This book offers a new and radical interpretation of the core of Spinoza's metaphysics. The first half of the book, which concentrates on the metaphysics of substance, suggests a new reading of Spinoza's key concepts of Substance and Mode, of Spinoza's pantheism and monism, and of his understanding of causation. The second half addresses Spinoza's metaphysics of Thought and presents three bold and interrelated theses on Spinoza's two doctrines of parallelism, on the multifaceted structure of ideas, and on Spinoza's reasons for holding that we cannot know any attributes of God, or Nature, other than Thought and Extension. Finally, the author shows that Spinoza assigns clear priority to the attribute of Thought without embracing reductive idealism.

The essays in this volume investigate several themes, notably Spinoza's monism, the nature of the individual, the relation between mind and body, and his place in 17th century philosophy.

In Spinoza’s Argument for Substance Monism: Why There Is Only One Thing, Christopher Martin provides an interpretation and defense of this argument, using speculative metaphysics as a method to show how the key terms and concepts are employed and fit together. Specifically, Martin argues that (i) Spinoza’s understanding of substance and attribute departs only slightly from dominant historic notions; (ii) his definition of God in terms of attributes instead of perfections is quite helpful and (mostly) compatible with more traditional definitions; and (iii) Spinoza’s pairing of causal and conceptual relations is more intuitive than we think. Martin also shows how these essences function as causes and explains why, with Spinoza’s understanding of emanation and conceptual independence, any substance must have every attribute. These features of Spinoza’s argument explain and defend his ultimate claim that God/Nature is the only substantial being in existence. This book demonstrates how approachable and compelling Spinoza’s argument is and illustrates the practice and potential of speculative metaphysics for specialists and non-specialists alike.

Spinoza's guiding commitment to the thesis that nothing exists or occurs outside of the scope of nature and its necessary laws makes him one of the great seventeenth-century exemplars of both philosophical naturalism and explanatory rationalism. Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy brings together for the first time eighteen of Don Garrett's articles on Spinoza's philosophy, ranging over the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, and political philosophy. Taken together, these influential articles provide a comprehensive interpretation of that philosophy, including Spinoza's theories of substance, thought and extension, causation, truth, knowledge, individuation, representation, consciousness, conatus, teleology, emotion, freedom, responsibility, virtue, contract, the state, and eternity-and the deep interrelations among them. Each article aims to resolve significant problems in the understanding of Spinoza's philosophy in such a way as to make evident both his reasons for his views and the enduring value of his ideas. At the same time, Garrett's articles elucidate the relations between his philosophy and those of predecessors and contemporaries like Aristotle, Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz. Lastly, the volume offers important and substantial replies to leading critics on four crucial topics: the necessary existence of God (Nature), substance monism, necessitarianism, and consciousness.

Contemporary philosophers frequently assume that Kant never seriously engaged with Spinoza or Spinozism-certainly not before the break of Der Pantheismusstreit, or within the Critique of Pure Reason. Offering an alternative reading of key pre-critical texts and to some of the Critique's most central chapters, Omri Boehm challenges this common assumption. He argues that Kant not only is committed to Spinozism in early essays such as "The One Possible Basis" and "New Elucidation," but also takes up Spinozist metaphysics as Transcendental Realism's most consistent form in the Critique of Pure Reason. The success -- or failure -- of Kant's critical projects must be evaluated in this light. Boehm here examines The Antinomies alongside Spinoza's Substance Monism and his theory of freedom. Similarly, he analyzes the refutation of the Ontological Argument in parallel with Spinoza's Causa-sui. More generally, Boehm places the Critique of Pure Reason's separation of Thought from Being and Is from Ought in dialogue with the Ethics' collapse of Being, Is and Ought into Thought.

This study traces the development of the metaphysics of the material world in early modern thought. It starts with the scholastic innovator Suárez, proceeds to a consideration of Suárez's connections to Descartes, and ends with an examination of Spinoza's fundamental re-conceptualization of the Cartesian material world.

Renowned for his metaphysics, Spinoza made significant contributions to understanding the human mind, the emotions, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Beginning with an overview of Spinoza's life, Michael Della Rocca carefully unpacks and explains Spinoza's philosophy: his metaphysics of substance and argument at the center of his whole system that God is the sole independent substance; his account of the human mind and its relation to the body; his theory that human beings tend towards self-preservation and his most famous work, the Ethics, including the problem of free will; and his writings on the state, religion and scripture. Della Rocca concludes with a chapter on Spinoza's legacy and how modern philosophers, Hume, Hegel, and Nietzsche, responded to Spinoza's challenge. Ideal for those coming to Spinoza for the first time as well as those already acquainted with his thought, Spinoza is essential reading for anyone studying philosophy.