In this stunning exposé, Dmitry Zubov reveals the dark truth of the terrible losses suffered by Soviet flyers, the inferiority of the Russian aircraft on World War II's Eastern Front, and the almost slave-like conditions in which those aircraft were made. The Soviet history of the Second World War, written under the conditions of a totalitarian regime, reflected all its features, with the result that it includes solid sets of patriotic fables that have no connection with reality. Many of the events of the war were distorted beyond recognition or even made up from beginning to end. Archives containing original documents were available only to selected, specially verified KGB ‘historians’ who presented only the version of the war that was acceptable to the Soviet regime. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of declassifying archives and gaining wide access to information gradually began to reveal the terrible truth of the crimes of the Soviet regime. One of which, of course, was the incompetent leadership of the Red Army, which led to massive loss of life across the military and civilians alike. However, the consequences of decades of Soviet propaganda had a strong impact on both Russian and world historical science. Because of this, not only Russian, but, unfortunately, many European and American historians found themselves repeating the Soviet myths they had been fed. The history of Soviet fighter aircraft did not escape this fate. The tale of Stalin’s so-called ‘Falcons’, who allegedly shot down dozens and even hundreds of Luftwaffe aircraft, was persistently drummed into the heads of many generations of Russian people. These heroes, supposedly, flew Soviet fighters whose technical characteristics were many times superior to their German counterparts, with the result that Luftwaffe aces were reportedly afraid of meeting them in the air. These primitive propaganda clichés became a model for describing the actions of Stalin’s fighter aircraft. In this stunning exposé, Stalin’s Falcons reveals the stark and dark truth of the terrible losses suffered by Soviet flyers, the inferiority of the Russian aircraft and the almost slave-like conditions in which those aircraft were made.

From 1929 until 1953, Iosif Stalin’s image became a central symbol in Soviet propaganda. Touched up images of an omniscient Stalin appeared everywhere: emblazoned across buildings and lining the streets; carried in parades and woven into carpets; and saturating the media of socialist realist painting, statuary, monumental architecture, friezes, banners, and posters. From the beginning of the Soviet regime, posters were seen as a vitally important medium for communicating with the population of the vast territories of the USSR. Stalin’s image became a symbol of Bolshevik values and the personification of a revolutionary new type of society. The persona created for Stalin in propaganda posters reflects how the state saw itself or, at the very least, how it wished to appear in the eyes of the people. The ‘Stalin’ who was celebrated in posters bore but scant resemblance to the man Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, whose humble origins, criminal past, penchant for violent solutions and unprepossessing appearance made him an unlikely recipient of uncritical charismatic adulation. The Bolsheviks needed a wise, nurturing and authoritative figure to embody their revolutionary vision and to legitimate their hold on power. This leader would come to embody the sacred and archetypal qualities of the wise Teacher, the Father of the nation, the great Warrior and military strategist, and the Saviour of first the Russian land, and then the whole world. This book is the first dedicated study on the marketing of Stalin in Soviet propaganda posters. Drawing on the archives of libraries and museums throughout Russia, hundreds of previously unpublished posters are examined, with more than 130 reproduced in full colour. The personality cult of Stalin in Soviet posters, 1929–1953 is a unique and valuable contribution to the discourse in Stalinist studies across a number of disciplines.

