A Washington Post Best Book of 2021 ​The #1 New York Times bestselling investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about America’s longest war, foreshadowing the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, by Washington Post reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist Craig Whitlock. Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support. At first, the goals were straightforward and clear: defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11. Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power, the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives. Distracted by the war in Iraq, the US military become mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand. But no president wanted to admit failure, especially in a war that began as a just cause. Instead, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress, even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory. Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam, The Afghanistan Papers contains “fast-paced and vivid” (The New York Times Book Review) revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines. In unvarnished language, they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess, that the nation-building project was a colossal failure, and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government. All told, the account is based on interviews with more than 1,000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted, and sometimes entirely fabricated, version of the facts on the ground. Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to meet with him. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are.” His successor, Robert Gates, said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda.” The Afghanistan Papers is a “searing indictment of the deceit, blunders, and hubris of senior military and civilian officials” (Tom Bowman, NRP Pentagon Correspondent) that will supercharge a long-overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. has begun to implement the new strategy articulated by Pres. Obama in Dec. 2009. The U.S. military and civilian surge is intended to create an 18-month window of opportunity to strengthen the Afghan government¿s ability to provide for its security and deliver essential services to its people. The U.S. gov¿t. needs to improve the way it designs and implements reconstruction programs. More attention must be paid in these 4 areas: matching the appropriate human and financial resources to achieve policy objectives; developing metrics to measure project and program results to ensure that reconstruction goals are being met; providing better oversight of contractors; and increasing efforts to deter corruption.

This report to the incoming Administration and the new Congress identifies what the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) sees as the greatest threats to the ultimate success of the more than 15-year-long U.S.-funded reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Since 2002, Congress has appropriated more than $115 billion for Afghanistan's reconstruction, the largest expenditure to rebuild a single country in our nation's history. This tremendous amount of taxpayer money has been used to train Afghan security forces, stand up the Afghan government, and develop the local economy. Yet the reconstruction effort remains tenuous and incomplete and much of the reconstruction mission is at risk. This report outlines the most critical issues threatening reconstruction and also offers key questions to consider when crafting policies for addressing these vexing challenges. Figures. This is a print on demand report.

U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilise Afghanistan are mixed and subject to debate; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and security in many areas of Afghanistan, particularly the U.S.-led eastern sector of Afghanistan. However, a November 2007 Bush Administration review of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan reportedly concluded that overall progress was inadequate. This mirrors recent outside studies that contain relatively pessimistic assessments, emphasising a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks, and increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, as well as increasing divisions within the NATO alliance about the relative share of combat among the nations contributing to the peacekeeping mission. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan as failing -- either through lack of attention or eliberatestrategy -- to prevent Taliban commanders from operating from Pakistan. To try to gain momentum against the insurgency, the United States is considering new initiatives including adding U.S. troops to the still combat-intense south, possibly assuming U.S. command of the southern sector, and increasing direct U.S. action against Taliban concentrations inside Pakistan. Politically, the Afghan government remains reasonably stable. The post-Taliban transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005; a new constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to debate and peacefully resolve differences, as well as a centre of political pressure on President Hamid Karzai. Major regional strongmen have been marginalised. Afghan citizens are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban, and women are participating in economic and political life. Presidential elections are to be held in the fall of 2009, with parliamentary and provincial elections to follow one year later. To help stabilise Afghanistan, the United States and partner countries are deploying a 47,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, including the restive south. Of those, 19,000 of the 31,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF. The U.S. and partner forces also run regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are building an Afghan National Army and National Police. The United States has given Afghanistan over $23 billion (appropriated, including FY2008 to date) since the fall of the Taliban, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces.

Under the protection of foreign forces, a special place has flourished in Afghanistan. The Marefat School is an award-winning institution in the western slums of Kabul, built by one of the country’s most vulnerable minorities, the Hazara. Marefat educates both girls and boys; it teaches students to embrace the arts, criticize their leaders, interrogate their religion, and be active citizens in a rapidly changing country. But they are dependent on foreign forces for security. When the United States begins to withdraw from Afghanistan, they are left behind, unprotected. Acclaimed journalist Jeffrey E. Stern explores the stakes of war through the eyes of those touched by Marefat: the school’s daring founder and leader, Aziz Royesh; a mother of five who finds freedom in literacy; a clever mechanic; a self-taught astronomer; the school’s security director; and several intrepid students who carry Marefat’s mission to the streets. We see how Marefat has embraced the United States and blossomed under its presence---and how much it stands to lose as that protection disappears. The Last Thousand tells the story of what we leave behind when our foreign wars end. It shows us up close the promise, as well as the peril, of our military adventures abroad. Stern presents a nuanced and fascinating portrait of the complex history of Afghanistan, its American occupation, and the ways in which once community rallies together in compelling, heartbreaking, and inspiring detail.