Søgeord: Y-Force; Kinesiske Hær; Kina; Wheeler, R.A.; Yu Fei-peng; Wavell; Japan, Japanske Styrker; US War Department; General Marshall; Stimson, H.L.; Trident; Krigshjælp; SEAC; Soong, T.V.; Somervell, B.B.; SOS, Services of Supply; Rangoon; Mountbatten; Magruder, J.; Lo Cho-ying; Ledo Road; MacArthur; McCloy, J.J.; Ho Ying-chin; Guerrillakrig; Burma Campaign; Currie, L.; CEF; Churchill; Chennault, C.L.; Wingate; Bissel, C.L.; Arnold, H.H.; Alexander, H.

"This general history, based on archival and monographic sources, some of which were not available to earlier writers, is designed to be a balanced and comprehensive synthesis. Seldom does a historian come upon a richer mix of colorful personalities, dramatic action, Byzantine intrigue, and momentous historical issues." "The impact of Americans on China during the war was enormous. Much of U.S. activity in China, because of inadequate knowledge of China's culture, government, and military capabilities, was harmful to China and Chiang's regime. Moreover, U.S. efforts to induce Chiang to make reforms designed to improve his regime's war effort and chances for post-war survival were ineffective." "The sulfurous American General Joseph Stilwell, assigned to serve as Chiang's chief of staff, underestimating the fighting ability of the Japanese and disregarding Chiang's advice, followed a strategy in the first Burma campaign that contributed to the loss of Chiang's best divisions and the chance of holding north Burma. Stilwell's obsessive demand for a new Burma campaign involved him in bitter controversies with Chiang, the British, and U.S. Air Commander Claire Chennault." "When the British demanded that Stilwell be removed from Burma, he, with Roosevelt's support, demanded that Chiang turn over to him the command of China's armed forces, which was equivalent to control of China. But Americans could not enforce this demand on Chiang, who expelled Stilwell from China. Ambassador Patrick Hurley then attempted to arrange a coalition government between Chiang and the Communists, a proposal Chiang rejected." "At Roosevelt's insistence, Chiang allowed America to send U.S. personnel, the "Dixie Mission," to the Communist headquarters at Yennan. Mao Tse-Tung convinced Foreign Service Officer John Service and others that he sought a cooperative relationship with America (in order, among other reasons, to reduce his dependence on Russia). Before Stilwell's dismissal Americans had decided to arm the Communists, but the removal of Stilwell defeated that purpose, and U.S. aid continued to go exclusively to Chiang. It appeared that the ideological preferences of Americans brought about a postponement of cooperation with the ultimately victorious Chinese Communists, despite an eventual common interest in keeping Soviet influence in East Asia in check." "This comprehensive study is illustrated and includes a chronology, glossary, bibliography and index."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved

Since the original publication of this classic book in 1979, Roosevelt's foreign policy has come under attack on three main points: Was Roosevelt responsible for the confrontation with Japan that led to the attack at Pearl Harbor? Did Roosevelt "give away" Eastern Europe to Stalin and the U.S.S.R. at Yalta? And, most significantly, did Roosevelt abandon Europe's Jews to the Holocaust, making no direct effort to aid them? In a new Afterword to his definitive history, Dallek vigorously and brilliantly defends Roosevelt's policy. He emphasizes how Roosevelt operated as a master politician in maintaining a national consensus for his foreign policy throughout his presidency and how he brilliantly achieved his policy and military goals.

Uncertain Allies looks at the U.S. military’s experience in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater during World War II through the eyes of Joseph Stilwell, the commanding general of all American forces in those three countries. Accomplished historian Eric Setzekorn, focuses on two key themes: uncertain allies and ambiguous missions. Despite being allies, relationships between the Americans and Chinese, as well as the Americans and the British, were marked by a profound lack of trust in the CBI theater. This was particularly problematic because most combat personnel under Stilwell’s command were Chinese. As a result, the lack of trust directly impacted tactical and operational planning. The second reoccurring theme, ambiguous missions, refers to the poorly defined goals for the theater. The CBI’s mission was vague, and Stilwell lacked clear objectives or benchmarks of success. Underlying both themes is the key flaw in Stilwell’s conduct in the CBI theater: a failure to understand the American political context in which he operated. Stilwell advocated for a transactional military and political relationship despite clear indications that President Roosevelt, other political leaders, and the American public at large desired a long-term cooperative relationship. In this context of deep and widespread public support for forging a close and lasting alliance with China, Stilwell’s proposals to make military aid and American support on a quid pro quo basis was an isolated position that inevitably ran into staunch opposition. The result was a dangerous disconnect between American military operations and national policy. Setzekorn, who is fluent in Chinese, relied on a wide variety of sources when writing this penetrating account of the U.S. military’s time in the CBI theater, including Chinese and Japanese language archival material. The declassification of numerous U.S. government sources over the past fifteen years also enables Setzekorn to make a full assessment and analysis of World War II-era strategic thinking and military policy.