Since the late 1970s the Red Sea has become extremely important both in international politics and regional affairs. This situation came about because of the growing Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa and Saudi efforts to have the Red Sea treated as an ‘Arab Lake’. This book, first published in 1985, examines the development of the Red Sea as a significant problem in superpower relations and assesses its relative importance in the context of other conflicts in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Third World. It analyses Soviet interests in the Red Sea area and examines its record in seeking to intervene in the domestic politics of the region. The book also discusses the degree of regional stability in the Red Sea both in terms of inter-Arab relations and Afro-Arab regulations. This issue is considered against the background of the security of the Nile valley. In conclusion the book argues that Saudi Arabia’s regional policies aimed at enhancing internal and external security have proved destabilizing and in a way even adventurous. By fermenting Somali nationalism Saudi Arabia hoped to push the Soviets out of the Red Sea. In fact this policy reinforced the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s regular interference in the domestic affairs of North Yemen may well prove extremely counter-productive. The book argues that the West’s preoccupation with the region would lessen considerably if Saudi Arabia and Egypt would promote policies of cooperation, rather than destabilization at both inter-Arab and Afro-Arab levels.

The Red Sea basin lies within a region syllogized variously as the 'arc of instability, ' the 'crescent of crises' and the 'crumbling triangle.' Regardless of the metaphor utilized, this volatile cul-de-sac pulses with instability. The pattern of Soviet strategy that emerges for the Red Sea basin indicates not a grand design, but rather an attempt to manage regional instability in accordance with Russian national interests. Destabilizing events provide Moscow with targets of opportunity which are selectively exploited to achieve foreign policy goals. These goals are strategic, political and economic in nature. Naval diplomacy implemented by the maturing Soviet Navy comprises an essential and, at times, decisive element of the overall strategy for the Red Sea basin. Frequently, the Soviet military assistance program, assiduously cultivated in the region, provides the exploitive vehicle with which to capitalize on targets of opportunity generated by the persistent patterns of instability. Moscow's strategy for the Red Sea basin is supported by the major components of the Soviet bureaucracy: defense and heavy industries, armed forces, fishing and maritime fleets and ideological agencies. It is unlikely to change in the aftermath of the Brezhnev succession. (Author).

Study is part of William R. Kintner's (editor) forthcoming volume on Soviet policy along the Black Sea-Vladivostok maritime route.

This book examines the international politics of the Red Sea region from the Cold War to the present. It argues that the Red Sea region demonstrates well the characteristics of a sub-regional system, with increasing economic and social interdependence, greater regional integration, with the stronger regional powers – Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia – seeking to establish their influence over the sub-region, and with all states forming regional alliances to protect their interests and to fend off possible encroachment of others.

Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente with the US induced Moscow to restrainthat a US-Moscow détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.