Spatial Competition in a Differentiated Market with Asymmetric Costs
Title | Spatial Competition in a Differentiated Market with Asymmetric Costs PDF eBook |
Author | Tarek H. Selim |
Publisher | |
Pages | 0 |
Release | 2020 |
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Spatial quality choice is introduced, where consumers are horizontally differentiated by taste and firms vertically differentiated by quality location, within an equilibrium model of duopoly competition characterized by asymmetric fixed and variable costs. Firms choose quality location followed by prices but then may vertically re-locate their quality offerings based on changing horizontal consumer taste. A monopolistic equilibrium solution arises with firms achieving positive economic profits through price-quality markups exceeding marginal costs. Under strict inequality conditions, each firm acts as a monopolistic competitor within a range of quality choices governed by multiple relative differentiation outcomes. On the other hand, vertical re-location exhibits a resistance to change on the part of vertically located firms such that firms dislike quality re-location and prefer stable preferences in quality. Such resistance to change is overcome by firms re-locating their quality offerings to maximize monopolistic brand-space gains. It is argued that more horizontal differentiation may force more product differentiation by vertical quality relocation. A relative change in quality preferences may result in wider quality spreads in the market through vertical quality re-locations, even though the resistance to change arguments may still hold good.
Spatial Competition in Quality
Title | Spatial Competition in Quality PDF eBook |
Author | Raphael Auer |
Publisher | |
Pages | 53 |
Release | 2014 |
Genre | Competition |
ISBN |
We develop a model of vertical innovation in which firms incur a market entry cost and position themselves in the quality space. Once established, firms compete monopolistically, selling to consumers with heterogeneous tastes for quality. We establish existence and uniqueness of the pricing game in such vertically differentiated markets with a potentially large number of active firms. Turning to firms' entry decisions, exogenously growing productivities induce firms to enter the market sequentially at the top end of the quality spectrum. We spell out the conditions under which the entry problem is replicated over time so that each new entrant improves incumbent qualities in fixed proportions. Sequential market entry overcomes the asymmetry of the location problem, which unavoidably arises in the quality spectrum because of its top and bottom ends. Our main technical contribution lies in handling this asymmetry, a feature absent in Salop (1979) and other circular representations of Hotelling (1929) and Lancaster (1966).
Preemptive Entry in Differentiated Product Markets
Title | Preemptive Entry in Differentiated Product Markets PDF eBook |
Author | Simon P. Anderson |
Publisher | |
Pages | 0 |
Release | 2000 |
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Models of spatial competition are typically static, and exhibit multiple free-entry equilibria. Incumbent firms can earn rents in equilibrium because any potential entrant expects a significantly lower market share (since it must fit into a niche between incumbent firms) along with fiercer price competition. Previous research has usually concentrated on the zero-profit equilibrium, at which there is normally excessive entry, and so an entry tax would improve the allocation of resources. At the other extreme, the equilibrium with the greatest rent per firm normally entails insufficient entry, so an entry subsidy should be prescribed. A model of sequential firm entry (with an exogenous order of moves) resolves the multiplicity problem but raises a new difficulty: firms that enter earlier can expect higher spatial rents, and so firms prefer to be earlier in the entry order. This tension disappears when firms can compete for entry positions. We therefore suppose that firms can commit capital early to the market in order to lay claim to a particular location. This temporal competition dissipates spatial rents in equilibrium and justifies the sequential move structure. However, the policy implications are quite different once time is introduced. An atemporal analysis of the sequential entry process would prescribe an entry subsidy, but once proper account is taken of the entry dynamics, a tax may be preferable.
Spatial Competition and Equilibrium in a Circular Market
Title | Spatial Competition and Equilibrium in a Circular Market PDF eBook |
Author | Andreas Kopp |
Publisher | |
Pages | 32 |
Release | 1993 |
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ISBN |
Price-response Asymmetry and Spatial Differentiation in Local Retail Gasoline Markets
Title | Price-response Asymmetry and Spatial Differentiation in Local Retail Gasoline Markets PDF eBook |
Author | Jeremy A. Verlinda |
Publisher | |
Pages | 64 |
Release | 2007 |
Genre | Gasoline |
ISBN |
Asymmetric Information and the Market Structure of the Banking Industry
Title | Asymmetric Information and the Market Structure of the Banking Industry PDF eBook |
Author | Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia |
Publisher | International Monetary Fund |
Pages | 32 |
Release | 1998-06-01 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 145195154X |
The paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi-period model of spatial competition. All lenders face uncertainty with regard to borrowers’ creditworthiness, but, in the process of lending, incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients, acquiring an advantage over potential entrants. These informational asymmetries are an important determinant of the industry structure and may represent a barrier to entry for new banks. The paper shows that, in contrast with traditional models of horizontal differentiation, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of fixed costs.
Market Definition with Differentiated Products
Title | Market Definition with Differentiated Products PDF eBook |
Author | |
Publisher | |
Pages | 258 |
Release | 2009 |
Genre | |
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