Medieval discussions of mental representation were constrained in essential ways by Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of intelligible species. Aquinas' view of a formal mediation of sensible reality in intellectual knowledge was not universally accepted. In particular, after his death, a long series of controversies developed about the necessity of intelligible species. (These were analyzed in the first volume of this study.) The first part of this book deals with Renaissance controversies, discussing Peripatetics, Neoplatonics, and a group of relatively independent authors. In the second part, developments of late Scholasticism, and the elimination of the intelligible species in modern non-Aristotelian philosophy are scrutinized. Particular attention is paid to the possible roots of the seventeenth-century theories of ideas in traditional philosophy.

This study examines the history of a fundamental problem in Aristotelian cognitive psychology, i.e. the nature and function of the mechanisms that provide the human mind with data concerning physical reality. Chapter I traces the Classical and Arabic prehistory of the Medieval doctrine of intelligible species. Scholastic discussions on formal mediation in intellective cognition were constrained in essential ways by Thomas. Chapter II analyzes his views on mental representation in the context of the reception of Peripatetic psychology in the West. The following chapters (III-V) examine the controversies about the necessity of intelligible species, from Aquinas' death to the 15th century. Another volume is planned, devoted to Renaissance discussions, developments of later Scholasticism, and the elimination of the intelligible species in modern non-Aristotelian philosophy.

The main purpose of this book is to offer a comprehensive historical analysis of the discussions on a crucial problem for the early modern theory of knowledge: the formal mediation of sensible reality in intellectual knowledge.

This study examines the history of a fundamental problem in Aristotelian cognitive psychology, i.e. the nature and function of the mechanisms that provide the human mind with data concerning physical reality. Chapter I traces the Classical and Arabic prehistory of the Medieval doctrine of intelligible species. Scholastic discussions on formal mediation in intellective cognition were constrained in essential ways by Thomas. Chapter II analyzes his views on mental representation in the context of the reception of Peripatetic psychology in the West. The following chapters (III-V) examine the controversies about the necessity of intelligible species, from Aquinas' death to the 15th century. Another volume is planned, devoted to Renaissance discussions, developments of later Scholasticism, and the elimination of the intelligible species in modern non-Aristotelian philosophy.

This look at Gassendi’s philosophy and science illuminates his contributions to early modern thought and to the broader history of philosophy of science. Two keys to his thought are his novel picture of acquiring and judging empirical belief, and his liberal account of criteria for counting empirical beliefs as parts of warranted physical theories. By viewing his philosophical and scientific pursuits as part of one and the same project, Gassendi’s arguments on behalf of atomism can be fruitfully explained as licensed by his empiricism.