A comprehensive assessment of Soviet relations with the West, set in the context of the emergence of a new Russia. This volume anlayzes the formulation of foreign policy during the period from the first decade of the Bolshevik Revolution, through the gradual erosion of ideological differences.

The purpose of this treatise is to give a brief account of Soviet foreign policy from the moment of the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 to the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Second World War, in June, 1941.

Gorbachev’s Gamble offers a new and more convincing answer to this question by providing the missing link between the internal and external aspects of Gorbachev’s perestroika. Andrei Grachev shows that the radical transformation of Soviet foreign policy during the Gorbachev years was an integral part of an ambitious project of internal democratic reform and of the historic opening of Soviet society to the outside world. Grachev explains the motives and the intentions of the initiators of this project and describes their hopes and their illusions. He recounts the story of the internal debates and struggles in the Kremlin and behind-the-scene decisions that led to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and eventually the demise of the Soviet Union itself. The book is based on exclusive interviews with the leaders of the Soviet Union including Gorbachev, personal notes and diaries of their assistants and advisers and transcripts of the discussions inside the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee. Together they constitute a multi-voice political confession of a whole generation of decision-makers of the Soviet Union that enables us better to understand the origin and the breathtaking trajectory of the events that led to the end of the Cold War and the unprecedented transformation of world politics in the closing decades of the 20th century.

Since the sudden collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe in 1989, scholars have tried to explain why the Soviet Union stood by and watched as its empire crumbled. The recent release of extensive archival documentation in Moscow and the appearance of an increasing number of Soviet political memoirs now offer a greater perspective on this historic process and permit a much deeper look into its causes. The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy is a comprehensive study detailing the collapse of Soviet control in Eastern Europe between 1968 and 1989, focusing especially on the pivotal Solidarity uprisings in Poland. Based heavily on firsthand testimony and fresh archival findings, it constitutes a fundamental reassessment of Soviet foreign policy during this period. Perhaps most important, it offers a surprising account of how Soviet foreign policy initiatives in the late Brezhnev era defined the parameters of Mikhail Gorbachev's later position of laissez-faire toward Eastern Europe--a position that ultimately led to the downfall of socialist governments all over Europe.

Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, first published in 1962, reviews the constants and variables in the Soviet international course after Stalin. It examines the legacy of Stalin’s policy of Soviet imperialism, and how much his foreign policy was followed by his successors. It looks at the period of transition, the uprisings in Europe, the new Soviet course toward the ‘uncommitted nations’, Sino-Soviet relations, the ascent of Khrushchev and the stiffening of the Soviet view toward the West.

This textbook examines Soviet thinking in the economic, political and military spheres, linking domestic and foreign policies. Part One describes the evolution of its foreign policy; Part Two, details the impact it had on the rest of the world (by region).

Exploring Soviet and Russian history and politics, The Uses of History brings together the classic essays of renowned scholar Alexander Dallin. The author provides insightful analysis and nuanced interpretations of such key--and controversial--issues as the domestic sources of Soviet foreign policy, Stalin's leadership in World War II, U.S.-Russian relations in the Reagan era, the causes of USSR's collapse, and the disappointments of Russia's post-Soviet evolution. Dallin rejects single-factor explanations for Soviet and Russian policies, instead examining the complex interplay of internal and external conditions, institutions, and individual leadership. All readers interested in Soviet and post-Soviet history will find this collection a stimulating and deeply knowledgeable resource.