This paper considers the role of stock-based compensation, such as restricted stock grants and stock options, in mitigating the moral hazard problem in teams in which agents who face the possibility of turnover must choose a level of effort or investment within working relationships with the other agents. We formally derive results in which stock-based compensation is a component of an optimal compensation contract, and in particular, in which stock-based compensation is superior to cash-based compensation such as bonuses and severance payments. We also show that stock-based compensation is not optimal in individual production. The results also provide new empirical and practical implications for stock-based compensation from the viewpoint of team incentives and job turnover.

This highly visual guide offers startup founders and employees a “nuts and bolts” view of how stock options and other forms of equity compensation work in early-stage startups. Throughout this guide numerous mini-infographics illustrate the key concepts founders need to know and show the relationships between stock option grants, vesting timelines, exercise timing, and associated tax implications. In detail, this Founder’s Pocket Guidewalks entrepreneurs though the following elements: Startup Equity Compensation Basics: Sharing Equity with Your Team The first section of this guide is structured to help founders build a base of understanding about the numerous definitions and terminology related to startup equity compensation and stock options. Topics covered include: · A brief refresher on startup equity in preparation for delving into the details of stock options and other forms of equity compensation. · A quick review of how startup equity ownership is shared between the various stakeholder of a startup including the founders, investors, and employees. · The fundamental mechanics of how startup stock options work, including option grants, exercising, vesting, and selling of stock shares. · A detailed review of equity compensation terminology and definitions, such as vesting, strike price, fair market value, and spread. · An explanation of each of the most common types of equity compensation including Restricted Stock, Incentive Stock Options, Non-Qualified Stock Options, and Restricted Stock Units. Equity Compensation Types in Detail The next section of this guide reviews each of the most common types of equity compensation, including detailed components such as tax implications, vesting and exercise parameters, and other IRS rules governing the ownership of each equity type. The following equity compensation types are covered: · Restricted Stock (RS) · Incentive Stock Options (ISOs) · Early Exercise Incentive Stock Options (EE-ISOs) · Nonstatutory Stock Options (NSOs) · Early Exercise Nonstatutory Stock Options (EE-NSOs) · Restricted Stock Units (RSU) Establishing Your Startup’s Equity Plan In the final part of this guide we dig deeper into the key areas founders need to consider when developing an equity plan for their startup, with specific focus on the following issues: · When to implement a formal equity incentive plan · What factors to consider when deciding how large the equity compensation pool should be · How to decide employee equity award amounts at the different stages of a startup’s lifecycle · What general steps to take to establish a equity compensation plan for your startup · What key information that must be communicated to employees about equity compensation awards · Which step-by-step calculations are needed to truly understand equity ownership percentages and value · How IRS and SEC rules impact private company equity compensation

This book is the "Hello, World" tutorial for building products, technologies, and teams in a startup environment. It's based on the experiences of the author, Yevgeniy (Jim) Brikman, as well as interviews with programmers from some of the most successful startups of the last decade, including Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, GitHub, Stripe, Instagram, AdMob, Pinterest, and many others. Hello, Startup is a practical, how-to guide that consists of three parts: Products, Technologies, and Teams. Although at its core, this is a book for programmers, by programmers, only Part II (Technologies) is significantly technical, while the rest should be accessible to technical and non-technical audiences alike. If you’re at all interested in startups—whether you’re a programmer at the beginning of your career, a seasoned developer bored with large company politics, or a manager looking to motivate your engineers—this book is for you.

Numerous private and public companies offer stock option plans every year to motivate, retain, and reward employees. But implementing the right stock option plan can be a complex and daunting undertaking, without the proper guidance.The Complete Guide to Employee Stock Optionsunravels the mystery of creating a meaningful equity compensation plan for employees that is favorable for the business. Author and attorney Frederick D. Lipman describes in complete detail the legal, operational, and motivational aspects of developing a stock option program, whether it's for the new start-up looking to attract top talent or the venerable company looking for ways to reward its best performing employees. Readers will discover how to: * Understand the pros and cons of different option plans* Implement the right plan to meet the company's future plans* Motivate key employees with equity compensation* Minimize the risk of losing equity in a volatile market* And much moreThis book also includes useful information for employees who want to understand what their stock options mean and how to maximize their profitability. Complete wi

I investigate whether equity grants increase the costs of CEO dismissal or departure (Oyer, 2004; Almazan and Suarez, 2003). I argue that costs of dismissal are increased because equity grants become exercisable upon forced departure. Equity grants can increase the costs of leaving because voluntarily departing CEOs forfeit equity compensation upon departure. I follow Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) in linking CEO equity compensation to a measure of labor market competition in a sample of S&P1500 companies from 1996 to 2010. I find that the intensity of labor market competition measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states affects equity grants and that the correlation is reversed in the penultimate year of forced CEO departure. This is consistent with the view that CEOs are concerned about being replaced in competitive labor markets and therefore demand more compensation that converts into severance pay. Conversely, when a dismissal is anticipated, I argue that CEOs are concerned about finding new employment and are then insured against a lack of outside opportunities. In addition, I conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between stock options, restricted stock grants and other long-term compensation between 2001 and 2006. I argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not increase managerial accountability (see for example Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2005) and that new accounting rules did not increase accounting costs of stock options (see for example Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu, 2012). Instead, I suggest that the effective prohibition of executive loans from firms and brokers made it prohibitively costly for CEOs to exercise stock options. I find that stock options began to be replaced with other long-term compensation as early as 2004. CEOs began to accumulate vested but unexercised stock options. I do not find evidence that CEOs sold vested stock to raise funds.In the final empirical chapter, I consider whether a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states can be interpreted as a proxy for labor market competition. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) argue that it is product market competition that affects CEO equity grants. My results are consistent with Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) who do not find evidence that product market competition has any significant impact on equity grants. Instead, I find that labor market competition retains a significant and positive impact in our tests, and notably holds for the largest single product market. The principal limitations of the project were found to be the difficulty of collecting data of intended turnover and classifying it into forced and voluntary turnover. With respect to loans to executives, loans by brokers are usually not disclosed. This study is the first to analyze equity compensation as severance arrangement. CEO cash constraints in exercising options is an unexplored explanation for their disappearance.