The Battle of Kursk in July 1943 is known for being the largest tank battle in history. A Russian victory, it marked the decisive end of the German offensive capability on the Eastern Front and set the scene for the Soviet successes that followed. While many have focused on the tank engagements, especially the Battle of Prokhorovka, there was an intense air battle going on overhead that was bigger than the Battle of Britain. As part of the German offensive, the Luftwaffe’s VIII Air Corps deployed around 1,100 aircraft in the south alone, while the opposing Soviet Second and Seventeenth air armies initially deployed over 1,600 aircraft. There was a similar effort surrounding the German attack in the north. The battle in the south began with a Soviet air strike on German airfields and a fight for control of the air that continued throughout the day across the front. On the first day of the battle, 5 July 1943, the Germans flew at least 2,387 sorties in the south while the two Soviet air armies flew 1,688 sorties. That first day of battle resulted in 19 to 27 German planes and 189 Soviet aircraft shot down. This was an aerial engagement like no other ever seen before. Involved on the German side were the 52nd and 3rd Fighter Wings. The 52nd Fighter Wing was the most accomplished fighter wing in history and many of its top aces were involved in the combats over the Kursk battlefield. These included Walter Krupinski (197 claimed kills in the war), Günther Rall, the third highest scoring ace in history (275 claimed kills), and the highest scoring ace in history, Erich Hartmann (352 claimed kills). Opposing them were what were to become three of the top five Soviet aces: Kirill Yevstigneyev (53 claimed kills), Nikolai Gulayev (55 claimed kills) and the top scoring Allied ace of the war, Ivan Kozhedub (62 claimed kills). This was indeed the battle of the aces. But there was also the massive ground attack effort by both sides, including the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka fitted with 37mm anti-tank guns flown by the man who would become most decorated soldier of the Third Reich, Hans-Ulrich Rudel. The aerial battle involved hundreds of Soviet Sturmoviks, or IL-2s, Stalin’s armored ground attack plane. The battle featured the famous attack by Luftwaffe Hs-129s and Fw-190s on Soviet armor on 8 July 1943. Aces at Kursk is not just a war story, but a revealing investigation that analyses the entire air battle that turned the tide of the war on the Eastern Front.

After the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934, folklore, like literature, became an instrument of the political propagandist. Folklorists devoted considerable efforts to attending to what purported to be a rebirth of the Russian epic tradition, producing works of pseudofolklore that as often as not featured Joseph Stalin in the hero's role. Miller's account of this curious episode in the history of popular culture and totalitarian politics, and his synopses and translations of "classic" examples of folklore for Stalin, seek to serve as a resource not only for the study of contemporary folklore but also for the political scientist.

A study of the cultural implications of portraits of Stalin and his era since his death in 1953. This work explores the cultural implications of prominent images in Russian thought and literature devoted to the Stalin era since the dictator's death in 1953. Author of the works discussed include some of the most important Russian writers of the past four decades: Solzhenitsyn, Vasilii Grossman, Vladimir Voinovich, Anatolii Rybackov among others.

The Siege of Leningrad was one of the most brutal battles of the Second World War. The second largest and most populous city in the Soviet Union, Leningrad, now St. Petersburg, was one of the three priority targets of the German invasion, Operation Barbarossa. A total of 333 large military factories were concentrated in Leningrad and, accordingly, 565,000 workers lived there, producing tanks, aircraft, artillery and warships. On 10 July 1941, German tank divisions, having broken through the front south of the city of Pskov, reached the town of Luga. From there, Hitler’s forces had just over 110 miles to go to Leningrad. Meanwhile, the city was feverishly preparing for defense. Stalin’s deputies, Zhdanov and Voroshilov, planned to use the entire combat-ready population of Leningrad for that purpose. Believing that the city would soon be captured by the Germans, Stalin ordered the immediate evacuation of military factories and skilled workers from Leningrad to the East. Before the city was completely blockaded, most of the valuable equipment had been removed. However, the remaining civilian population, including about 400,000 children, were left to their fate. In early September 1941, German divisions supported by the Luftwaffe’s VIII Fliegerkorps, captured the town of Shlisselburg. Leningrad was now cut off from the rest of the Soviet Union. Hitler believed that the city would soon echo to the sound of German jackboots. Leningrad, however, did not give up. In the autumn of 1941, the Wehrmacht did not have enough forces to take the city and for three long years the main means of fighting its defenders were the Luftwaffe and long-range artillery. In September 1941, when the systematic bombing and shelling began, many thousands of families tried to leave Leningrad, but nearly all of the escape routes were cut off. Food supplies in the city sharply decreased. In this book the authors explore the full story of the German and Soviet aerial battles in the Leningrad sector during the siege. There are devastating details of the bombing of the starving population, numerous attempts by the Luftwaffe to destroy the Red Baltic Fleet, and air attacks against the ‘Road of Life’, along which vital food and ammunition were delivered to the city, and combats in the skies over Leningrad and its surroundings. Revealing what was happening in the air and on the ground, as well as in the German and Russian headquarters, the authors explain why, in spite of numerous successes, the Luftwaffe failed to help force the surrender of Leningrad.

From the Soviet technical intelligentsia emerged more than three quarters of recent Politburo members, including Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny. The largest single group of dissenters, including Grigorenko, Sakharov, and Solzhenitsyn, have also been members. Originally published in 1978. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.