Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 signalled the beginning of significant improvements in Soviet-Israeli relations--thoroughly examined in this carefully researched volume. Based on an analysis of Soviet behavior and interviews with Israeli and Soviet Foreign Ministry officials and PLO leaders, this study describes how eased tensions between the Soviet Union and Israel have been achieved and analyzes the Soviet Union's reasons for advancing diplomatic relations with Israel. Robert Owen Freedman follows the progress of Soviet policy from the 1985 meeting between the Soviet and Israeli ambassadors to France, to the 1987 arrival of the Soviet consular delegation in Israel, which heralded rapid improvement on the diplomatic front, to the 1989 trade agreements, cultural, academic, and athletic exchanges, and the 1990 political meetings between high ranking officials. Freedman identifies three primary goals that motivated these Soviet initiatives towards Israel: a desire to improve relations with the United States; a desire to play a major role in Middle East diplomacy; and a desire for trade with Israel. Both meticulously documented and forward-looking, the conclusions reached can stimulate discussion and provide a basis for further study for members of the academic, political, and diplomatic communities.

This is a comprehensive study of Soviet policies in the Middle East. Concentrating on policy developments, Professor Golan analyses the major Soviet decisions and objectives from the end of World War II to the Gorbachev era. She pays particular attention to the wars and crises of recent years and the often problematic development of political relationships in the region. Professor Golan begins by demonstrating how, until the end of the Brezhnev period, Soviet policies towards the Middle East were principally influenced by the demands of superpower competition with the USA. This is followed by a series of broadly chronological case studies of the main Soviet alliances, such as Syria and South Yemen; and of Sadat's Egypt and Khomeni's Iran. This original and important book culminates in a study of Gorbachev's interests, initiatives, and 'new thinking' in relation to overall Soviet foreign policy objectives and the role of the Soviet Union in the region.

This study examines the changes in Soviet foreign policy that Mikhail Gorbachev has introduced as "new thinking." In particular, it considers the application of new thinking to the Middle East, distinguishing between continuity and change, and, particularly, the tactical as distinct from the essential nature of this change. The analysis focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the role of the Palestinians, and Soviet-Syrian relations. It also discusses the evolution of the Soviet position on the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet Union's relations with the Persian Gulf states. The author concludes that the Soviets have not entirely abandoned their interests in the Middle East, but have adopted a more flexible stance that fits in with the new thinking.

This is a case study of Soviet foreign policy towards a Third World regional conflict over the past 40 years, from the Stalin era to the advent of the Gorbachev era. While dealing at length with Cold War, détente and post-détente phases of Soviet involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, some perennial questions relating to the nature and conduct of Soviet foreign policy have been poignantly addressed. The theme of its progressive de-radicalization and eventual de-decolonization has been brought into bold relief. There is thus very little evidence to suggest that in this area the USSR has been consistently acting from an ideological grand design. Rather, its diplomacy most often appears to be reactive to events and responsive to opportunities. Soviet policy in this region appears to be conservative, ambivalent, shifting and compromising, rather than an adventurism or overtly revisionist policy. This synoptic but closely reasoned and lucidly written book will provide the reader with deep insights into the interventionist behaviour of a super-power in a Third World regional setting.

“[Matlock’s] account of Reagan’s achievement as the nation’s diplomat in chief is a public service.”—The New York Times Book Review “Engrossing . . . authoritative . . . a detailed and reliable narrative that future historians will be able to draw on to illuminate one of the most dramatic periods in modern history.”—Los Angeles Times Book Review In Reagan and Gorbachev, Jack F. Matlock, Jr., a former U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and principal adviser to Ronald Reagan on Soviet and European affairs, gives an eyewitness account of how the Cold War ended. Working from his own papers, recent interviews with major figures, and unparalleled access to the best and latest sources, Matlock offers an insider’s perspective on a diplomatic campaign far more sophisticated than previously thought, waged by two leaders of surpassing vision. Matlock details how Reagan privately pursued improved U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations even while engaging in public saber rattling. When Gorbachev assumed leadership, however, Reagan and his advisers found a willing partner in peace. Matlock shows how both leaders took risks that yielded great rewards and offers unprecedented insight into the often cordial working relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev. Both epic and intimate, Reagan and Gorbachev will be the standard reference on the end of the Cold War, a work that is critical to our understanding of the present and the past.