Exchange rate-based inflation stabilization (ERBS) policies are associated with a boom-recession cycle in economic activity and sustained real exchange rate appreciation. A class of models in the literature has explained these empirical regularities with the lack of credibility of the stabilization plans. The lack-of-credibility models typically assume perfectly forward-looking pricing behavior without inflation stickiness and attribute the slow decline in inflation to the consumption boom that occurs due to the perceived temporariness of the ERBS policy. This paper tests the empirical validity of forward-looking pricing behavior in Mexico and Turkey, two countries which have experienced ERBS. It finds that the forward- and backward-looking components of inflation weigh approximately equally in pricing behavior, and therefore, that inflation is partially sticky. The paper then develops the theoretical implications of partial inflation stickiness in a lack of credibility model of ERBS and concludes that the presence of stickiness significantly reduces the persistence of the consumption boom predicted by the model, but helps to explain the recession in the late phase of the stabilization.

This paper uses a unified analytical framework to assess, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the relevance of the different hypotheses that have been proposed to explain the real effects of exchange rate-based stabilizations. The four major hypotheses analyzed are: (i) the supply-side effects associated with an inflation decline; (ii) the perception that the exchange rate peg is temporary; (iii) the fiscal adjustments that tend to accompany the peg; and (iv) the existence of nominal rigidities in wages or prices.

We analyze coordination of monetary and exchange rate policy in a two-sector model of a small open economy featuring imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign financial assets. Our central finding is that management of the exchange rate greatly enhances the efficacy of inflation targeting. In a flexible exchange rate system, inflation targeting incurs a high risk of indeterminacy where macroeconomic fluctuations can be driven by self-fulfilling expectations. Moreover, small inflation shocks may escalate into much larger increases in inflation ex post. Both problems disappear when the central bank leans heavily against the wind in a managed float.

Contents : Wage Inequality and Regional Unemployment Persistence: U.S. vs. Europe, Guiseppe BErtola and Andreas Ichino. Capital Utilization and Returns to Scale, Craig Burnside, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. Banks and Derivatives, Gary Gorton and Richard Rosen. Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilizations: Theory and Evidence, Sergio Rebelo and Carlos Vegh. Inflation Indicators and Inflation Policy, Stephen Cecchetti. Recent Central Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy, Carl Walsh. Is Central Bank Independence (and Low Inflation) the Result of Effective Financial Opposition to Inflation?, Adam Posen. The Unending Quest for Monetary Salvation, Stanley Fischer.