This new study analyzes Soviet political and economic policies toward East Germany from 1945 to 1955, focusing on the transition from ambivalence to support. In her introduction Phillips outlines the postwar situation and reviews differing interpretations of Soviet policy. She reviews the issues of postwar settlement relating to East Germany and describes the conflicts within the Soviet leadership over German policy. Discussing Soviet economic exploitation of Germany and the harsh reparations policy, she contrasts these developments with the relatively moderate Soviet policies of socialization implemented in the same period, including improved consumption, economic aid, and toleration of private trade and production. She analyzes the factors that undermined the stability of the Ulbricht regime and culminated in the June 1953 uprising, creating an abrupt change of direction in Soviet policy toward the German Democratic Republic and East European bloc that existed prior to 1953. She argues that Soviet policies during the immediate postwar period were ambivalent, serving a mix of political and economic goals that were often incompatible, and that the Soviet commitment to incorporate East Germany into the Soviet bloc was not evident until after mid-1953.

Das Buch ist eine Analyse von Aufstieg und Fall des sowjetischen Herrschaftssystems in dem Gebiet, das zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges "Osteuropa" genannt wurde, und der Rolle, die das Deutschlandproblem dabei gespielt hat. Gestützt auf die Auswertung neuer Quellen aus den Partei- und Staatsarchiven ehemals kommunistischerer Länder rekonstruiert es die folgende Entwicklung: die Teilung Deutschlands und dabei die Rolle der Sowjetunion unter Stalin; das eiserne Festhalten seiner Nachfolger an der Teilung; ihr zunehmendes Bewusstsein der hohen Kosten, welche die Aufrechterhaltung des imperialen Systems in Ostmitteleuropa verursachte; der Fehlschlag ihrer Anstrengungen, die wachsende wirtschaftliche und finanzielle Abhängigkeit der DDR von der Bundesrepublik zu verhindern; und schließlich die Gründe dafür, warum Gorbatschow die Auflösung des sowjetischen Herrschaftsbereichs in Ostmitteleuropa hinnahm und sogar der Mitgliedschaft des wiedervereinigten Deutschlands in der Nato zustimmte."Angesichts der russischen Okkupation der Krim, der anhaltenden Krise in der Ostukraine und der dadurch ausgelösten Gegenreaktionen von NATO und EU scheint sich der Kalte Krieg in Europa zurückgemeldet zu haben. Geeigneter kann der Zeitpunkt für die überarbeitete Neuauflage des sich inzwischen zu einem Standardwerk entwickelten Buches von Hannes Adomeit nicht sein. Seine profunde Kenntnis und Auseinandersetzung mit sowjetischer und russischer Politik seit fünf Jahrzehnten und sein Zugang zu neuem russischen Archivmaterial qualifiziert ihn zu einem der besten und erfahrensten Experten auf internationaler Ebene. Wer die sowjetische Politik nach dem II. Weltkrieg bis zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands und ihre Implikationen für die letzten 25 Jahre verstehen will, kommt an Adomeits Buch und seiner analytischen Brillanz nicht vorbei". Prof. Dr. h.c. Horst Teltschik, September 2015 "Of all of the analyses of the fall of the Soviet Union and reunification of Germany, Hannes Adomeit's 1998 classic, "Imperial Overstretch", has stood the test of time. Its re-publication here by Nomos, with some modest updates by the author, will be welcomed by scholars, students, the policy community, and the informed public, as a trenchant interpretation of what happened to the 'Soviet bloc', but also as an introduction to the assertive imperial politics of Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federation." Norman M. Naimark, Stanford University, November 2015

"This article [examines] ... recent disclosures about Soviet decionmaking towards Germany in the period from Stalin's death in March 1953 until Beria's arrest in late June of that same year. Many historians and political scientists have wondered if there might have been a chance during this short period to reunify Germany more than thirty years before Gorbachev came to power"--Page 1.

