Prepared as part of a continuing program of research undertaken by the RAND Corporation for United States Air Force Project RAND.

The Russia-Europe relationship is deteriorating, signaling the darkest era yet in security on the continent since the end of the Cold War. In addition, the growing influence of the Trump administration has destabilized the transatlantic security community, compelling Europe—especially the European Union—to rethink its relations with Russia. The volume editors’ primary goal is to illuminate the nature of the deteriorating security relationship between Europe and Russia, and the key implications for its future. While the book is timely, the editors and contributors also draw out long-term lessons from this era of diplomatic degeneration to show how increasing cooperation between two regions can devolve into rapidly escalating conflict. While it is possible that the relationship between Russia and Europe can ultimately be restored, it is also necessary to understand why it was undermined in the first place. The fact that these transformations occur under the backdrop of an uncertain transatlantic relationship makes this investigation all the more pressing. Each chapter in this volume addresses three dimensions of the problem: first, how and why the power status quo that had existed since the end of the Cold War has changed in recent years, as evidenced by Russia’s newly aggressive posturing; second, the extent to which the EU’s power has been enabled or constrained in light of Russia’s actions; and third, the risks entailed in Europe’s reactive power—that is, the tendency to act after-the-fact instead of proactively toward Russia—in light of the transatlantic divide under Trump.

This in-depth exploration of five industries in the Kola Peninsula examines Soviet power and its interaction with the natural world.

An examination of Soviet European policies since 1964. The Brezhnev- Kosygin regime elected to continue Khrushchev's foreign policies, which had been initiated by Stalin to upset the postwar status of Western Europe while preserving it in the East. These policies were primarily aimed at eroding NATO unity and undermining U.S. influence in Europe. However, the USSR failed to stem the erosion of Soviet control in the East without resort to force. Although the Soviets suffered several disadvantages from invading Czechoslovakia in 1968, the invasion helped them to (1) reestablish Soviet military credibility; (2) destroy Czech and similar reform movements; (3) deploy more troops in the Warsaw Pact's northern area; and (4) remind West Germany that the USSR controls negotiations with the East. With the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global military power in the late sixties, Soviet leaders might be tempted to pursue bolder policies. The forthcoming strategic arms limitation talks may serve to clarify Soviet intent.

The monumental events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union must be understood, Jan Van Oudenaren argues, in the context of a process of East-West détente begun in 1953 in the aftermath of Stalin's death. Van Oudenaren's comprehensive and timely study examines the development of Soviet-Western détente from the death of Stalin to the unification of Germany. In redefining détente as a process, rather than a code of conduct, Van Oudenaren looks to its origins in Soviet policy earlier than previously identified and analyzes both its history and character. His study explores the restoration of four-power negotiations in Germany and Austria in the mid-1950s, their subsequent breakdown in the Berlin crisis, their unexpected revival in 1990 in the form of "two plus four" talks on German unity, and the future of the Soviet Union as a European power. Among the key elements of détente discussed are diplomacy, particularly the role of summit conferences; cooperation among parliaments, political parties, and trade unions; arms control; economic relations; and links among cultural institutions, churches, and peace movements.

An examination of Soviet European policies since 1964. The Brezhnev- Kosygin regime elected to continue Khrushchev's foreign policies, which had been initiated by Stalin to upset the postwar status of Western Europe while preserving it in the East. These policies were primarily aimed at eroding NATO unity and undermining U.S. influence in Europe. However, the USSR failed to stem the erosion of Soviet control in the East without resort to force. Although the Soviets suffered several disadvantages from invading Czechoslovakia in 1968, the invasion helped them to (1) reestablish Soviet military credibility; (2) destroy Czech and similar reform movements; (3) deploy more troops in the Warsaw Pact's northern area; and (4) remind West Germany that the USSR controls negotiations with the East. With the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global military power in the late sixties, Soviet leaders might be tempted to pursue bolder policies. The forthcoming strategic arms limitation talks may serve to clarify Soviet intent.

The familiar story of Soviet power in Cold War Eastern Europe focuses on political repression and military force. But in Empire of Friends, Rachel Applebaum shows how the Soviet Union simultaneously promoted a policy of transnational friendship with its Eastern Bloc satellites to create a cohesive socialist world. This friendship project resulted in a new type of imperial control based on cross-border contacts between ordinary citizens. In a new and fascinating story of cultural diplomacy, interpersonal relations, and the trade of consumer-goods, Applebaum tracks the rise and fall of the friendship project in Czechoslovakia, as the country evolved after World War II from the Soviet Union's most loyal satellite to its most rebellious. Throughout Eastern Europe, the friendship project shaped the most intimate aspects of people's lives, influencing everything from what they wore to where they traveled to whom they married. Applebaum argues that in Czechoslovakia, socialist friendship was surprisingly durable, capable of surviving the ravages of Stalinism and the Soviet invasion that crushed the 1968 Prague Spring. Eventually, the project became so successful that it undermined the very alliance it was designed to support: as Soviets and Czechoslovaks got to know one another, they discovered important cultural and political differences that contradicted propaganda about a cohesive socialist world. Empire of Friends reveals that the sphere of everyday life was central to the construction of the transnational socialist system in Eastern Europe—and, ultimately, its collapse.