Presenting a radically different view of the operations of the labor market, in this 1999 book Professors Pryor and Schaffer explain the growing inequality in wages and how those with the least education are being squeezed out of the labor market. Why have wages in those jobs requiring extra-high cognitive skills risen while all other wages have stagnated or fallen? And why are more university graduates taking high-school jobs? The authors of this volume present data revealing that jobs which require a high educational level are increasing more slowly than those with somewhat lower requirements. However such jobs are increasing faster than those requiring still less formal education. Professors Pryor and Schaffer also show how women are replacing men in jobs which require higher levels of education and, moreover, how those with high cognitive skills are replacing those with lower cognitive skills.

Politicians, journalists, and the public have expressed rising concern about the decline—or percieved decline—in middle-class jobs. The U.S. work force is viewed as increasingly divided between a prosperous minority that enjoys ever-rising wages and a less affluent majority that struggles harder each year to make ends meet. To determine whether and why this view of the job market is accurate, labor market economists anaylze trends in the distribution of jobs and wages over the past two decades and attempt to forecast the future course of American earnings inequality. McKinley L. Blackburn, David E. Bloom, and Richard B. Freeman assess the reasons behind the deterioration of earnings and job opportunities among less skilled men. They consider the impact of changes in industrial structure, declines in unionization, and trends in the level and quality of schooling for men who have limited skills and education. Gary Burtless examines the effect of the business cycle, within and across different regions of the United States, on earnings inequality and analyzes the effects of demographic change on inequality over the past twenty years. Rebecca M. Blank studies the rise of part-time employment and its impact on wages, fringe benefits, and the quality of jobs. Linda Dachter Loury focuses on the effect of the baby boom and baby bust on demand for schooling among new labor market entrants. If young entrants are discouraged from seeking college training by the high cost or low payoff of schooling, the long-term impact will be a gradual decline in the skills of the U.S. work force. Robert Mofitt analyzes the effect of welfare state programs on the growth of low-wage jobs, and the extent to which the welfare reforms of the eighties have affected low-income workers.

Recent studies of late nineteenth century labor market integration have found that despite high rates of geographic mobility relatively large inter- and intra-regional differentials in real wages persisted with little tendency toward convergence. These results point to the absence of a unified national labor market, but the scope of these studies is limited by their reliance on comparisons of wage quotations for narrowly defined occupations. Such data are available for only a small and possibly unrepresentative segment of the labor force, and cover only a limited sample of cities and time periods. This paper uses an alternative source of data--average annual earnings calculated from the Census of Manufactures--to extend the examination of labor market integration to all male manufacturing workers in 114 cities from 1879 through 1919. In contrast to earlier research, the average earnings data indicate that a well integrated labor market had emerged in the Northeast and North Central regions of the country by 1879. They also reveal a strong tendency toward earnings convergence within the South Atlantic and South Central regions, suggesting the emergence of a unified southern labor market. Large and persistent North-South, and West-East differentials in earnings indicate, however, that despite the integration of regional labor markets after the Civil War, a unified national labor market had not yet developed.

By one reading, things look pretty good for Americans today: the country is richer than ever before and the unemployment rate is down by half since the Great Recession—lower today, in fact, than for most of the postwar era. But a closer look shows that something is going seriously wrong. This is the collapse of work—most especially among America’s men. Nicholas Eberstadt, a political economist who holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute, shows that while “unemployment” has gone down, America’s work rate is also lower today than a generation ago—and that the work rate for US men has been spiraling downward for half a century. Astonishingly, the work rate for American males aged twenty-five to fifty-four—or “men of prime working age”—was actually slightly lower in 2015 than it had been in 1940: before the War, and at the tail end of the Great Depression. Today, nearly one in six prime working age men has no paid work at all—and nearly one in eight is out of the labor force entirely, neither working nor even looking for work. This new normal of “men without work,” argues Eberstadt, is “America’s invisible crisis.” So who are these men? How did they get there? What are they doing with their time? And what are the implications of this exit from work for American society? Nicholas Eberstadt lays out the issue and Jared Bernstein from the left and Henry Olsen from the right offer their responses to this national crisis. For more information, please visit http://menwithoutwork.com.

Over the last half century, U.S. wage growth stagnated, wage inequality rose, and the labor-force participation rate of prime-age men steadily declined. In this article, we examine these labor market trends, focusing on outcomes for males without a college education. Though wages and participation have fallen in tandem for this population, we argue that the canonical neo-classical framework, which postulates a labor demand curve shifting inward across a stable labor supply curve, does not reasonably explain the data. Alternatives we discuss include adjustment frictions associated with labor demand shocks and effects of the changing marriage market--that is, the fact that fewer less-educated men are forming their own stable families--on male labor supply incentives. Our observations lead us to be skeptical of attempts to attribute the secular decline in male labor-force participation to a series of separately-acting causal factors. We argue that the correct interpretation probably involves complicated feedback between falling labor demand and other factors which have disproportionately affected men without a college education.