"Here Winkler argues that in contrast to conventional diplomatic channels, Soviet and American naval offices, sharing bonds inherent in seamen, were able to put ideology aside and speak frankly. Working together, they limited incidents that might have had unfortunate consequences."--BOOK JACKET.

Great friendship existed between the United States and Imperial Russia during the nineteenth century. The Old World Russian autocracy supported the young New World democracy because of the emerging U.S. role as a bulwark against Great Britain's ambitions, in Asia and in the North Pacific Ocean region especially. In fact, when the American Civil War threatened to divide the United States, Russia alone among the European great powers gave no aid or comfort to the seceding states. The surprise 1863 arrival of squadrons of Russian warships and thousands of Russian sailors in New York and San Francisco proved fortuitous, coming when the Union feared British and French intervention on the Confederacy's behalf. C. Douglas Kroll, using both Russian and U.S. documents, investigates why the Russian Pacific Squadron came to San Francisco, a port of departure for California and Nevada gold headed east; what happened during its nearly year-long visit; and how its presence influenced events. With the units of the U.S. Navy's small Pacific Squadron widely dispersed and Confederate commerce raiders on the loose, the Russians' arrival suggested to on-lookers that they intended to defend the Union against interference. Whether actively supporting the Union or training and refitting or both, the Russian officers and sailors endeared themselves to San Francisco's citizens. Parades and balls, as well as dinners hosted by both sides, helped San Franciscans overlook the various differences they had with their Russian visitors. Kroll gives us a thorough examination of the Russians' visit and its social, diplomatic, and military impact.

George examines seven cases--from Pearl Harbor to the Persian Gulf--in which the United States has used coercive diplomacy in the past half-century.

This book offers a detailed investigation of naval diplomacy, past and present, and challenges the widely accepted Anglo-American school of sea power thought. Despite the acknowledgement of the importance of the threat or use of force in the pursuit of policy since the dawn of strategic thought, the utility of seapower in operations other than war is poorly understood and articulated. Theorists have invariably viewed seapower in peacetime through the lens of hard power effects such as coercion and deterrence. Commentaries on engagement, interoperability and the forging of friendships are largely conspicuous by their absence. This book considers how all these strands of international politics can be better understood for use in the 21st century. The book explains and defines naval diplomacy, with existing theoretical frameworks being critically analysed. It reviews over 500 incidents from the post-Cold War era, drawing on this empirical evidence to determine that naval diplomacy remains a potent means of 21st century statecraft. It finds that existing understanding of naval diplomacy is insufficient and offers an alternative model, drawing on basic communication and stakeholder theories. The implications of the book relate directly to national security: naval deployments could be more effectively targeted; foreign activity at sea could be better understood and, if necessary, countered; finally, the ability of non-state actors to support national interests from the sea could, potentially, be better harnessed. This book will be of much interest to students of naval power, maritime security, strategic studies and International Relations.

`James Cable's book...has deservedly remained the classic work' - Geoffrey Till, International Relations`...a classic work in the modern literature on naval power...This third edition is to be welcomed, not only because it increases the book's availability but because Cable's revisions highlight the increased relevance of the topic.' - Michael Pugh, Journal of Strategic Studies When Gunboat Diplomacy was first published in 1971, it broke new ground with its study of how, in peacetime and in the twentieth century, governments used their naval forces in international disputes. Now fully revised and brought up to date after the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the cold war, this third edition of a book that was already a modern classic has a foreword by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald.