This report explores ways in which the Army might improve its ability to contribute to the prompt, global power-projection capability of the United States. By that the authors mean the strategic responsiveness of early-entry forces in situations where time is critical. Through a case study based upon the Army's new Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), the authors examine two components of early-entry force strategic responsiveness: rapidly tailoring a mission-focused force package and moving the force. The report begins by analyzing options, given existing technology, for improving the deployment time of Army units. Then it examines how the Army might improve its ability to facilitate the rapid-deployment initiation of joint, mission-tailored packages of capabilities. In essence, there are two problems: initiating deployment of the right force capabilities and then getting these capabilities where they need to be as quickly as possible. Specific issues examined in the report include forward basing, new concepts in prepositioning, significant but underappreciated opportunities in process improvement, and speeding the delivery of initial operating capabilities through deployment phasing and improved planning. The research offers an approach for leveraging force modularity concepts to transition to a capabilities-based, rapid mission, force-tailoring construct. (3 tables, 38 figures, 32 refs.).

Using a case study based on the Army's new Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the authors explore how the Army might improve its ability to contribute to prompt, global power projection, that is, strategically responsive early-entry forces for time-critical events. The authors examine options to reach a dual goal: to initiate deployment of the right force capabilities, and then get those capabilities where they need to be as quickly as possible.

Today, the U.S. Army is decisively engaged in both fighting an unfamiliar type of war and transforming itself to meet the challenges of future warfare. But what are those challenges? What capabilities does U.S. strategy demand of its military instrument? Where are the major capability gaps, and how should they inform Army Transformation to ensure the future expeditionary Army has the right campaign qualities? This paper argues that the major capability gap in today's force - and vital for future campaigns - is the ability to conduct stabilization. It begins with exploring the changes in U.S. strategy that are the impetus behind the need for greater capacity to conduct post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Then, it analyzes the emerging role of the Army in post-conflict operations in the context of modern combat to more fully understand the specific requirements of stabilization. The paper then develops an operational concept - progressive stabilization - that complements the Army's concept of rapid decisive operations while improving its ability to contribute to long-term conflict resolution. It outlines three key force attributes an expeditionary force structure must have to provide the requisite mix of combat and stabilization capabilities. Finally, this paper builds on those attributes to suggest three areas where Army leaders must make near-term adjustments in the Modular Force to ensure the nation has a truly expeditionary force with the campaign capacity for both rapid decisive operations and stabilization.

The ability of U.S. forces to provide swift and tailored responses to a multitude of threats across the globe is a crucial component of security in today's complex political environment. To realize its goals of global strike and persistent dominance, it is vital that the Air Force support the warfighter seamlessly and efficiently in all phases of deployment, employment, and redeployment. One of the major pillars for achieving these objectives is a global combat support basing architecture. This report presents an analytic framework and model for evaluating options for overseas combat support basing. The authors develop several sets of deployment scenarios to measure the effect of timing, location, and intensity of operational requirements on combat support and to account for the inherent uncertainties in future planning. They apply political, geographical, and vulnerability constraints to the model and present a feasible set of candidate locations for consideration by the Air Force.

Includes publications previously listed in the supplements to the Index of selected publications of the Rand Corporation (Oct. 1962-Feb. 1963).