This report reviews rationales offered by national governments for including or maintaining certain corporate assets in state ownership. Drawing on a survey of 24 countries, the report provides guidance to authorities seeking to reform or review their ownership policies.

This report reviews the rationales offered by national governments for including or maintaining certain corporate assets in state ownership. Drawing from responses from 24 countries to a questionnaire based on the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (the “Guidelines”), the report aims to provide guidance to authorities seeking to reform or review their ownership policies. It does so, first, by providing provides an inventory of national practices regarding the application of the Guidelines recommendation that governments should develop and issue an ownership policy that defines the overall objectives of state ownership, the state’s role in the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and how it will implement its ownership policy. Second, the report illustrates how the state enterprise ownership policy is applied in situations where new SOEs are created, or when the state decides to terminate its enterprise ownership. The report was reviewed by the OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices, which oversees implementation of the Guidelines, and is current as of October 2014.

Eskom is a South African company that has developed from a state utility under apartheid into a competitive state-owned enterprise. This book draws on the knowledge about corporate governance in state-owned enterprises. It locates Eskom's experience in that context and argues that a state-owned enterprise can be run as efficiently as any other.

The aim of this paper is to shed new light on key challenges in governance arrangements for state owned enterprises in infrastructure sectors. The paper provides guidelines on how to classify the fuzzy and sometimes conflicting development goals of infrastructure and the governance arrangements needed to reach such goals. Three policy recommendations emerge. First, some of the structures implied by internationally adopted principles of corporate governance for state owned enterprises favoring a centralized ownership function versus a decentralized or dual structure have not yet been sufficiently tested in practice and may not suit all developing countries. Second, general corporate governance guidelines (and policy recommendations) need to be carefully adapted to infrastructure sectors, particularly in the natural monopoly segments. Because the market structure and regulatory arrangements in which state owned enterprises operate matters, governments may want to distinguish the state owned enterprises operating in potentially competitive sectors from the ones under a natural monopoly structure. Competition provides not only formidable benefits, but also unique opportunities for benchmarking, increasing transparency and accountability. Third, governments may want to avoid partial fixes, by tackling both the internal and external governance factors. Focusing only on one of the governance dimensions is unlikely to improve SOE performance in a sustainable way.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play an important role in Emerging Europe’s economies, notably in the energy and transport sectors. Based on a new firm-level dataset, this paper reviews the SOE landscape, assesses SOE performance across countries and vis-à-vis private firms, and evaluates recent SOE governance reform experience in 11 Emerging European countries, as well as Sweden as a benchmark. Profitability and efficiency of resource allocation of SOEs lag those of private firms in most sectors, with substantial cross-country variation. Poor SOE performance raises three main risks: large and risky contingent liabilities could stretch public finances; sizeable state ownership of banks coupled with poor governance could threaten financial stability; and negative productivity spillovers could affect the economy at large. SOE governance frameworks are partly weak and should be strengthened along three lines: fleshing out a consistent ownership policy; giving teeth to financial oversight; and making SOE boards more professional.

An estimated 22% of the world’s largest firms are now effectively under state control, this is the highest percentage in decades. These firms are likely to remain a prominent feature of the global marketplace in the near future.