The Stoics distinguish two forms of eros. In vicious agents eros is indeed a passion and thus born out of a defective rational judgment about what is needed for happiness. But there is also a positive form of erotic love, practiced by the Sage on the basis of knowledge, which aims to reproduce his virtuous condition in others. In this Element, the author shows how the Stoics' wider theoretical commitments in ethics, epistemology, aesthetics, and psychology support their duplex account of eros. They also consider the influence of Plato's Symposium on the Stoic account, arguing for hitherto unrecognized links with Socratic moral psychology. The Element concludes with an assessment of how the Stoic erotic ideal fares in relation to our intuitions about the non-egoistic and particularized nature of love.

This provocative work provides a radical reassessment of the emergence and nature of Christian sexual morality, the dominant moral paradigm in Western society since late antiquity. While many scholars, including Michel Foucault, have found the basis of early Christian sexual restrictions in Greek ethics and political philosophy, Kathy L. Gaca demonstrates on compelling new grounds that it is misguided to regard Greek ethics and political theory—with their proposed reforms of eroticism, the family, and civic order—as the foundation of Christian sexual austerity. Rather, in this thoroughly informed and wide-ranging study, Gaca shows that early Christian goals to eradicate fornication were derived from the sexual rules and poetic norms of the Septuagint, or Greek Bible, and that early Christian writers adapted these rules and norms in ways that reveal fascinating insights into the distinctive and largely non-philosophical character of Christian sexual morality. Writing with an authoritative command of both Greek philosophy and early Christian writings, Gaca investigates Plato, the Stoics, the Pythagoreans, Philo of Alexandria, the apostle Paul, and the patristic Christians Clement of Alexandria, Tatian, and Epiphanes, freshly elucidating their ideas on sexual reform with precision, depth, and originality. Early Christian writers, she demonstrates, transformed all that they borrowed from Greek ethics and political philosophy to launch innovative programs against fornication that were inimical to Greek cultural mores, popular and philosophical alike. The Septuagint's mandate to worship the Lord alone among all gods led to a Christian program to revolutionize Gentile sexual practices, only for early Christians to find this virtually impossible to carry out without going to extremes of sexual renunciation. Knowledgeable and wide-ranging, this work of intellectual history and ethics cogently demonstrates why early Christian sexual restrictions took such repressive ascetic forms, and casts sobering light on what Christian sexual morality has meant for religious pluralism in Western culture, especially among women as its bearers.

Model mothers -- A band of brothers -- The mystery of marriage -- The desirable contest between fathers and sons -- The imperfect imperial family -- Rewriting the family

The Role Ethics of Epictetus: Stoicism in Ordinary Life offers an original interpretation of Epictetus’s ethics and how he bases his ethics on an appeal to our roles in life. Epictetus believes that every individual is the bearer of many roles from sibling to citizen and that individuals are morally good if they fulfill the obligations associated with these roles. To understand Epictetus’s account of roles, scholars have often mistakenly looked backwards to Cicero’s earlier and more schematic account of roles. However, for Cicero, roles are merely a tool in the service of the virtue of decorum where decorum is one of the four canonical virtues—prudence, justice, greatness of spirit, and decorum. In contrast, Epictetus sets those virtues aside and offers roles as a complete ethical theory that does the work of those canonical virtues. This book elucidates the unique features of Epictetus’s role based ethics. First, individuals have many roles and these roles are substantial enough that they may conflict. Second, although Epictetus is often taken to have only a sparse theory of appropriate action (or “duty” in older translations), Brian E. Johnson examines the criteria by which appropriate action is measured in order to demonstrate that Epictetus does have an account of appropriate action and that it is grounded in his account of roles. Finally, Epictetus downplays the Stoic ideal of the sage and replaces that figure with role-bound individuals who are supposed to inspire each of us to meet the challenges of our own roles. Instead of looking to sages, who have a perfect knowledge and action that we must imitate, Epictetus’s new ethical heroes are those we do not imitate in terms of knowledge or action, but simply in the way they approach the challenges of their roles. The analysis found in The Role Ethics of Epictetus will be of great value both to students and scholars of ancient philosophy, ethics and moral philosophy, history, classics, and theology, and to the educated reader who admires Epictetus.

On the surface, stoicism and emotion seem like contradictory terms. Yet the Stoic philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome were deeply interested in the emotions, which they understood as complex judgments about what we regard as valuable in our surroundings. Stoicism and Emotion shows that they did not simply advocate an across-the-board suppression of feeling, as stoicism implies in today's English, but instead conducted a searching examination of these powerful psychological responses, seeking to understand what attitude toward them expresses the deepest respect for human potential.

"Long's discussions enjoy consistently thorough contextualization; psychology cannot be understood without natural philosophy, nor dialectic without ethics, and Long's case studies show both that and how that is the case, in persuasive detail and with enviable clarity. The pieces fall into three subject areas: intellectual and cultural inheritance, ethics, and psychology."—Catherine Atherton, New College, Oxford "A. A. Long's Stoic Studies does far more than bring together a set of important papers on Stoicism. Read together, the papers in this collection paint two pictures. One is of the author and his broad-minded pursuit of an intellectual 'fascination,' a pursuit carried out with historical and literary rigour as well as considerable philosophical ingenuity. The other is of the Stoic school itself, emerging from a passion for Socratic arguments... It is a long and remarkably rich philosophical history, and Tony Long has done a very great deal to help others feel its fascination."—Brad Inwood, University of Toronto "Long writes in a lucid, engaging way, even when treating difficult subjects or referring to complex scholarly and philosophical debates. He has a special gift for combining, in thirty pages or so, an illuminating survey of a topic with at least one sustained analysis of a key text or theory. As a result, this collection has a coherence and internal development that makes it comparable with a good monograph."—Christopher Gill, University of Exeter

Was verstanden Stoiker unter einer polis und Staatlichkeit? Was passiert, wenn ihre Ideen unter wechselnden historischen Bedingungen gelebt und neu gedacht werden? The Stoics and the State verfolgt diese Fragen mit detaillierter, philologischer Quellenkritik, präziser Konzeptanalyse sowie weit ausholender thematischer und diachronischer Kontextualisierung. Der systematische Teil behandelt Definitionen, Aspekte der Staatlichkeit (Staatsgebiet, Institutionen, Volk und Staatsidee) und das für den stoischen Staat konstitutive Gemeinsame Gesetz. Die diachronische Darstellung von Zeno bis Marcus Aurelius zeigt die Anwendung der Theorie auf real existierende Gemeinwesen: ihre Bewertung, ihre Entstehung und die politische Praxis. Beispiele moderner Rezeption von Justus Lipsius bis Martha C. Nussbaum verdeutlichen die Eigenheiten der stoischen Staatstheorie, nicht zuletzt ihre Grundlegung in einem Menschbild, das unsere Natur nicht nur als politisch sondern als sozial und wohltätig begreift.