Osprey's study of Soviet riflemen during the portion of World War II from 22 June 1941 to 9 May 1945, known as the Great Patriotic War. In the first four months of the war the The Red Army did not refer to its ground combat troops as "infantry" but as "rifle troops" (streltsi), dating back to the Czarist era when rifle units were considered more elite than rank-and-file infantry (pyekhoty). The Soviet rifleman initially suffered defeats and retreat during the early desperate days of the Great Patriotic War, then rallied to conduct a stubborn defense in the brutal winter of 1941/42, and eventually turned the tables at the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk. This title provides a view of the Soviet rifleman in defeat and victory, on the defensive and in attack, and in the heat of the summer and the frozen brutality of the Russian Winter. Their political beliefs, motivation, training, everyday life, weaponry and equipment are examined, accompanied by rare photographs and full color artwork.

The Axis invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 pitted Nazi Germany and her allies against Stalin's forces in a mighty struggle for survival. Fighting alongside the spearhead Panzer divisions were Germany's highly skilled and veteran motorized infantrymen – including the German Army's premier unit, Infanterie-Regiment (mot.) Großdeutschland. Opposing these German mobile forces, the Soviets deployed the often ill-trained and poorly equipped men of the rifle regiments, who fought tenaciously and with the threat of savage reprisals from their own side. In this book three bruising clashes during the first seven weeks of the campaign are assessed – a bloody encounter battle at Zhlobin, the struggle for the destroyed city of Smolensk and then a prolonged clash along a dangerously stretched German defensive perimeter at Vas'kovo–Voroshilovo.

Fully illustrated, this study assesses the Soviet and Waffen-SS troops who contested the cities of Kharkov and Rostov-on-Don on the Eastern Front during 1942–43. As the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union unfolded, two places that suffered exceptionally severely were Kharkov (now Kharkiv) in Ukraine and Rostov-on-Don in Russia. In total, Kharkov would change hands violently four times between October 1941 and August 1943, and Rostov-on-Don also four times between November 1941 and February 1943. In this book, Chris McNab examines the fighting men of the Red Army and the Waffen-SS who clashed in three battles – one for Rostov (July 1942) and two for Kharkov (February–March and August). He clearly explains the key differences between these two opponents – training, tactics, weaponry, ideology and motivation – and examines how these differences played out in the three engagements, which ranged from open-terrain combined-arms battles to close-quarters street fighting in major urban zones. The text is complemented by specially commissioned artwork and mapping and carefully chosen archive photographs.

On 26 June 1941, unidentified bombers attacked the Hungarian town of Kassa, prompting Hungary to join its Axis partners in Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union. Hungary's contribution to Barbarossa was designated the Carpathian Group, its most powerful component being the Mobile Corps, which fielded motorized rifle, cavalry, bicycle and light armoured troops. The Hungarians faced Soviet forces belonging to the Kiev Military District, deployed in four armies along a 940km-long front. On the defeated side in World War I, Hungary had seen its borders redrawn and its armed forces constrained by treaty, but was determined to recover territories lost to adjoining countries. When Hungary decided to participate in Operation Barbarossa, however, the Royal Hungarian Army was deployed in the Soviet Union and not against its neighbours. Meanwhile, the Red Army, while remaining among the most formidable armies of the era, had been seriously weakened by successive purges, its shortcomings exposed by the Winter War against Finland in 1939–40. During the opening battles (4–13 July), the Hungarian motorized rifle and armoured units clashed with the withdrawing Red Army forces. In the battle for Uman (15 July–8 August) the Hungarians blocked the Soviet troops' efforts to break out from encirclement. During the Hungarian defensive operation at the River Dniepr (30 August–6 October), counter-attacking Soviet units exerted heavy pressure on the defending Hungarians. Both sides would seek to draw lessons from these opening battles as the war in the East continued to rage into 1942. Fully illustrated, this book investigates the Hungarian and Soviet soldiers who fought in three battles of the Barbarossa campaign, casting new light on the role played by the forces of Nazi Germany's allies on the Eastern Front.

A fully illustrated survey of the Soviet infantryman on the Eastern Front in World War II. The Soviet Army was ill-prepared for its ally’s treacherous onslaught in 1941. Its officer corps decimated by Stalin’s purges and its men less well-trained than the Germans, the Red Army was poorly led, hampered by the power of the political officers and only partly mobilized. But, in spite of the huge German victories and the speed of the Nazi attack, the Soviets proved fantastically capable of rolling with the punches. The vast territory of the Soviet Union and huge population were significant, as was substantial assistance from the West—the United States and Britain in particular—which was in evidence when the German columns got to within a few miles short of Moscow and were held and then forced back. The tide turned thanks to help from outside and the efforts of the Soviet soldiers, who proved hardy and durable. And just like its soldiers, Russian infantry equipment was rugged and effective. While Soviet infantrymen may not have had the flexibility or tactical nous of the Germans, they did not lack cunning: deception, camouflage skills and endurance made Russian snipers, as an example, more than the equal of the Germans. Most of the views of the Soviet soldier and campaign are influenced by self-serving German postwar accounts designed to excuse their loss by suggesting that Adolf Hitler’s meddling and Soviet numbers were the main reasons for victory: this denigrates the Russian infantryman whose toughness and ingenuity helped destroy the Third Reich in spite of the faults of its own regime. Fully illustrated with over 150 contemporary photographs and illustrations, Soviet Infantryman on the Eastern Front in the Casemate Illustrated series provides an insight into the Soviets’ main theater of operations in World War II.

From June 1941, the Soviets were forced to undertake large-scale defensive operations in the face of the overwhelming German blitzkrieg assault, operations which ran counter to their preference for highly mobile, offensive warfare. Lessons were quickly learned across a wide variety of terrain and climates, including the open steppes, dense forests, wooded swamps, cities, and in snow and ice, where the availability of construction materials differed greatly. The first to cover this topic in the English language and containing detailed information about the trenches, bunkers, observation posts and weapon positions, this book examines field fortifications built from local materials by infantrymen, as well as their use of mines, field camouflage techniques, and construction tools. It provides a first fascinating insight into Russian defensive attempts against the overwhelming might of the German Army.