Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge. Epistemologists seek to understand knowledge’s nature and availability. What is knowledge? There are competing theories. Can we really have knowledge? Challenges abound. In this lively book, Stephen Hetherington introduces us to epistemological theorizing. He builds a theory and tests it, refines it, and challenges it again. He explores such topics as evidence, truth and belief, different kinds of knowledge, and knowledge’s value, as well as sceptical views concerning knowledge of the physical world, one’s own mind and memory, and rational limits for observation and reason. This epistemological theorizing is then applied to some of life’s most pressing issues, such as how to live and how to understand ourselves and others. What is Epistemology? is a practical and student-friendly guide to one of the most dynamic areas of philosophy. It will be the go-to introductory epistemology text.

From Plato, through Descartes to W.V. Quine and Edmund Gettier, this concise introduction and reference guide explores the history of thinking about 'knowledge'.

How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures takes bold steps towards answering that question. What methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress until now? This volume contains provocative essays by prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Doubt is cast upon the powers of conceptual analysis and of epistemological intuition. Surprising aspects of knowledge are noticed. What is it? What is it not? Scepticism's limits are traced. What threatens us as potential knowers? What does not? The nature and special significance of inquiry, of normative virtues, of understanding, and of disagreement are elucidated, all with an eye on sharpening epistemology's future focus. There is definite insight and potential foresight. How might real epistemological progress occur in the future? Epistemology Futures offers some intriguing clues.

This textbook introduction offers a new way of approaching metaphysics and epistemology - via links to ethical and social questions. It asks questions such as: Fundamentally, what are we? And what, if anything, do we know?

What is knowledge? How hard is it for a person to have knowledge? Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge confronts contemporary philosophical attempts to answer those classic questions, by identifying and arguing against two fundamental epistemological presumptions. Can there be both better and worse knowledge of some fact? Can you improve your knowledge of a particular fact? Can there be especially bad knowledge of a specific fact? Epistemologists routinely answer these questions with a resounding 'No'. But Stephen Hetherington argues that those standard answers are mistaken. The result is a theory of knowledge that is unique in conceiving of knowledge in a non-absolutist way. The theory offers new solutions to many traditional epistemological puzzles, including various kinds of scepticism, the Gettier challenge, and the problem of the criterion. It also offers a fresh way of using G. E. Moore's anti-sceptical gambit, along with reinterpretations of the epistemic roles of fallibility, luck, relevance, and dogmatism. And what can we know about knowledge? The role of intuition in shaping epistemological thought about knowledge is critically examined. Anyone working on epistemology will enjoy this original and challenging work.

This book enriches our understanding of knowledge and Gettier's challenge, stimulating debate on a central epistemological issue.

Some key aspects of contemporary epistemology deserve to be challenged, and How to Know does just that. This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a practicalist conception of knowledge. Presents a philosophically original conception of knowledge, at odds with some central tenets of analytic epistemology Offers a dissolution of epistemology’s infamous Gettier problem — explaining why the supposed problem was never really a problem in the first place. Defends an unorthodox conception of the relationship between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, understanding knowledge-that as a kind of knowledge-how.