The Warsaw Pact is generally regarded as a mere instrument of Soviet power. In the 1960s the alliance nevertheless evolved into a multilateral alliance, in which the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members gained considerable scope for manoeuvre. This book examines to what extent the Warsaw Pact inadvertently provided its members with an opportunity to assert their own interests, emancipate themselves from the Soviet grip, and influence Soviet bloc policy. Laurien Crump traces this development through six thematic case studies, which deal with such well known events as the building of the Berlin Wall, the Sino-Soviet Split, the Vietnam War, the nuclear question, and the Prague Spring. By interpreting hitherto neglected archival evidence from archives in Berlin, Bucharest, and Rome, and approaching the Soviet alliance from a radically novel perspective, the book offers unexpected insights into international relations in Eastern Europe, while shedding new light on a pivotal period in the Cold War.

Stalinism Revisited brings together representatives of multiple generations to create a rich examination of the study and practice of Stalinism. While the articles are uniformly excellent, the book's signal contribution is to bring recent research from Eastern European scholars to an English-speaking audience. Thus the volume is not just a "state of the discipline" collection, in which articles are collected to reflect that current situation of scholarship in a given field; instead, this one includes cutting edge scholarship that will prompt more of the same from other scholars in other fields/subfields. I would recommend this book highly to anyone interested in understanding the technology of Stalinism in both thought and practice. Nick Miller Boise State University The Sovietization of post-1945 East-Central Europe---marked by the forceful imposition of the Soviet-type society in the region---was a process of massive socio-political and cultural transformation. Despite its paramount importance for understanding the nature of the communist regime and its legacy, the communist take-over in East Central European countries has remained largely under-researched. Two decades after the collapse of the communist system, Stalinism Revisited brings together a remarkable international team of established and younger scholars, engaging them in a critical re-evaluation of the institutionalization of communist regimes in East-Central Europe and of the period of "high Stalinism." Sovietization is approached not as a fully pre-determined, homogeneous, and monolithic transformation, but as a set of trans-national, multifaceted, and inter-related processes of large-scale institutional and ideological transfers, made up of multiple "takeovers" in various fields. Theoretically minded and empirically sound, the collection adds key elements to our comparative understanding of Stalinist regimes in their various historical permutations. The richness of the source material employed and its comparative scope recommend Stalinism Revisited as a major, synthetic contribution to the study of East-Central Europe's Sovietization. Constantin lordachi Central European University, Budapest

This book examines Soviet Foreign Policy towards East Germany in the late 1980s. By focusing on the complex interaction between domestic political thought and developments in the international system, the author illustrates the hierarchical relationship between the GDR and the USSR and offers different perspectives for understanding Soviet foreign policy. The books demonstrates that shifts in Soviet policy towards the GDR stemmed, on the one hand, from the international level, in that Soviet security was legitimated by the existence of two full-fledged German states, and, on the other, may be best explained in terms of ideas and Gorbachev’s new political philosophy.​

The Cold War was a unique international conflict partly because Josef Stalin sought socialist transformation of other countries rather than simply the traditional objectives. This intriguing book, based on recently accessible Soviet primary sources, is the first to explain the emergence of the Cold War and its development in Stalin's lifetime from the perspective of Soviet policy-making. The book pays particular attention to the often-neglected "societal" dimension of Soviet foreign policy as a crucial element of the genesis and development of the Cold War. It is also the first to put German postwar development into the context of Soviet Cold War policy. Stalin vainly tried to mobilize the Germans with slogans of national unity and then to discredit the West among the Germans by forcing the surrender of Berlin. Further attempts to prevail deadlocked him into a confrontation with the newly united Western powers. Comparing Stalin's internal statements with Soviet actions, Gerhard Wettig draws original conclusions about Stalin's meta-plans for the regions of Germany and Eastern Europe. This fascinating look at Soviet politics during the Cold War provides readers with new insights into Stalin's willingness to initiate crisis with the West while still avoiding military conflict.