Game theory involves multi-person decision making and differential dynamic game theory has been widely applied to n-person decision making problems, which are stimulated by a vast number of applications. This book addresses the gap to discuss general stochastic n-person noncooperative and cooperative game theory with wide applications to control systems, signal processing systems, communication systems, managements, financial systems, and biological systems. H∞ game strategy, n-person cooperative and noncooperative game strategy are discussed for linear and nonlinear stochastic systems along with some computational algorithms developed to efficiently solve these game strategies.

This volume is based on lectures given at the NATO Advanced Study Institute on "Stochastic Games and Applications," which took place at Stony Brook, NY, USA, July 1999. It gives the editors great pleasure to present it on the occasion of L.S. Shapley's eightieth birthday, and on the fiftieth "birthday" of his seminal paper "Stochastic Games," with which this volume opens. We wish to thank NATO for the grant that made the Institute and this volume possible, and the Center for Game Theory in Economics of the State University of New York at Stony Brook for hosting this event. We also wish to thank the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, for providing continuing financial support, without which this project would never have been completed. In particular, we are grateful to our editorial assistant Mike Borns, whose work has been indispensable. We also would like to acknowledge the support of the Ecole Poly tech nique, Paris, and the Israel Science Foundation. March 2003 Abraham Neyman and Sylvain Sorin ix STOCHASTIC GAMES L.S. SHAPLEY University of California at Los Angeles Los Angeles, USA 1. Introduction In a stochastic game the play proceeds by steps from position to position, according to transition probabilities controlled jointly by the two players.

This book for beginning graduate students presents a course on stochastic games and the mathematical methods used in their analysis.

This book focuses on various aspects of dynamic game theory, presenting state-of-the-art research and serving as a testament to the vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. Its contributions, written by experts in their respective disciplines, are outgrowths of presentations originally given at the 14th International Symposium of Dynamic Games and Applications held in Banff. Advances in Dynamic Games covers a variety of topics, ranging from evolutionary games, theoretical developments in game theory and algorithmic methods to applications, examples, and analysis in fields as varied as mathematical biology, environmental management, finance and economics, engineering, guidance and control, and social interaction. Featured throughout are valuable tools and resources for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students interested in dynamic games and their applications to mathematics, engineering, economics, and management science.​

Stochastic games provide a versatile model for reactive systems that are affected by random events. This dissertation advances the algorithmic theory of stochastic games to incorporate multiple players, whose objectives are not necessarily conflicting. The basis of this work is a comprehensive complexity-theoretic analysis of the standard game-theoretic solution concepts in the context of stochastic games over a finite state space. One main result is that the constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium becomes undecidable in this setting. This impossibility result is accompanied by several positive results, including efficient algorithms for natural special cases.

The subject theory is important in finance, economics, investment strategies, health sciences, environment, industrial engineering, etc.

The theory of two-person, zero-sum differential games started at the be­ ginning of the 1960s with the works of R. Isaacs in the United States and L. S. Pontryagin and his school in the former Soviet Union. Isaacs based his work on the Dynamic Programming method. He analyzed many special cases of the partial differential equation now called Hamilton­ Jacobi-Isaacs-briefiy HJI-trying to solve them explicitly and synthe­ sizing optimal feedbacks from the solution. He began a study of singular surfaces that was continued mainly by J. Breakwell and P. Bernhard and led to the explicit solution of some low-dimensional but highly nontriv­ ial games; a recent survey of this theory can be found in the book by J. Lewin entitled Differential Games (Springer, 1994). Since the early stages of the theory, several authors worked on making the notion of value of a differential game precise and providing a rigorous derivation of the HJI equation, which does not have a classical solution in most cases; we mention here the works of W. Fleming, A. Friedman (see his book, Differential Games, Wiley, 1971), P. P. Varaiya, E. Roxin, R. J. Elliott and N. J. Kalton, N. N. Krasovskii, and A. I. Subbotin (see their book Po­ sitional Differential Games, Nauka, 1974, and Springer, 1988), and L. D. Berkovitz. A major breakthrough was the introduction in the 1980s of two new notions of generalized solution for Hamilton-Jacobi equations, namely, viscosity solutions, by M. G. Crandall and P. -L.