Commission (EU) to adopt Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of environmental programmes’ effects. This book provides a multidisciplinary approach to SEA, and addresses the demand for policies and strategies to strengthen resilience through concrete measures to reduce energy consumption, mitigate pollution, promote social inclusion and create urban identity.

This study argues that the George W. Bush administration charted the correct strategy in Iraq, but has failed to match its military means to its strategic ends.

This unique sourcebook provides a global, state-of-the-art review of the rapidly evolving field of strategic environmental assessment (SEA) that is intended to serve as a baseline for the work of an OECD Task Team on SEA and a UNEP initiative on integrated planning and assessment. It describes trends in application and experience in different contexts worldwide, providing in-depth coverage of the status of SEA systems, and practice in developed, transitional and developing countries by a range of development agencies. The book draws on a large body of published and unpublished material, and contributions from a wide range of individual experts, organizations and agencies. It provides an unparalleled and invaluable understanding of the emerging scope and potential of SEA and describes how, when and where it is being used. The sourcebook includes a probing review of concepts, terminology, approaches and tools of SEA, and a comparative analysis of the different types of existing SEA systems. The volume also contains many case examples illustrating SEA practice in different countries and contexts, a full set of references and a number of appendices containing source materials.